Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

693.94/1–952

No. 467
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] January 9, 1952.

Subject:

• Japanese Relations with China

Participants:

• Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
• Mr. John Foster Dulles
• Mr. John Allison

Sir Oliver Franks called this afternoon at Mr. Dulles’ request for preliminary discussion on relations between Japan and China preparatory to the meeting between Secretary Acheson and Foreign Minister Eden on January 10. Mr. Dulles stated he thought it would be helpful, in view of the fact that Mr. Eden had come into this problem “in the middle”, to make a chronological statement and put the matter in proper focus. He gave Sir Oliver a memorandum, copy attached,¹ setting forth the history of the problem from May 19, 1951, until the present date. Mr. Dulles pointed out that in all his actions he had been motivated by the desire to keep US–UK policy as close together as possible and at the same time bring about an early ratification of the Japanese peace treaty by the United States Senate. He emphasized that he had resisted attempts by members of the Senate to take the stand that Japan should at once conclude a peace treaty with Nationalist China and was hopeful that the action he had taken and which he would explain to Sir Oliver would result in the Senate’s early ratification of the treaty without attaching reservations concerning the necessity of Japan’s concluding a treaty with Nationalist China. Mr. Dulles had consistently borne in mind the agreement with the former Labor Government that Japan should have free choice as to what was in its best interests, that nothing should be done which would compel Japan to make a treaty with Nationalist China which would recognize Nationalist China as at present able to speak for all of mainland China, and that any treaty which might be negotiated between Japan and Nationalist China should not be finally consummated until after the coming into force of the multilateral treaty of peace. Mr. Dulles reiterated previous remarks that it would be most unfortunate for all of us, the UK included, if at this juncture the United States Senate should fail to ratify the treaty and thus prevent its early coming into force. He then informed Sir Oliver that he had just recently received by mail from Mr. Yoshida a letter stating what Mr. Yoshida’s position was with regard to China and the action which his Government desired to take. He showed this letter to Sir Oliver in confidence with the request that he inform Mr. Eden about it and about Mr. Dulles’ conviction that with such a letter it would be possible to obtain Senate ratification. He added that at no time had it been his understanding of the Dulles-Morrison agreement² that it would prevent Japan from taking action which it deemed in its own interest, and he pointed out how the facts of US–Japan relationships were such that it was unthinkable, for the next several years at least, that Japan would pursue a policy in the Far East which was counter to that of the United States.

After reading the letter Sir Oliver stated that he had certain observations to make which he hoped would be helpful in considering the coming talks between the Secretary and Mr. Eden on this matter. He stated that he had the distinct impression that the attitude of the present British Government toward China was not entirely the same as that of the Labor Government, but that, while it did not consider the importance of diplomatic relations with Communist China in the same light as its predecessor, nevertheless it did agree with the Labor Government that Chiang Kai-shek had no future on the mainland of China, and that, while possibly the Chinese Communist Government might not last, nevertheless Chiang’s Government could not return. It therefore would not be the belief of the present Government that anything should be done which would add to the prestige or stability of the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which was looked upon by the UK and by important elements of the Commonwealth, such as India, as a symbol of what should not be.

Sir Oliver then turned to the question of how the discussions might go between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden and pointed out that, while Mr. Eden certainly had a knowledge of American Constitutional processes, nevertheless he probably did not have as deep an understanding of their actual workings as someone who had spent more time in the United States; therefore, in Sir Oliver’s opinion, it would be more persuasive if the American Constitutional aspect of this problem, i.e. the obtaining of Senate ratification, not be emphasized at the beginning of the talks. He suggested rather that the facts of the Japan-China situation be enumerated; namely, the long-term pull toward the continent, the necessity of action which would ensure that this pull did not operate to the detriment of the West and that Japan remain part of the Western camp rather than that of Soviet Communism, and the necessity of Japan’s aligning its policies with those of the United States at this time when the United States had in fact great responsibilities regarding the defense of Japan and its economic future. After these points had been properly developed it would then be possible to mention the problem connected with ratification of the treaty in the United States Senate.

Sir Oliver said that in his opinion the talk had been most helpful and thanked Mr. Dulles for his frankness.

1. Not found attached; apparently the same as the memorandum, supra.
2. Reference is to the statement, “Chinese Participation and Formosa”, June 19, 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1134.