Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

Dulles files, lot 54 D 243, “United Kingdom”

No. 468
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] January 10, 1952.

Subject:

• Japan’s Relations with China

Participants:

• United States:
  • Secretary Acheson
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Matthews
  • Mr. Perkins
  • Mr. Allison
• United Kingdom:
  • Foreign Minister Eden
  • Sir Oliver Franks
  • Mr. F.S. Tomlinson

The Secretary opened the discussion by referring to a previous brief mention of the matter between the President and Mr. Churchill¹ and the fact that the matter had been referred to Mr. Eden and the Secretary for further discussion and decision. Mr. Dulles was then requested to state his understanding of the situation. He spent some time going over the complete history of the problem of Japan’s relations with China, beginning with the statement Prime Minister Yoshida had made on May 19, 1951, that the Japanese Government under no circumstances desired signature by the Chinese Communist regime to the peace treaty with Japan and that basically the Japanese Government wishes to make peace with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that in all his actions he had been motivated by the desire to keep US–UK policy as close together as possible and at the same time bring about an early ratification of the Japanese peace treaty by the United States Senate.² He emphasized that he had resisted attempts by members of the Senate to take the stand that Japan should at once conclude a peace treaty with Nationalist China and was hopeful that the action he had taken and which he would explain would result in the Senate’s early ratification of the treaty without attaching reservations concerning the necessity of Japan’s concluding a treaty with Nationalist China. Mr. Dulles had consistently borne in mind the agreement with the former Labor Government that Japan should have free choice as to what was in its best interests, that nothing should be done which would compel Japan to make a treaty with Nationalist China which would recognize Nationalist China as at present able to speak for all of mainland China, and that any treaty which might be negotiated between Japan and Nationalist China should not be finally consummated until after the coming into force of the multilateral treaty of peace. He added that at no time had it been his understanding of the Dulles-Morrison agreement that it would prevent Japan from taking action which it deemed in its own interest, and he pointed out how the facts of United States–Japan relationships were such that it was unthinkable, for the next several years at least, that Japan would pursue a policy in the Far East which was counter to that of the United States.

Mr. Dulles referred to the fact that he had now received a direct communication from Mr. Yoshida, stating the intentions of the Japanese Government, and that it would probably be necessary to make this known during the course of the Senate’s consideration of the peace treaty with Japan. Mr. Dulles concluded by stating that in his opinion the action which the United States had taken was the absolute minimum necessary to achieve the desired results in the United States Senate and at the same time retain the spirit and in fact the letter of the Dulles-Morrison agreement. He expressed the hope that the United Kingdom would be able to go along with this contemplated action.

Mr. Eden expressed appreciation for the detailed account given by Mr. Dulles and said that he fully appreciated the factors which influenced United States wishes in this matter. He could only repeat what he had said before, namely that his Government would have much preferred that any expression of intention by the Japanese with respect to their future action could have been withheld until after the actual coming into force of the treaty of peace, but that if, for what seemed to the United States good and sufficient reason, this was not possible, he did not believe that his Government would wish to make any great issue over the matter. He reiterated the well known UK view that nothing should be done which would give the Japanese opportunity in the future to say that whatever action they might take toward China was forced upon them and not the result of their own free will. In this connection Mr. Dulles pointed out that final action by Japan, including ratification of any treaty or agreement with Nationalist China by the Japanese Diet, would not take place until after the multilateral peace treaty had become operative, and hence would be the free and voluntary act of the Japanese people.

Secretary Acheson said that he wished to supplement Mr. Dulles’ remarks by pointing out that the Japanese would have great difficulty in working out with the Government on Formosa the type of limited agreement contemplated, and that the Chinese Nationalists had certain strong cards in their hands. They might well induce certain of their friends in the Senate to advocate a postponement of ratification proceedings until the Senate could have an opportunity to study in detail any proposed agreement between Japan and Formosa to see whether or not it met all Chinese desires. This would be bad enough, but there was a second course of action which might be even more distressing, namely that the Senate would attach to the ratification a reservation to the effect that the treaty would not become operative until Japan had concluded an agreement with Formosa. This not only would be bad for the United States, but would confront all the other signatories to the treaty with a very difficult problem. The Secretary then went on to say that it was most desirable to have Sir Esler Dening, British Ambassador in Japan, informed of the results of our talks so that if he were approached by the Japanese he could make clear that if they desired to go ahead with beginning negotiations with the Chinese Nationalist Government they would not incur the displeasure of the British Government. Mr. Eden thought this raised rather difficult problems and might seem to necessitate his Government’s completely reversing its previous stand and that this would be most embarrassing. Considerable discussion then took place among those present over possible wording of a message to Dening which would not do violence to the previous British position and yet would indicate to the Japanese that if they took action which they desired to do in their own interest the British Government would interpose no objection. It was finally left that the British side would endeavor to draft an appropriate instruction to Dening and would consult later with the United States side on this matter.³

1. In addition to Document 464, see the Minute of the Third Formal Meeting of the President and the Prime Minister, Jan. 8, 1952, scheduled for publication in volume vi.

2. The President submitted the Japanese Peace and Security Treaties to the Senate on Jan. 10, together with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines, signed at Washington on Aug. 30, 1951, and the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (later known as the ANZUS Pact), signed at San Francisco on Sept. 1, 1951. For text of the latter two treaties, see 3 UST (pt. 3) 3947 and 3420, respectively.

   For text of the President’s message and accompanying papers, see Senate Executives A, B, C and D, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952).

3. In Topad 1951 to Tokyo, Jan. 11, drafted by Allison, the Department in part stated:

   “We were shown last night text of msg to Dening which in substance states that as result of full exchange of views UK understands US position, but nonetheless adheres to its prior stand. However, UK believes matter is one for Jap to decide in manner they believe to be in their best interests and UK will not put any pressure on Jap either to act or not to act in any particular manner. Dening was authorized to make above position known to Jap if questioned by them, but our understanding is that he is not to initiate discussions on this matter with Jap. … In Dept’s opinion, Brit fully understand necessity of some public commitment by Jap re Chi, but are not for domestic polit reasons able to reverse their previous stand.… You shld seek an interview with Yoshida and inform him of results of talks with Brit on this matter. Brit agreed on fundamental necessity of Jap’s foreign policy’s being in harmony with that of US, and such differences as exist relate only to matter of timing of Jap announcement re policy. However, Brit also agree that in final analysis question of timing is one for Jap to decide. Eden stated specifically that this was not in his mind a major issue, and that it will not cause any real difficulty either between US and UK or UK and Jap.” (693.94/1–1152)