Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–852

No. 503
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] February 9, 1952.

Subject:

• Collective Defense Measures with Japan

Problem

We have received two telegrams from Mr. Rusk¹ dealing with Article XXII of the Administrative Agreement which describes the collective defense measures which may be taken “in the event of hostilities or imminently threatened hostilities in the Japan area”. He requests a United States Government position as to whether we press for the language in our present draft or authorize modifications of it to meet the Japanese viewpoint.

Background

Article XXII constituted one of the major points of difference between State and Defense, and it seemed likely that the decision would have to be put up to the President. However, agreement was finally reached to present to the Japanese a draft of Article XXII which provides for a unilateral United States determination as to whether an emergency exists and for the abrogation of the imposed by the Administrative Agreement if necessary to carry out the purposes of Article I of the security Treaty and to ensure the security of United States forces. A combined Command with a United States Commander may be established by agreement with the Government of Japan.

Current Negotiations With the Japanese

The Japanese have in these negotiations been taking the kind of position that might be expected of a friendly sovereign nation. They have informally expressed their willingness to do all that we ask in our draft of the Administrative Agreement. However, because of domestic political difficulties they cannot in a public document subscribe to some of the commitments which we have requested them to make. This situation applies particularly to Article XXII. There has been great public concern in Japan over such questions as our possible use of Japanese bases for atomic attacks upon China or Russia and possible commitments for the use of Japanese forces. In our opinion, the Japanese are not overestimating their domestic problem when they say that the provision for the virtual abrogation of the limitations of the Agreement in an emergency situation would undoubtedly create the impression among the Japanese people that the Agreement is a “mere scrap of paper”.

The Japanese have put forward as their proposal the following simple statement:

“In the event of hostilities, or imminently threatened hostilities, in the Japan area, the Governments of Japan and the United States shall immediately consult together with a view to taking necessary measures to carry out the purpose of Article I of the Security Treaty.”

This language does not give us a clear right to take necessary measures to meet an emergency situation, and therefore will be unsatisfactory to the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Rusk, with Earl Johnson’s concurrence, says that the following should be the chief elements of our position:

(a) The limitations of the Administrative Agreement should not apply in an emergency.

(b) The United States forces must act in an emergency to carry out the purposes of the Security Treaty and to provide for their own security.

(c) We should accept the principle of consultation on joint measures which the United States and Japan might agree to take in an emergency.

Mr. Rusk suggests that we may find it both necessary and desirable to go one step further and agree to consultation even with respect to measures taken by the United States, since such consultation would inevitably have to be undertaken even though we could not make our necessary action subject to its results. He also points out that in the negotiations we still have major difficulties with respect to facilities and areas, the sharing of expenses, and jurisdiction. His belief is that we should not utilize our ammunition on this article.

The last attachment² is a draft of language which might be a reasonable compromise. I have talked with Frank Nash about this subject, and he believes that it may be possible to find a middle ground which will be acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he is giving our suggested language some further consideration.

Recommendation

The United States Government should authorize Mr. Rusk to accept the principle of consultation even with respect to the measures the United States forces must take in an emergency. It should be left to Mr. Rusk’s discretion to achieve the best possible result on Article XXII and the greatest advantage in the negotiations from whatever concession is made to the Japanese viewpoint. The chief reasons for the adoption of this recommendation follow:

1. Consultation with the Japanese, even in an emergency, is inevitable and would in any event be undertaken practically simultaneously with action to meet the emergency.

2. United States interests are probably best protected by avoiding public disclosure in the Agreement of the full extent of Japanese willingness to cooperate with us in the event of an emergency. Yoshida’s best line now might be that these matters can most appropriately be left to further consideration and consultation between the two Governments.

3. However sweeping the language of the Agreement, it means nothing unless we have the full and willing support of the Japanese Government and people.

4. We need the support of the present Japanese Government for many measures which are unpopular in Japan—rearmament, reparations, restrictions on trade with mainland China, and facilities and areas for our forces. We should avoid imposing any further burden upon them unless it is absolutely necessary.

This subject will have to be taken up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but you may wish to discuss with Mr. Lovett the main questions of policy which are involved.

[Attachment]

Article XXII

Defense Measures

This Agreement assumes peace, not war. It assumes that the presence of United States forces in and about Japan will deter attack and prevent hostilities in the Japan area.

If these assumptions should prove not to be the case, and if there should be hostilities or imminently threatened hostilities in the Japan area, a new situation will have arisen the character of which cannot be foreseen, and the Governments of Japan and the United States shall immediately consult together concerning the necessary measures, including appropriate joint measures, to carry out the purposes of Article 1 of the United States–Japan Security Treaty.

In the event of such hostilities or imminently threatened hostilities the Commander of the United States forces in and about Japan will have the inherent rights of a field commander whose forces are subject to hostile attack, to make such disposition of his forces in and about Japan as he may judge to be required for their safety and the performance of their mission.

1. Copies of telegram 1649 and Topad 1651 from Tokyo, Documents 500 and 501, are attached to the source text.

   Other attachments, besides that printed below, include: Article I of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the language of Article XXII from the Jan. 22 draft of the Administrative Agreement, and the original JCS language of Aug. 1951. For text of the last-named draft, see footnote 6, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1283.

2. Printed below.