Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

794A.5 MSP/11–254

No. 356
Extracts of Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 20, 1954—9 p.m.

Mr. Robertson set forth in full the case for introduction into the UN of a cease fire resolution as to the off-shore islands as tentatively proposed by New Zealand. Mr. Robertson said the U.S. would flatly and resolutely oppose any attempt to submit “the Formosa question” to the UN in connection with the New Zealand resolution. New Zealand fully agreed with the U.S. that it would be necessary to oppose any substantial amendment of this resolution or any connection of it with other questions. The situation created by the hostilities in and around the off-shore islands was the sole question. The Secretary of State wanted to strengthen, not weaken, the Republic of China.

The Secretary is hopeful that he will be able to announce very soon the opening of negotiations for a Mutual Defense Pact. However, it is necessary to be certain of bi-partisan Senatorial support for such a pact. The Department is now engaged in consultations with key Senators of both parties to ensure that such a treaty would receive the necessary ratification. Mr. Robertson said that it was important for the two Governments to have a full exchange of views and to concert their efforts so as to turn the existing situation to the advantage and not the disadvantage of the two countries. Mr. Robertson reiterated that the proposed resolution did not signify any change in the attitude of the U.S. Government toward the Chinese Communist regime. He said the U.S. Government does not and will not recognize the Communist regime in Peiping as the Government of China.

Foreign Minister Yeh pointed out that under the proposed New Zealand Resolution, as he understood it from the paraphase which had been read to him, the UN would “remain seized” of the offshore islands question. This could amount to more than a call for a truce. He pointed out that the Chinese Government had already given assurances to the U.S. authorities that the Chinese Government would not mount any invasion of the Mainland without U.S. assent. He said that the Chinese do not like to see any Communist build-up on the other side of the water from Quemoy. A dangerous build-up could continue notwithstanding a cease-fire. The problem as he saw it was how to prevent the Communist side from getting stronger during the interim.

Mr. Robertson predicted that the Communists probably would contemptuously reject the resolution, in which case there would be no loss, but a net gain, for the Chinese Nationalists. He said if the Communist side does accept, the off-shore islands would remain in Chinese Nationalist hands, which was the essential immediate objective. The UN interest in the matter would serve to protect Chinese Nationalist retention of the islands. Then a Mutual Defense Pact would help to protect Formosa and the Pescadores, without excluding the possibility of agreed action against the Mainland if such action should ever become necessary. He emphasized that the treaty would have to be defensive in nature, as were all U.S. security pacts. We now have a sort of stop gap protective arrangement, in the Executive Order to the 7th Fleet, which was occasioned by the Korean War. There was some doubt as to the legality of extending the Presidential Directive to cover the off-shore islands. Mr. Robertson pointed out that a treaty would have a more permanent character than an Executive Order such as the one issued to the 7th Fleet. Conclusion of a treaty would serve notice to the world that Formosa could not be invaded without challenging the U.S. It would tend to take the whole subject of Formosa out of the sphere of UN debate, since the intentions of the U.S. as to Formosa would no longer be in doubt. It would still be possible for the two Governments, by mutual agreement between themselves, to consider measures to take advantage of any situation adverse to the Communists which might develop on the Mainland.

Ambassador Tsiang said that Mr. Robertson assumed the resolution would be rejected. It is necessary to consider the consequences of both acceptance and rejection by the Communists. If the resolution is accepted it would be tantamount to a truce. The assumption is that in such event the status quo would be maintained. This would tend to condition the UN to a two-China concept.

Mr. Robertson said that possibly the situation would be so viewed by some. He said that some people already think in terms of two Chinas. Some think in terms of only one China, and that China to them is Red China. Even many Western Governments argue that realities must be recognized now, by which they mean the fact of Communist control of the Mainland. The implications of this attitude we do not like, but we must acknowledge that the attitude exists and is strongly held. U.S. opposition has been a real factor in keeping Communist China out of the UN and diplomatically isolated up to a point.

Ambassador Tsiang said the chances of Communist China gaining admission to the UN would be better after tabling of the resolution than now, with the two-China concept gaining ground. Mr. Robertson said that the question of two-Chinas may be brought up by some delegations—but it would not grow directly out of the New Zealand resolution.

Ambassador Tsiang said that if the non-Communist side willingly accept the status quo in the China area, Communist China would gain status thereby. Communist China would be given assurance that she would not be exposed to attack. This would give Communist China a great advantage. This would amount to calling on the Chinese Government to forswear its right to recover the Mainland. He did not attach paramount military value to the off-shore islands. The destiny of China did not depend on the islands as territory. But they were a symbol. If positive action looking toward the Mainland were delayed indefinitely, the prospects for Free China were very dim. The whole life of Chinese of his generation was based on the hope of returning to the Mainland in their lifetime. He said that free Chinese must not be robbed of their dreams. Their dreams made it possible for them to carry on.

