Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–3154

No. 337
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)¹

top secret

[Taipei,] October 13, 1954—8 a.m.

Place: Presidential Residence, Taipei, Formosa

Participants:

• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Secretary General, Chang Chun
• Acting Foreign Minister, Shen Chang-huan²
• Interpreter, Samson Shen
• Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson
• Ambassador Karl L. Rankin
• Walter P. McConaughy, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs

Mr. Robertson stated that his Government had learned of a proposal to be brought before the UN by New Zealand relative to the off-shore islands now in possession of the forces of the Chinese Government. The United States Government greatly desires that these positions should be retained under the control of the Chinese Government. U.S. intelligence indicates that an all-out assault is likely to occur against one or more of the islands. The U.S. military advisers hold the view that if this does occur, no amount of skill and bravery on the part of Nationalist forces on these islands would suffice against the massive assault which could and probably would be mounted. The U.S. Government realizes that this loss would be a serious blow to the prestige of Nationalist China.

The U.S. Government has thoroughly considered the possibility of U.S. military intervention to assist the Chinese Government forces to hold these islands. The U.S. has been careful to keep the Communists in uncertainty as to the probable U.S. course of action. However, we must say in the utmost confidence that it is highly doubtful that the President could now, without Congressional authorization, thus enlarge the mission of the Seventh Fleet, authorized in 1950 in connection with the Korean War, and engage in what might in fact become a major war with Communist China. The President also feels that the fate of these off-shore islands, while very important, would not justify him in calling on the American nation to engage in what might become a war of indeterminate scope, intensity, and duration. It is uncertain that if the Congress were asked for such authority it would be readily granted.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. Government has considered whether United Nations procedures as proposed might perhaps be invoked in a way which would either deter Communist military attacks against these islands, or put the Communists in a position to be condemned further by world opinion.

The current and threatened attacks are avowedly part of a program directed against Formosa and the Pescadores which the U.S. is committed to help defend. Thus the situation involves a threat to international peace and security. It is one which, by the UN charter, both the U.S. and the Chinese Governments as members are obligated to seek to settle by peaceful means. The U.S. Government thinks it probable that the Security Council, if asked, would be disposed to recommend a suspension of assaults against these offshore islands, without prejudice. This would also involve suspending counter-attacks in defense of these islands. It is emphasized that such a recommendation would pertain solely to hostilities related to the off-shore islands.

Such an attitude on the part of the Security Council would then confront the Soviet Union with the necessity either of approving or vetoing such action. If the Soviet Union exercised its veto on behalf of the Chinese Communists, this would be a further evidence to the world of their contempt for the purposes and principles of law, peace, and order enunciated in Article I of the UN Charter. It would create a further reason why the Chinese Communists regime and its claim to a position in the UN would be further discredited. It is possible that on the foundation thus created, the existing embargo provisions against Communist China would get new vitality and support.

If, which seems unlikely, the Soviet Union approved the proposal and the Chinese Communists complied, then at least the island positions would be provisionally secured, and the grave consequences of their loss would be avoided.

The U.S. Government has had confidential discussions of this situation with the New Zealand Government which is much concerned and sympathetic. It now plans to take an initiative in this matter. It is one of the Governments now represented in the Security Council and the U.S. has with it, as the Chinese Government knows, the treaty relationship represented by ANZUS.

The U.S. Government realizes that unfriendly powers represented on the Security Council will doubtless try to turn the situation to the disadvantage of the Chinese Government and attempt to couple with this matter new and unacceptable proposals. However, after a thorough canvas of the situation, the U.S. Government feels confident that the matter can be kept confined to the matter of hostilities on, or immediately related to, the off-shore islands and that larger political questions can be and will be kept divorced from the contemplated proceedings.

At the time of any UN proceedings, the U.S. would want to reaffirm, perhaps more formally, its firm intention to associate itself with the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

It is not clear to the U.S. Government that it would be necessary or advisable for the Chinese Government actually to support the move planned by New Zealand. It might be that an attitude of reserve would be advisable until the Communists show their hands.

