795.00/4–2253
No. 97
The President of the Republic of
China (Chiang Kai-shek) to President Eisenhower1
My Dear President Eisenhower: The Soviet peace offensive, which I am sure is being carefully studied and weighed by your good self and your colleagues as it is by me, is, in my opinion chiefly directed towards what the Kremlin fears to be a gradual crystallization of an integrated anti-Communist policy which you have given indication of pursuing. In other words, the support which you have had since your inauguration both at home and abroad has been the cause of this peace offensive. I do not believe that the Kremlin would be so naive as to presume that you could be brought to accept the view that Malenkov2 is beginning to initiate a democratization program for the Soviet peoples, or that Malenkov is prepared to call off the Communist program of world conquest.
I believe that the peace offensive was launched (1) to gain time for the consolidation of power on the part of the new Soviet hierarchy at home and for exerting tighter control over the satellites abroad; (2) to bring still greater disunity into the United Nations, particularly between the United States and the United Kingdom, so that the Soviet Union might maneuver itself into an advantageous position to collect the fruits of aggression for the Chinese and Korean Communists by achieving political gains at the United Nations; (3) to create difficulties for your administration vis-à-vis Congress when your Federal budget comes up for examination; (4) to allow the return of American war prisoners to their homes to create a popular demand for the withdrawal of your troops from Korea in order to pave the way for such a demand to be presented again at the United Nations.
I have no doubt that with your experience and wisdom, you are fully equal to the new situation which has presented itself. I am certain that you will not be prevailed upon in any circumstances to relax your effort in achieving greater unity among the anti-Communist peoples, but that you will continue to strengthen and integrate their forces into a united front. The present overtures from [Page 189] Soviet Russia, be they of an offensive or defensive character, must not be allowed to neutralize what you have already achieved or to forestall what you have set out to achieve. In this, I would like to pledge my fullest cooperation. It is necessary at this crucial moment for all of us who would not wish to see the future generations subjected to Communist tyranny to be steadfast and united in the pursuance of our common purpose.
You have seen how the protracted truce talks at Panmunjom have created disunity at the United Nations, how, during these talks, Communist acts of infiltration have been allowed to gain ground in Asia and in the Americas, how your own boys on the Korean front have been demoralized and driven into a sense of exasperation, how the Communists have made use of the stalemate to dig in behind their lines and, most of all, how the heightened expectancy for a truce resulting from this long indecisive period has caused a great many people to view the truce in Korea as the sole objective and to lose sight of the fundamental issues of the Korean question. In short, the Panmunjom stalemate has worked to the advantage of the Communists in that they have wrested the initiative from the Western Powers. It is my view, therefore, that while the peace offensive has to be accepted at its face value, a time limit must be set for achieving a truce in the field and for a political settlement of the Korean question in accordance with the objectives already set forth by the United Nations and to the reasonable satisfaction of the free Korean people. Without a time limit, I am afraid the present peace offensive would only serve to further strengthen the initiative which Soviet Russia has already taken into its own hands.
I am moved to communicate to you in this personal manner because I see the beginning of the success of your policy and the effects which such success has on the Soviet policy-makers. I also see how the present peace offensive can neutralize what measure of success which you have already achieved and the unfortunate aftermath of such an eventuality.
It is imperative, I feel, for us to seek ways and means by which we can gradually take away the political and military initiative from the Communist world. You have already achieved something. I look to you to pursue your policy to its fruitful conclusion.
I trust that this communication will find you in good health. My wife joins me in conveying to you and Mrs. Eisenhower our warmest personal regards and highest esteem.
Sincerely yours,