Mr. Robertson said the Free Chinese were not being asked to give up their dreams. Formosa signifies infinitely more to the free world than the small island which it appears to be on a map. It is a place where dreams can originate. It is a symbol of the Free China which one day may assume its rightful place. But what prospects are there in the immediate future for a successful counter attack? What are the potentialities? No diplomatic support could be expected from Great Britain or the Scandinavian countries. Even France is now somewhat doubtful. The U.S. is the only Great Power giving full support to Free China. The U.S. is not asking the representatives of Free China to abandon their dreams—or even to support the resolution. It would seem to be to the advantage of the Chinese to reserve their position until they could consider the attitude assumed by the Soviet bloc.

Ambassador Tsiang said he recognized the validity of the observations made by Mr. Robertson. He said although his people might indulge in dreams, they were not fools. But the Government could not afford to tell the Chinese people on Formosa, overseas, or on the Mainland that they could not expect to win back the Mainland. The vision of a return to the Mainland “has a power beyond that of fleets and armies”.

Foreign Minister Yeh thought if the resolution was supported by the U.S., regardless of the Communist attitude the impression would be created that the U.S. is ready to draw another truce line—another 38th parallel. To the people on Formosa and the 13,000,000 overseas Chinese it would signify that the U.S. is prepared to recognize and assist a truce line, to give a sanctuary to the Communist build-up on the Mainland. Mr. Robertson said there was no way of preventing a Communist build-up now. So there would be no change in that situation.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that the build-up opposite the offshore islands was now retarded by air bombardment and artillery fire. That had more restraining effect than a Security Council recommendation. If the resolution were accepted, the Soviet Union and Communist China would take advantage of the truce line. U.S. support for Free China would not be made more effective. Mr. Robertson asked if the Chinese Communists were likely to change the propaganda line which they had peddled to Attlee and other British Laborites—that all the off-shore islands and Formosa belonged to and must be returned to the Chinese Communists? Would they supinely accept a resolution which would confirm Chinese Nationalist retention of the islands?

Foreign Minister Yeh said that if the resolution were rejected there would be no international protection for the off-shore islands. And the psychological effect of the resolution having been introduced would be adverse to Free China and against the interests of the free world. Mr. Robertson asked how the situation after rejection would be any different from now? If the resolution is accepted, it gives Nationalist China undisputed protection of the islands. If rejected and Communist attacks against the islands are resumed, the hopes of Nationalist China for winning more international support are greatly strengthened.

Mr. Wainhouse said he did not read the resolution as freezing the Chinese Nationalists while permitting the Chinese Communists to build-up. Neither side was inhibited from taking preparatory action. The resolution would merely call for a cessation of hostilities. Neither side would be disadvantaged as to a build-up.

Foreign Minister Yeh said he was concerned by the reference to “peaceful means” in the resolution. Would this not signify that a truce or cease-fire would tend to lead to a general armistice? Mr. Wainhouse said that this would depend on developments. No one could say anything further now. The stoppage of firing was as far as the terms of the resolution went.

Foreign Minister Yeh pointed out that the UN resolution on Korea² had condemned the Communists as the aggressors. The New Zealand resolution would not give Free China the UN protection accorded Korea. Mr. Robertson remarked that an aggression resolution as to the off-shore islands would not in his opinion be supported in the UN.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that the resolution would leave his Government in a far worse position. In addition to the psychological problem, there would be the question of how to protect the offshore islands if the Communists rejected the New Zealand proposal. The New Zealand initiative would leave a bad psychological effect on the Chinese people and on neutralist nations. It would accord no protection whatever. In Korea there is a commitment to take up arms against the Communists in case of violation. Mr. Wainhouse pointed out that under the situation now existing there is no protection. If the present situation should contineu, “where do we head in”?

Ambassador Koo said the resolution says nothing about who started the fighting. The Chinese Government position as a victim of aggression would not be reflected in the New Zealand resolution. The New Zealand wording would carry disadvantageous political implications for the Chinese Government. Ambassador Koo said the resolution should state clearly that the hostilities were started by the Peiping regime, and that that regime should stop the hostilities. The resolution should recognize that the Chinese Government merely took retaliatory action. He thought his Government could agree that if the Communists refrain from attacking the off-shore islands, it will not take retaliatory action against the Chinese Communists now. But the Chinese Government must not give up its hope or its legal right to liberate the Mainland eventually, in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese people.

