793.00/10–1454: Telegram
No. 344
The Acting
Secretary of State to the Embassy
in the Republic of China1
niact
237. Eyes only Ambassador Rankin from Secretary. Re immediately preceding telegram,2 following personal message for Chiang Kai-shek from Secretary:
[Page 762]Begin text. Dear Mr. President: Walter Robertson has reported on his talks with you. I am not surprised that your initial reaction to the New Zealand proposal is negative. I have myself shared many of your doubts. However, I believe that the ChiComs’ reaction will be even more negative than yours. I do not think they will want to have the UN throw a mantle of protection around these off-shore islands, and I doubt that they will even appear under circumstances where your Government represents China on the Security Council and they appear, if at all, merely as invited parties. Therefore the probable result will be that the ChiComs will again show a disregard for the processes of the UN, thus strengthening the moral position of your side. But even the pendency of this matter on the agenda of the SC may in fact operate to deter their armed attacks against these islands, as such attacks would show their aggressive intentions and disregard of the UN, and to justify and strengthen the resolve of other govts who withhold recognition of the ChiComs.
You may be confident that the US will never agree to a submission to the UN of the question of the ChiComs’ right to govern Formosa, and already our discussions with New Zealand have gone as far as humanly possible to assure that its submission will not involve other than the precise matters covered by its proposal.
Of course it is always possible for any UN member at any time to bring to the SC or GA any question it wants regarding the Chinese situation. Even if New Zealand withdrew its proposal, that would not prevent someone else from introducing this matter into the UN in a much more controversial way. However, one thing you can know, and that is the solid position of the US.
The US statement in the SC in relation to the New Zealand resolution would be one of sympathy to the extent that it seeks to terminate hostilities that have been recently initiated by the ChiComs and which potentially involve a threat to the US by virtue of its committal to defend Formosa. We would of course make clear that the present hostilities were initiated by the ChiComs, although we would not in this connection ask that the resolution condemn Red China as aggressor. Our policy, which we believe you share, of closely limiting what the SC should deal with, would require us to support the resolution, which we believe has, through much effort on our part, been reduced to acceptable limited scope. If we should take the initiative in trying to enlarge the resolution, then that would open up a series of counterproposals, and all the questions which you and I are concerned about might be injected into the SC debate.
In confirmation of what Robertson will have told you, we are in principle prepared to make with you a defensive security treaty [Page 763] along the lines which you discussed with me. We greatly doubt, however, that it would be possible to announce or sign this treaty as quickly as you apparently suggested to Robertson. To attempt this would be to risk failure, because we shall first have to have private conversations with Senate leadership, both Republicans and Democrats. We do not doubt that such a treaty will win Senate approval, providing we have ample opportunity to explain its implications and what it is all about. If, however, the matter were to become public before our private explanations, then we fear that some Senators would publicly commit themselves to opposition, and once they are publicly committed then their conversion to support becomes extremely difficult. Also, the precise procedure we should adopt will depend to some extent upon the outcome of the November Congressional elections which will determine whether the Republicans or Democrats will organize the next Senate which would have to consider this treaty.
We have considered trying to have action before the SC delayed, but New Zealand has been pressing urgently for prompt action, and indeed the military position reported by our intelligence suggests that if these off-shore islands are to be saved and your Government spared a grave blow to its prestige, then this alternative procedure should quickly be gotten under way.
I am asking Ambassador Rankin to show you the text of the New Zealand proposal. In its present form it represents a very considerable modification from the initial proposal and is restricted carefully in its scope to an area where we do not believe your Government’s position could be injured.
We are resuming discussions with New Zealand in the above spirit. We do not know whether New Zealand will proceed. We shall keep you promptly informed and in the meantime beg that you will observe the closest secrecy with respect to all of these matters.
With assurance of my high regard, I am
John Foster Dulles. End text.