Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

795.00/2–2852: Telegram

No. 507
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Department of Defense

secret

Tokyo, February 11, 1952—12:55 a.m.

C 63311. Frank Nash from Earl Johnson. Department distribution only. Reurmsg DA 900472.¹ Optimistic estimate negotiations will be completed 16.

Re progress Article 22 have not receded from Dept position. However, realistic appraisal in my opinion, there is only limited chance that Japanese will accept principle of unilateral action and then only as it is nec for protection of US Armed Forces. Any other action including defense of Japan by US Forces they insist must embody principle of consultation.

Your attention invited Rusk’s Serial Cable no 14² to Sec State re Article 22 which sets forth problem of negotiation succinctly and fairly. Subsequent discussions confirm appraisal set forth therein. Dept should realize that bulk of our arguments have been presented. While additional pressure may result in inclusion of principles set forth our draft Article 22. The political powers in Japan most friendly to United States may be unseated if they agree. Moreover, if we succeed in inclusion of our principle on this basis, we may lose our cause, for as practical matter it would only be effective to degree Japanese are willing to allow it to be.

Do not know degree to which Dept position is to be held in order to achieve a world posture for reasons of German negotiations. However, desire to call your attention to following:

(a) Japanese since peace conference have been encouraged to and have assumed full sovereignty in negotiations, latest example, fisheries pact.

(b) Japanese fully informed on and unhesitatingly and cleverly exploiting their strategic position in relation to NATO, etc.

(c) Japanese thoroughly aware US domestic political situation, the home sensitivities it produces, and momentum presently behind ratification of treaties.

(d) Japanese either purposely insensitive to or interpret differently than we do the threat to their independence contained in Korean affair and lack of self defensive strength.

Suggest for your urgent consideration following:

(a) Article 22 paragraph 1 as finally approved before departing throws whole subject of defense measures in time of imminently threatened or actual hostilities back into security treaty language. In effect, grants US nothing it does not already have under that treaty.

(b) Paragraph 2 is really a vestigial remnant of what was once basis of authority for US exercising unilateral option on establishing a combined command and naming commander. As finally written, option was eliminated and was made subject to agreement. As practical matter, it gives US nothing would not have without the paragraph.

(c) Trend of negotiations indicates if pressure for unilateral action in paragraph 1 continued, Japanese will probably insist on answers to such possibly embarrassing questions as:

(1) What are our plans if Korean truce negotiations fail and what will Japan’s position be?

(2) What size and composition of forces do we plan in Far East?

(3) What exactly is meant by “Japan area”?

My instructions prior departure these questions were to be avoided.

(d) Accession to Japanese demand for inclusion of consultation principle will in sense impose restrictions on rights granted under security treaty.

Request Dept advise on which is preferred course, assuming foregoing observations prove correct:

(a) Continue to press for original position and be prepared to answer embarrassing questions.

(b) Accept Japanese amendment providing diluted version.

(c) Rely on security treaty language and eliminate completely Article 22 from adm agreement.

For your information, my personal observation is that Ambassador Rusk has held shrewdly and consistently to agreed to position and will employ every possible argument for obtaining desired position.

1. See footnote 2, Document 495.
2. Telegram 1649 from Tokyo, Document 500.