The U.S. Government did not however want this action to get underway which closely involves Chinese Government interests without the Chinese Government knowing that the action is contemplated. In the opinion of the U.S. Government, it can serve to advance and protect the interests of the Chinese Govt. and to avoid an alternative which would almost surely be very unhappy from the standpoint of what both Governments want.

General Chang Chun said he wished to seek clarification of two points: 1) What would be the situation if the Soviets reject the proposal? 2) If the Communists accepted the proposal, what political concessions would be made to them in return for the substantial military concession the Communists would be making? It would not be reasonable to expect the Communists not to exact a price.

Mr. Robertson replied that as to 1), the situation as to the islands would be as it is now, in the event of Communist rejection. There would be no change, but it would be hoped that the Communist international position would be adversely affected. As to 2), absolutely no political concessions had even been considered. The Communists would get nothing out of acceptance except a suspension of counterattacks in defense of the islands. The resolution would be carefully pin-pointed to the military situation relating to the offshore islands, and it was the firm intention to exclude everything else both from the text of the resolution and the discussion in the Security Council.

Acting Foreign Minister Shen said it was quite apparent to him that the Communists would use the resolution as a wedge to promote Chinese Communist participation in UN proceedings. This would tend to pave the way for eventual seating of Communist China in the UN. The Communists of course would insist that Communist China, as a party at interest, must be invited to the UN to present its case in the course of the debate on the New Zealand resolution. This would give the Communists a good opportunity to press their propaganda line before a world audience. They would undoubtedly capitalize on the opportunity to raise the entire “Formosa Question” and would seek to destroy the entire Chinese Government position in the UN.

Mr. Robertson said it would undoubtedly be necessary to agree to the appearance of Chinese Communist representatives before the Security Council in the course of consideration of the resolution. As one of the parties involved it would have, under the UN Charter, the right to be heard. However he did not agree that the Chinese Communists thereby could undermine the position of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Communists would not be present as a UN member, but only as a party to a situation which threatened peace and security. The item would be confined to the off-shore islands, and we did not think the Communists would be successful if they attempted to broaden the issue.

President Chiang asked Ambassador Rankin to express his opinion of the proposal.

Ambassador Rankin said that he did not feel that he was in a position to express a conclusive view. It was hoped to obtain the opinion of President Chiang after a full consideration of the proposal. However he would say that he knew that Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary Robertson had the essential interests of the Chinese Government very much at heart, and he believed that the President would be justified in giving very full consideration to their views on this important question.

President Chiang then said that he would give his preliminary reaction, speaking very frankly to Mr. Robertson as an old friend. It would be understood that he had not yet had time to give it the thorough study which it required. He would give a more considered opinion later in the day. However he could say at once that in his view the proposal could be used in pursuance of the current Communist line and would play into Communist hands. He said that a number of American organizations which had been known to follow the Communist Party line had advocated a cease fire along the lines of the proposed resolution. He mentioned in this connection the American Communist Party, the ADA, the CIO, and the United Nations Association. He said that a cease fire and neutralization of the islands was a recognized preliminary step in a carefully planned sequence of events designed to achieve Communist objectives as to China. He listed the steps as follows:

1) Neutralization and cease-fire as to off-shore islands.

2) Same, as to Formosa.

3) UN trusteeship for Formosa.

4) UN membership for Communist China.

5) Communist takeover of Formosa and liquidation of the Chinese Government.

He said that the Chinese Communists have been predicting this chain of events to the Chinese people on the mainland, and that this resolution would be recognized by the Chinese people as acquiescence in the first stage of the Communist scheme.

He said that if his Government gave its consent to the proposal, it would have a destructive effect on the morale of his troops, the common people living on Formosa, the overseas Chinese, and their enslaved fellow countrymen on the mainland who are looking for signs of resistance to Communism rather than evidences of a disposition to work out cease-fire agreements with them.

