793.5/10–2154: Telegram
No. 357
The Secretary of
State to the Department of
State
Dulte 6. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. I met with Eden at residence following four-power meeting this afternoon1 to discuss matter offshore islands. He was attended by Caccia and Allen. Merchant was with me.
I opened by saying that, pursuant to my conversation with Makins, I had been anxious to expose to him personally our thinking regarding negotiation Mutual Security Treaty with Chinese National Government as soon as it had crystallized. I said that the longer we had considered problem protection Formosa, particularly in connection with projected action in SC, the more we were convinced that it was necessary to regularize situation with respect to Formosa. I mentioned that I had discussed with Sir Winston in London two weeks ago2 this problem in connection with vital importance retention offshore island arc in Pacific. I described at some length origin original orders Seventh Fleet, extent to which they might be considered to rest on war powers and modification these orders by President early 1953. With armistices now concluded Korea and Indochina, necessity arose to make clear to Communists fact that we would not allow Formosa and Pescadores to fall [Page 789] into unfriendly hands. I noted curious, but deliberate, legal status Formosa under Japanese Peace Treaty and concluded by saying that we had hope that with US treaty protecting Formosa and some UN action safeguarding offshore islands, we might look forward to stabilization and peace in that area.
Eden listened with close attention and expressed appreciation fully [full?] exposition our thinking. He then asked in what form did we contemplate treaty would be cast. He indicated obvious concern that Formosa, while protected by US formal guarantee might continue to serve as base operations against Mainland and referred to uneasiness Cabinet over possibility that having launched action in SC, US might then negotiate treaty with Formosa which could be regarded as failure fully to disclose US intentions in advance institution action in SC.
I replied that purpose treaty would be clearly defensive and that in order to obtain ratification by Senate, I felt it would be necessary that this purpose be made abundantly clear in advance. I said, however, that it took two to conclude any treaty, and that it was by no means certain that Chiang Kai-shek would agree to accept treaty whose purpose was forthrightly designed for defense alone. I pointed out, moreover, that one could not overlook possibility that developments on Mainland at some future time might be of character which opened prospect collapse Communist regime and return Nationalist Government to China.
Eden made point he believed announcement intention negotiate treaty should precede any initiative by New Zealand on offshore island question in SC, and I agreed. Eden suggested that I might make speech which would indicate publicly US intention regularize situation Formosa, but make clear it was not intended that behind such protection island should serve as base for offensive action against Mainland.
I said that I did not believe further progress could be made until my return to Washington and that whereas I recognized risk leakage, particularly since Nationalists now generally informed of our intentions, I believed next week was earliest we could announce our intentions negotiate treaty which move I considered should be in advance any action by New Zealand in SC.
Eden again expressed his appreciation my exposition our thinking. I told him I had already held some preliminary consultations with certain congressional leaders, but that further activity on that front would be required before any public statement could be made. During conversation Eden indicated they would still desire inform Moscow and Peiping few hours in advance of action in SC with [Page 790] view to impressing on them seriousness with which they should regard such move.
- Oct. 20.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 351.↩