Foreign Minister Yeh referred to the phrase “by peaceful means” in the New Zealand resolution. He thought the resolution put both parties on the same footing as co-belligerents. He feared that a definite truce line was clearly envisaged. He thought the resolution should place the responsibility for the situation squarely on Communist China.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the situation in the off-shore islands were [was] not analogous to that in Korea. The UN itself went to war with the Communists in Korea. The UN was not involved in the war between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. Many nations were sympathetic to the claim of the islands to be attached to the Mainland and as rightfully belonging to the Government recognized as controlling the Mainland. Great Britain would not accept the resolution if it involved acceptance of the Nationalist Government as the legitimate government of all China. The resolution does not have anything to do with the return of the Chinese Nationalist Government to the Mainland. Such an ambition is neither encouraged or discouraged by the resolution. The subject is not mentioned in the resolution.

Ambassador Tsiang said that it would be difficult to argue that any sort of attack on the Mainland did not have some relationship to the off-shore islands. The Nationalists would be bound not to attack the Mainland. Ambassador Koo remarked that if the resolution were passed, the Communists would complain that any Nationalist action against them violated the resolution. He feared that the resolution in effect would bind only the Nationalists. Ambassador Tsiang felt the resolution was aimed to stop all present and prospective hostilities between Nationalist China and Communist China. Mr. Robertson reiterated that the resolution was aimed only at the off-shore islands.

Ambassador Tsiang said that if the resolution could ensure that all hostilities against the islands would stop, and nothing more was implied, he would be for it. Mr. Robertson said that to him the resolution implied no more than that. If it contained all the implications attributed to it by the Chinese representatives, he was not aware of it. The U.S. would not support the resolution if it were not pinpointed at the off-shore islands. Ambassador Tsiang said he felt this intent was not translated into the language of the resolution.

Mr. Wainhouse said that the language of the resolution was not necessarily final. The Chinese representatives had expressed a number of objections and apprehensions. All were agreed on the necessity of confining the resolution to the one issue. The problem was to find language to do this. He did not know how firm the language of the resolution was in the minds of the New Zealand representatives. He felt it ought to be possible to find language relieving the fears of the Chinese Government and expressing accurately the objective. He hoped that agreement could be reached on language. He felt that an explanation by the American representative in the Security Council when he cast the U.S. vote might serve to clarify the language of the resolution and the intent of the U.S.

Mr. Robertson said he was sympathetic with the psychological problems raised by the Chinese representatives. He thought it would be a good gamble that the Communist bloc could not capitalize on the resolution. If the Communists turned down the proposal, a climate much more helpful to Nationalist China would be established. On the other hand, if the off-shore islands were attacked without any UN interest in them, they might well be lost. This would create a bad psychological situation.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that if the islands were subjected to fullscale attack they would be lost regardless whether New Zealand resolution was submitted. No military assistance could be expected in any event. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Chinese forces were making use of American military assistance in their defense of the islands. Troops equipped and trained by MAAG on Formosa had rotational duty on the off-shore islands and there was no restriction on the use of U.S. supplied material on the off-shore islands.

Dr. Yeh said that the Soviet Union resolution of October 15 seemed almost identical to the proposed New Zealand resolution except that the Soviet resolution does not call for “peaceful means” of settlement, as does the New Zealand resolution. He felt that the “peaceful means” clause was the “operative” part of the New Zealand resolution.

Dr. Yeh felt that the resolution as perhaps incompletely paraphrased to him was highly unsatisfactory. He advised the U.S. representative to reconsider the matter. Mr. Robertson said that the U.S. was not the one to tell to reconsider the resolution. It was a New Zealand proposal. If the New Zealanders introduced it, we must devise the best plans for dealing with the situation which will then be created.

Mr. Wainhouse said that the New Zealand Government had stated in the strongest terms that Formosa must be kept out of Communist hands. New Zealand was motivated in this by a high degree of self-interest. Mr. Robertson said that New Zealand looked to the U.S. and not the UK for her security. Foreign Minister Webb’s views were questionable, but he was on the way out. There was absolutely no equivocation about Amb. Munro. He would in his opinion not act as a catspaw for the UK.

Foreign Minister Yeh asked if we were having talks with the New Zealand representatives? If so he wondered if we could not recommend to them a modification of the language? Mr. Wainhouse thought we might make the point to the New Zealanders that it was desirable for the resolution to point out who opened the hostilities, so that the two parties would not seem equally guilty of aggressive action. He thought the matter warranted further study.

Mr. Robertson said our UN representative would state our view of the hostilities, suggesting that the UN should call on the Chinese Communists to cease the attacks which they started. Dr. Yeh thought the present resolution did not clearly make this point. Mr. Robertson thought the language might be changed. He did not know just what language would be suitable. In any event the resolution would refer only to the one issue and not mention any large issues.