He said that the proposed resolution would be very difficult to explain to the Chinese troops if it were not opposed by the Chinese Government. If adopted, it would deprive the Chinese troops of their mission, their objective. The Chinese Government, if it ever consented to such a resolution, would have to devise some satisfactory explanation to give the troops. The President did not know how this could be done. He feared that Chinese Government agreement to the resolution would be considered as a betrayal of the trust reposed in the Chinese Government by all Chinese who seek the overthrow of the Communist regime.

The President doubted the possibility of preventing the Chinese Communists from raising the entire range of China issues to their own advantage.

The President said that his Government is deeply grateful for the assistance extended it by the American Government since the loss of the mainland. Nevertheless he thought he should speak frankly, knowing that he was speaking to true friends of China who would not take his bluntness amiss. He then said with some bitterness that he had believed for some time and still believes that the U.S. policy as to China may change at any time. His Government was trying to prepare for such an eventuality. His Government welcomed American assistance in the struggle against Communism, but if that assistance were withdrawn, his people were fully resolved to carry on the struggle regardless. He said he believed that his Government would eventually have to fight alone. It would fight on alone to the last ditch making the best use of all the resources then available to it. He said that he has ordered his troops on the off-shore islands to fight to the last man, with or without the assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

Mr. Robertson observed that no one was asking the Chinese troops not to fight if attacked. The object of the New Zealand resolution was to prevent an attack. Nothing in the resolution would interfere with the Chinese right to resist an attack. Mr. Robertson expressed confidence that the U.S. Delegation could exclude political matters from the Security Council consideration of the New Zealand proposal. U.S. representatives would take vigorous action to this end. The narrow scope of the resolution would help to prevent the discussion from broadening out into a general political debate on China issues.

Mr. Robertson said he did not know anything about the ADA or the other organizations mentioned having advocated a course similar to the proposed New Zealand resolution. He recognized that fellow travelers would support the sequence of events planned by the Communists which the President had mentioned, but he did not see how the New Zealand proposal would lead into or facilitate such a succession of events. He was positive that the New Zealand Government had acted in entire good faith in offering to introduce the resolution. The plan was very closely held, and only a few people within the U.S. Government knew anything about the proposal. It could not be identified with Communist schemes. In fact it was highly probable that the Communists would contemptuously reject it, as they had persistently resisted UN intervention in Korea. They could be expected to argue that the control of Chinese territory was a strictly internal matter entirely out of UN jurisdiction.

Mr. Robertson said that we must take into full account the legal limitation imposed on President Eisenhower as to the use of American troops without congressional authorization. It was a reality which would have to affect our course of action. He asked President Chiang to consider carefully the alternatives to the proposed resolution and to see if they were not far less desirable. He said that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had considered the matter carefully. They were convinced that the resolution combined with a mutual defense pact would improve the position of Nationalist China. He emphasized that the United States could not include a commitment to defend the off-shore islands in a defense pact. It would have to be clearly understood also that a pact would have to be purely defensive in character, as were the agreements with Korea, Philippines, and other countries. There could be no action of an offensive nature except by mutual agreement.

President Chiang said that the prospect of a defense pact did have a bearing on his evaluation of the proposed UN move. If a formal announcement of an intention by the U.S. and China to negotiate a defense pact preceded the New Zealand move, the harmful effects of the latter might be offset or at least greatly mitigated, but the pact announcement must come first. The timing was highly important.

At this point (approximately 10:15 a.m.), the President suggested the conference be recessed until 11:00 a.m. so that the participants would have an opportunity to study the various aspects of the problem and perhaps discover a new and better approach. It was agreed that the participants would reconvene in the President’s office in down town Taipei.

The meeting was resumed at 11:00 a.m. in the office of President Chiang, with two additional representatives of the Chinese Government present: Vice President Chen Cheng and Prime Minister O.K. Yui. President Chiang said he had asked the Vice President and Premier to attend in view of the great importance which attached to the question under discussion.

Mr. Robertson said that in his view the essential question was whether the New Zealand proposal was preferable to the alternatives, and whether it was in the long term interest of the Chinese Government. On the day he left, he and Secretary Dulles had had a long talk with Senator Knowland. He was not authorized to quote the Senator, but felt certain Senator Knowland would not object to mention of the view he had expressed on this subject. Senator Knowland, who is well known to the Chinese Government as a strong opponent of Communist aggression, had indicated that in view of all the circumstances he felt the UN move was the best thing to do.

