794A.5/4–1653: Telegram

No. 98
The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

1094. Department pass CINCPAC. Re Department’s telegrams 795 April 81 and 827, April 13. I have informed President Chiang and Foreign Minister that US seeks “formal undertaking from Chinese Government not to engage in offensive military operations which US considers inimical to its best interests.” In line with President Chiang’s assurance to me February 1 (my telegram 784)2 in response to request made on my own responsibility I have been again assured of Chinese Government’s full commitment in principle.

Before replying formally Foreign Minister urgently requests clarification re practical methods of determining what operations US would consider inimical to its best interests. He assures me Chinese Government would under no circumstances initiate operations which it considered might harm US interests whether political or military, national or international. However, US and Chinese estimate of situation might not coincide in every case and question is complicated by nature of guerrilla operations from off-shore islands which in past sometimes involved use of regular Chinese forces.

Foreign Minister asks for specific examples of operations US would consider “inimical.”

President Chiang specifically raised question of handling guerrilla operations which by their nature are often undertaken on responsibility of local commanders without reference to Chinese Chief of Staff in Taipei. He thought not feasible to obtain advance approval for every such operation through General Chase from CINCPAC.

Responding to earlier questions from Chinese Chief of Staff, General Chase tentatively suggested advance US concurrence might be desirable for an operation involving 500 or more men or a raid of battalion, regiment, division or larger size. Use of aircraft and armor also suggested as dividing line. But in recent discussions it pointed out that raid of less than 500 men might under certain circumstances be considered inimical by US.

Evident from foregoing that US insistence upon right to pass on all offensive military operations would carry with it assumption of [Page 191] detailed responsibility which largely avoided to date for political and other reasons.

Under above circumstances Chinese Government not told delivery of F–84 aircraft being delayed until commitment obtained. I have no reason doubt their good faith in present instance and their questions appear pertinent. Hope arrival of jet aircraft will not be held up by possible delay in replying to Chinese Government queries.

Should we seek formal commitment in principle with provision for filling in details subsequently?

Rankin