Dr. Yeh said the New Zealand move called for a settlement by “peaceful methods”. It would take away Chinese Government rights as to the Mainland. Mr. Wainhouse said that the resolution does not pre-empt or prejudice Chinese rights in any way. It was better for questions not related to the point at issue not to be mentioned in the resolution.

Ambassador Koo said that the reference to settlement by peaceful methods was not pertinent to the point of issue and might better be omitted. Mr. Wainhouse doubted whether New Zealand would be willing to delete this reference, but he thought the reference to the UN remaining “seized” of the question might be eliminated.

Ambassador Koo asked why it could not be specified that the “peaceful methods” referred only to the off-shore islands. That would mitigate one of the Chinese apprehensions. Mr. Robertson said the entire resolution as now framed applies only to the offshore islands.

Mr. Robertson asked how much importance the Chinese representatives attached to retention of the off-shore islands? Did they have great importance as a listening station? Would Chinese Communist capture of the islands be a blow to Chinese Nationalists prestige? Ambassador Tsiang said the islands undoubtedly were important and their loss would be a blow to prestige but he thought the adverse effects of the New Zealand resolution on prestige would be worse.

Mr. Robertson asked if in the last analysis, assuming they had no other choice, the Chinese Nationalists would rather lose all the off-shore islands than accept the New Zealand resolution? Dr. Yeh said if these were the only choices, he thought the answer would be yes but the islands were important and he thought there were other alternatives.

Ambassador Tsiang agreed that the loss would represent a severe blow to morale, but the New Zealand resolution would constitute a heavier blow. Mr. Robertson asked if that was the official position of the Chinese Government? Dr. Yeh said if the paraphrased version of the New Zealand resolution, which was all he had been given, was correct and represented the final form of the resolution, he thought the answer was yes. He could not answer authoritatively when he had no idea of the exact wording of the text.

Mr. Wainhouse said that if the reference to “peaceful methods” actually covered only the off-shore islands, this should be made clear. The applicability of the resolution solely to the off-shore islands should be pinpointed throughout. Dr. Yeh observed that it was impossible to divorce the off-shore islands from the Mainland. Mr. Wainhouse said that an effort had been made to do so in this resolution. In what respect had it not succeeded? Dr. Yeh said that he would reserve a position on that until he saw the actual text of the resolution.

Dr. Yeh said that Chinese Nationalist intelligence had established that the Chinese Communists already know of our decision not to defend the off-shore islands. He said that Chu Teh declared in the course of a meeting with other Communists on July 19 in Peiping that information had been received that the Americans would not defend the off-shore islands. Again on August 13 or 14 at a conference in Mao Tse-tung’s house the same assertion was made.

Mr. Robertson said if that report was correct, the Communists know they now have the capabilities of taking the islands without getting involved with the U.S. He asked if the Chinese Nationalists would continue that precarious situation in preference to the measure of support which would be afforded them by affirmative UN action? Dr. Yeh said “definitely no”. Mr. Robertson said that reply did not seem to be in accord with what he had said earlier. Dr. Yeh said that the New Zealand resolution had only been read to him in paraphrase. As read to him, he thought it would give rise to bad effects. It would boomerang on both his Government and the U.S. Government unless it was amended as just suggested. “Peaceful means” of settlement was the stated objective of the resolution as it stood. Mr. Robertson repeated that “peaceful means” of settlement referred only to the off-shore islands question.

Dr. Yeh said that Mr. Robertson must forgive his apprehensions. Mr. Robertson said he well understood the misgivings. Everyone, American and Chinese, wants to avoid being trapped in a situation which might make our joint position weaker. The U.S. representatives were just as concerned about this as were the Chinese. The U.S. of course would have no interest in joining other nations which might want to bring larger questions as to China into the UN.

Dr. Yeh said that he would undertake a study as to how, if at all, the resolution could be made to serve our common interests. At the moment he did not see how this could be done.

1. The source text, drafted by McConaughy on Nov. 2, is headed as follows:

   “Extracts of Memorandum of Conversation at Twin Oaks [the Chinese Embassy in Washington,] October 20, 1954 at 9 p.m. with the following present: Chinese Foreign Minister George Yeh; Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo; Ambassador T.F. Tsiang, Permanent Representative of China to the UN; Chinese Minister Tan; Assistant Secretary Robertson; Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford; Mr. Wainhouse, Deputy Director of 10; and Mr. McConaughy, Director for Chinese Affairs; on the subject of the ‘Proposed New Zealand Resolution’”.

   A detailed memorandum of conversation by McConaughy, dated Oct. 20, from which these extracts were taken, is filed in 793.5/10–2054.

2. Reference is to UN Resolution 498(V), Feb. 1, 1951; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 150.