793.5/10–2754
No. 362
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
Subject:
- 1. New Zealand Resolution.
- 2. Mutual Defense Treaty.
Participants:
- Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Foreign Minister, Dr. George Yeh
- The Secretary
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for FE
- Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Director for CA
Limited distribution. Foreign Minister Yeh referred to the Chinese memorandum of October 231 setting forth the Chinese position in regard to the New Zealand resolution. He said that he would be grateful if the Department could reply informally in writing to the Chinese memorandum, so that he could make appropriate recommendations to his Government on the basis of the written U.S. reaction.
The Secretary said that he would prefer to wait a day or so before expressing any further views. There are certain aspects of the matter which are still under consideration. He hoped that it might be possible to start serious talks with the Chinese representatives about the 29th. He confirmed that the United States wanted to work out a Mutual Security Treaty, as the Generalissimo had been informed. The question of how to specify the area to be protected was causing some difficulty. Obviously it could not be said that every little island dot off the coast of China, if taken by the Chinese Communists, would represent a danger to peace and security. There are good reasons for considering the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores important to the security of the United States. But the United States cannot commit itself to fight for the retention of the off-shore islands by the Chinese Government. At the same time the U.S. does not want to leave them vulnerable to Chinese [Page 798] Communist attack. The Department is wrestling with this problem at the moment. Meetings are taking place with the responsible people from the Pentagon. All are thinking hard about the problem, but a minimum of 48 hours is needed for [all?] to think the problem through and obtain necessary clearances. It should be possible to start serious talks early next week, if not during this week-end. Insuperable obstacles might be encountered, but we hope not. He said he has been exploring all the angles of the problem since his talk with the Generalissimo in Taipei. He has worked hard on the difficult aspects. The question is very much on his mind. The Foreign Minister might be needed back in Washington in a day or so.
Foreign Minister Yeh said that he had to return to New York on the 28th. He could return to Washington any time after the 29th. He hoped that the Chinese position was made clear in the memorandum of October 23. He feared that the New Zealand Government might have under-estimated the implications and connotations of its proposed resolution. The Chinese Government would be willing to go along with the resolution if the undesirable implications and connotations were eliminated. He observed that in the Chinese view the resolution would not give actual protection to the off-shore islands. If the resolution were rejected by the Communists, the aggressive Communist attitude might help the moral position of the Chinese Government. But the adverse factors must be weighed against the possible moral benefit.
The Secretary said the Foreign Minister could be sure that the Department is studying the whole question with a sympathetic understanding of the Chinese Government’s point of view. He would prefer to wait about two days before saying anything more specific. Any time after Friday would probably be suitable. The Secretary added that the subject was very touchy politically. Of course, there was a group of senators quite dedicated to anything which would help the Chinese Government position. But actually this group constituted a minority of the Senate. It might be important to know the result of the elections on November 2 before proceeding. If Republican control of the Senate were retained, the Administration would be off to a good start and might get prompt action on a Treaty. But if the Democrats won control of the Senate, there would be a change in those to be consulted. Such a shift might delay action on Treaty matters. He hoped to get action started at once on a rounded program, of which the proposed Treaty would be a part. He hoped that the program would substantially meet the Foreign Minister’s wishes and strengthen the position of his Government. He recalled that he had told Ambassador Koo that a Defense Treaty might tend to weaken the position of the Chinese Government [Page 799] in some respects, since it could apply only to Formosa and the Pescadores. He remembered that the Generalissimo had maintained that appropriate language could readily be worked out to solve this problem. However, he had not received any concrete suggestion along this line from the Generalissimo. He was studying the matter closely anyway.
Foreign Minister Yeh asked if Treaty talks should get under way before the election.
The Secretary said that he thought it might be possible to start talks during the coming weekend.
Mr. Robertson pointed out that it would not seem desirable to make any announcement regarding any prospective Treaty before the election.
The Secretary emphatically agreed, but he thought that private talks with the Foreign Minister might start before the election. In any event it would take two or three days to consult President Chiang in Taipei.
Foreign Minister Yeh said that of course he recognized that the application of the operative clause of the Treaty would have to be limited to some extent. He suggested that the original draft Treaty submitted by the Chinese Government last December2 might be used as a tentative basis for the initial discussions. He appreciated that changes must be made. He said that even his own Government would not wish to stand pat on the language it proposed at that time. He thought his Government would have some changes to suggest. The Chinese position was by no means inflexible.
The Secretary said that both sides must be flexible and think in practical terms. It would be impossible to obtain ratification of a Treaty which might automatically draw the United States into war with Communist China.
