793.5/10–2654
No. 361
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and
Security Affairs (Bond)
Subject:
- China Item: Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
- Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Miles Bond, UN Political & Security Affairs
- Sir Robert Scott, British Minister
- Miss Barbara Salt, First Secretary, British Embassy
- Mr. M.G.L. Joy, First Secretary, British Embassy Ambassador
- Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand
- Mr. G.R. Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy
- Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
Ambassador Munro and Sir Robert Scott and their associates called on the Secretary today at their request to discuss the subject item in the light of the Secretary’s recent visit to Paris.
Ambassador Munro said he would be interested in hearing the Secretary’s latest thinking on the proposed New Zealand initiative and its timing, and also on the proposed mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China. The Ambassador said that his Government would like to see the shortest possible time elapse between the announcement by the U.S. Government regarding the proposed treaty and the announcement of the New Zealand initiative. He went on to say that he was still concerned about what the next step would be should the New Zealand resolution succeed, and in particular what could be said to the Communists regarding the future of the coastal islands. The Ambassador added that it was his understanding that the U.S. was disposed to discuss with the New Zealand Government the terms of any announcement which we might propose to make regarding the negotiation of a treaty with the Republic of China.
The Secretary said that he had had a couple of talks with Sir Anthony Eden on this general subject, and that there had been substantial agreement that announcement of the proposed treaty should precede announcement of the New Zealand initiative, but that the two steps should be taken as close together as practicable. The Secretary said that his general thought was that the two steps were parts of a single whole and should be carried out as a “two-pronged operation”. He said he believed that Sir Anthony agreed with that point of view.
The Secretary went on to say that we were all perplexed by two problems: (1) what subsequent action we should take in the event the New Zealand initiative should succeed (a problem which the New Zealand Ambassador had already raised), and (2) what we should do in the event of a Soviet veto. He said that in the latter eventuality the present situation in the coastal islands would probably persist, but that the likelihood of fighting might well be diminished by virtue of the moral effect of a majority vote of the Security [Page 795] Council, regardless of any veto. He said that if the operation failed and fighting should be intensified, the U.S. would be confronted with the difficult problem, from the standpoint of the proposed treaty, of what the Nationalist Chinese should do to defend the islands and to what extent we should assist them in that effort. The Secretary added that his own feeling was that even should the New Zealand resolution fail, we would not be worse off for having made the effort.
Ambassador Munro stated that the British Ambassador had made the suggestion that the Peace Observation Commission might be utilized in connection with the Quemoy situation. The Secretary observed that this suggestion might be worth thinking about.
Sir Robert stated that it was his understanding that Sir Anthony Eden wanted to go ahead with the present plans but that he did not believe that he could give a final commitment until he knew the full terms and conditions of the U.S. undertaking with respect to a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China. The Secretary said he thought that in general this did represent Sir Anthony’s feeling in the matter, and added that Sir Anthony’s particular concern was that the proposed treaty be defensive in character. He said that he did not, however, anticipate any difficulty in meeting Sir Anthony’s views in this regard.
Ambassador Munro asked the Secretary if he was still content with the draft resolution which had previously been agreed upon. The Secretary replied that he believed he was. Sir Robert then asked the same question with respect to the agreed Minute, adding that it was London’s view that both the resolution and the Minute should be reexamined in the light of the U.S. intention to go ahead with a treaty. In particular, he raised the question whether, taking into account the proposed treaty, discussion could still be confined as agreed in the Minute. The Secretary stated that he had never believed it would be possible to confine discussion to the subject matter of the New Zealand resolution, and that it was for this reason that he had concentrated on endeavoring to confine the action which our respective Governments would take. The Secretary went on to say that he was just beginning to resume consideration of the many aspects involved in the present exercise, and that this question might be considered on Thursday1 by the National Security Council.
Ambassador Munro asked if there would be any value in reconstituting the working group to consider such important details as the timing of the treaty announcement, arrangements for notification to Moscow and Peking concerning the New Zealand resolution, [Page 796] etc. The Secretary said he would rather wait a day or two to think about the problems involved from the point of view of the U.S. He pointed out that the proposed treaty was a difficult one to draw up, particularly because of the problem of how to deal with the coastal islands, and observed that the problem would be a much easier one if the New Zealand initiative should be successful. He added that in any event formulation of the treaty would require considerable consultation with the Chinese Nationalists.
Sir Robert agreed that if the New Zealand resolution failed, the problem of the treaty would be a much more difficult one for the U.S. The Secretary said that we were now studying ways and means of dealing with that problem. Ambassador Munro observed that a treaty covering only Formosa and the Pescadores would be particularly dangerous should the New Zealand resolution fail, since it would then constitute an open invitation to the Communists to seize the coastal islands. The Secretary said that we were of course aware of that and that it was our aim to deal with the two aspects of the problem simultaneously. Sir Robert expressed the opinion that the success of the New Zealand resolution in the UN would be dependent to a large measure on the manner in which the proposed treaty was initially presented to the public. The Secretary agreed that this might well be the case, and said that the whole problem which we were now considering involved a most difficult and delicate operation. He said that he believed, therefore, that it would be better not to set up the working group until we were a bit more sure of our ground. Ambassador Munro said that he accepted that judgment.
Sir Robert expressed agreement but said he believed we could still begin to think about the form of the proposed treaty announcement. The Secretary said he had assured Sir Anthony that we would discuss with the UK representatives the terms of the treaty announcement.
Ambassador Munro said that he assumed, in view of the foregoing, that the Secretary would not wish to discuss the matter further before Friday, to which the Secretary indicated agreement.
Mr. MacArthur raised the question of what Ambassador Munro should say to the press after the meeting; it was agreed that he should describe his visit as a normal periodic consultation with the Secretary—a “routine clearing of decks”.
Sir Robert asked what bearing the new Soviet agenda item on aggression against Communist China would have on our proposed course of action, and what the timing would probably be. Mr. Key said that the General Committee was scheduled to discuss inscription of the item on November 2, that being the end of the two-week postponement agreed upon by the Committee. With respect to the [Page 797] handling of the inscription question, Ambassador Munro said he assumed we were agreed that the item should be placed as far down as possible on the Committee I agenda.
- Oct. 28.↩