Vice President Chen Cheng said that the problem which concerns the UN was created by the Chinese Communists. “The problem is caused not by our attacking the Communists, but by their attacking us.” He said that since the puppet congress convened in Peiping, the Communists have not ceased their campaign for “liberation of Formosa.” This is not just propaganda but a real threat.

Mr. Robertson agreed and pointed out that the New Zealand resolution would call on the Communists to cease their attacks on the islands. Of course the converse would apply also—the Nationalists would then be expected to cease their counter-attacks.

The Vice President remarked that the Chinese Communists are still firing on Quemoy. The Chinese Government must return fire with fire. Otherwise there would be a serious morale problem.

Mr. Robertson said that he wholly agreed. No one is opposing Chinese Nationalist resistance to attack.

The Vice President said he was not sure that an effective cease fire could be achieved by a simple resolution or recommendation by the UN. Additional measures might be required. The Communists must not dare to violate the agreement. He asked what could be done to assure Communist compliance.

President Chiang interjected a query as to whether an international control commission or inspection group was contemplated?

Mr. Robertson said that if Security Council action was taken, it would amount to More than a simple statement. The Security Council would formally call on both sides to observe a cease fire. The resolution would be based on a finding that a threat to international peace and security existed. Both sides would be called on to stop, without prejudice. It was assumed that the Chinese Nationalists would reserve their position until they saw the Communist reaction. The U.S. would seek to line up the Council members to see that the resolution was limited solely to the one question, with no prejudice, and no broad discussion of Formosa. Mr. Robertson then repeated for the benefit of Vice President Chen Cheng the substance of his opening statement at the 8:00 A M meeting. He added that the U.S. was very anxious to prevent the Communists from learning that the U.S. is not in a position to participate in the defense of the off-shore islands. This would in effect give them a green light to invade the islands. More or less simultaneously with the introduction of the New Zealand resolution, the U.S. would hope to be able to announce the initiation of negotiations for a mutual defense pact with the Chinese Government. This would serve notice that the U.S. has not lost interest in the Chinese Government. It appeared that the one major difficulty in drafting acceptable treaty language would be the treatment of the off-shore islands question. It should be understood that there would be no chance of U.S. ratification of a treaty without an understanding that there would be no offensive action except by mutual agreement.

The Vice President expressed doubt that a cease fire could be achieved. The Communists would not abide by such a resolution. In Indochina, they had stepped up their offensive at Dien Bien Phu although a cease fire was already under negotiation at Geneva. The Chinese Government is on the defensive on the islands and should not be put in the same category with the aggressor. The Chinese Communists do not respect a cease-fire resolution—only force. The New Zealand move will not prevent Communists attacks, but a Seventh Fleet gesture is understood by the Communists. The off-shore islands are vital to the Chinese Government and the Government would have to fight to hold them. A cease-fire could not be depended upon.

Mr. Robertson asked what would Nationalist China have to lose by the cease fire effort? If and when the Communists contemptuously reject the proposal he would guess that the Chinese Nationalist position in the Free World would be strengthened. If New Zealand does not raise the off-shore islands issue in the UN, sooner or later some less friendly nation is likely to bring up broader questions, possibly including trusteeship. The New Zealand move will forestall the introduction of embarrassing broader questions. If this limited resolution should be rejected by the Communists and their attacks on the islands resumed, their prospects of introducing proposals objectionable to Free China would be greatly reduced.

Vice President Chen Cheng said he anticipated that while the matter was still under consideration in the UN, the Communists would bring about another Dien Bien Phu to the loss of the entire Free World.

Mr. Robertson said he did not see that the mere introduction of the resolution would improve Communist capabilities. He did not see that this observation constituted a reason for opposing the New Zealand resolution.