The Foreign Minister said that his Government did not want to force the United States into war with Communist China and would not propose Treaty language designed to embroil the United States with Communist China.
The Secretary remarked that the problem of drafting appropriate Treaty language could not be lightly brushed aside. It was extremely hard to solve.
Foreign Minister Yeh said that the Treaty could not stand by itself.
Secretary Dulles agreed. The two Governments must have an understanding on many things. This added to the difficulty.
[Page 800]Foreign Minister Yeh said the Treaty would have the advantage of affording a more permanent relationship. But other arrangements were needed also.
Secretary Dulles noted that there was a grave constitutional question as to how long the President could keep the order to the 7th Fleet in force. The original order of President Truman could be justified under the “war powers” of the President. But after the Korean Armistice there is a question as to the President’s authority in the absence of a Joint Resolution of Congress, or a Treaty ratified by the Senate. Legally the President acting independently of Congress might not have the power to determine that the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores is vital to the peace and security of the United States. The legal right of the President to direct the 7th Fleet to defend Formosa without Congressional sanction was being eroded with the lapse of time. The Attorney General might find that the President lacks constitutional authority to continue the order to the 7th Fleet. Senator Knowland has expressed the view that Congress would be reluctant to pass in advance a Joint Resolution giving this authority to the President. Congress does not like to give “a blank check”. If the President waits until an emergency arises and then seeks Congressional backing, the approval might come too late. Emergency powers do not last forever. The question is how to replace the 7th Fleet order with something not based on emergency powers. The United States Government does not want any gap in its defense arrangements. The off-shore island chain extends from the Aleutians through Japan and the Ryukyus, Formosa and the Philippines to Australia and New Zealand. Formosa is the only place in this chain not covered by defense provisions of undoubted validity. The United States does not want a gap in the chain any more than the Chinese Government does. The United States is working hard to find an answer along the lines of a Treaty.
Foreign Minister Yeh said that last February he wrote down some thoughts on the matter. At that time he doubted the constitutional position of the President. This was one of the reasons for a Treaty which he listed in a letter to Vice President Nixon.3
Foreign Minister Yeh then said that he wished to make a statement which must be put most precisely:
- a)
- The Chinese Government does not have the slightest intention of making a Treaty with the United States serve as a basis for action against the mainland of China.
- b)
- There is no intention on the part of the Chinese Government to involve the United States in war with Communist China.
The Foreign Minister said “I mean this Mr. Secretary, and I think you can trust me”.
The Secretary said that he did believe and accept the assurances of the Foreign Minister.
Foreign Minister Yeh said on the other hand his Government wanted to be certain that the Treaty did not confine its sovereignty to Formosa and the Pescadores. Such a limitation would be unacceptable both politically and psychologically. The Chinese Government position rests on two pillars: 1) its strength for defense, and 2) its hope for return to the mainland. The reference to “hope” might sound far fetched, but—
Secretary Dulles interrupted to say that the reference was not at all far fetched. He recognized its importance. It was his view that despotisms such as the one now ruling the mainland of China are not permanent. They run counter to the nature and aspirations of humanity. They often have a seemingly impregnable exterior but inside they are full of rottenness. We did not fully realize the truth of this generalization as applied to Nazi Germany until after the war we got into the secret wartime diaries and letters of the Nazi leaders. When they seemed so invulnerable in the war years, we know now they had already begun to crumble. Powerful leaders in a dictatorship may be liquidated very abruptly, as happened in the case of Beria last year. It is not unrealistic to envisage the possibility of a sudden unexpected collapse of a ruthless dictatorial regime. We would want to be ready, if the opportunity comes, to take immediate advantage of it. The opportunity might come in one year or in 5 years. No one could tell. The Secretary said he recognized that Formosa must not become an island prison for Free Chinese. On the other hand it would be folly to kill the chances of success by moving prematurely. He thought that if the Chinese Nationalists should try an invasion today, they would probably be destroyed. He assumed that the Chinese Government agreed that it did not have the capability at present for large-scale offensive action.
Foreign Minister Yeh said that the assumption was of course correct. He mentioned that the Chinese Government had already given a firm commitment not to mount any attack—even a large-scale raid or commando-type operation—without first obtaining U.S. consent. The Chinese Government had scrupulously lived up to this commitment and would continue to do so.
The conversation ended at about 11:10 a.m.
- This memorandum, with a covering note from Ambassador Koo, was delivered to the Department on Oct. 23. (793.00/10–2354)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 161.↩
- Presumably the letter transmitted in telegram 360, Document 162.↩