The Vice President said that he was concerned not with opposing the resolution but with how to achieve a secure cease-fire. Unless effective defense arrangements could be made in advance, the Communists would be given a good opportunity for successful aggression.

Mr. Robertson asked—”How?”

Vice President Chen Cheng said he did not think that New Zealand was acting entirely on her own initiative, and he feared the Communists already knew of U.S. reluctance to assist in the defense of the off-shore islands. The Communists knew of the U.S. decision not to cross the Yalu in Korea before American Commanders knew it. They know how to take advantage of such decisions.

Mr. Robertson asked if the New Zealand resolution would leave the Chinese Government worse off? He pointed out that there was no request for any action which would weaken the position of the Chinese Government vis-à-vis the Communists. On the contrary, the desire was to strengthen the Chinese Nationalist position.

General Chang Chun in response to a query from President Chiang, remarked that if the New Zealand proposal were adopted irrespective of its acceptability to the Chinese Government, it would be extremely important for the U.S. to agree to a bilateral pact which would include the off-shore islands.

Mr. Robertson interjected, “No.” He said that President Eisenhower feels that the off-shore islands cannot be included. Mutually acceptable language would have to be worked out in reference to territory necessary for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. The U.S. Government has announced that any Communist attempt to take Formosa would mean war with the U.S., but no wide general commitment can be submitted to the Senate for ratification. The New Zealand proposal might be an ingenious way to assure the retention of the off-shore islands through action by the Security Council. He agreed with Chang Chun that there was risk of Communist defiance of the UN on this issue, but such defiance would work against the Communists rather than our side.

General Chang Chun agreed that it would be possible and probably desirable for his Government to reserve its attitude toward the New Zealand proposal and wait for the Communist reaction. But the Chinese Government would have to take a voting position eventually. At that time the Government must have something constructive to tell its people and troops. Hence it is needful to start the defense pact discussions immediately, including a consideration of how to define the territory necessary for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. Robertson said he thought General Chang Chun was exactly right. He said he wanted to get back to Washington immediately, and would strongly recommend that an announcement be made promptly that we are entering into negotiations for a bilateral pact.

General Chang Chun inquired if it could be arranged for the announcement of intention to negotiate a pact to be made at the time of introduction of the New Zealand resolution, and for the pact to be signed on the same day that the vote was taken. In that case the Chinese Government could instruct its UN delegation to cooperate with the U.S. delegation.

Mr. Robertson said that the suggested arrangement would be ideal. But he did not know how long it would take for the two Governments to get together on the treaty language. There was a question of semantics. Also it was important to use language which would keep the Chinese Communists guessing as to our intentions respecting the off-shore islands. Yet there could be no expressed inclusion of the off-shore islands. Solution of these drafting problems would determine the date of signing. It was a guess—there was no way of knowing when agreement on language could be reached. The proposal was scheduled to be introduced in the UN within the next few days, but presumably there would be no vote right away. Undoubtedly there would be some discussion. It would seem inadvisable for the Nationalist Government to take a position immediately. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles would wish to consider the language of any proposed treaty. Mr. Robertson said he would recommend promp consideration. He recognized the psychological value of an early announcement of intention to open negotiations.

President Chiang said that Mr. Robertson must have seen the Chinese draft of a proposed pact.³ This draft did not mention the off-shore isalnds as such. What has happened to this draft?

Mr. Robertson said that the U.S. Government has studied the Chinese draft, but it has not been decided that the language is acceptable. He felt that suitable wording could be devised, but the conflicting considerations have not yet been reconciled. He wanted to repeat that the pact must be defensive in character, with no non-defensive action to be taken except as mutually agreed upon.

President Chiang said he agreed to the defensive nature of the pact.

Ambassador Rankin said that he wished to expand somewhat the views he had expressed earlier in response to President Chiang’s request. He said he had given considerable thought to the matter since Mr. Robertson’s arrival the afternoon before. It was regrettable that there was no single ideal solution. We are faced by alternatives all of which are less than perfect. To put it in the worst terms, it is a question of finding the least bad solution. On the military side it is an open question whether the Chinese Government, even with Seventh Fleet assistance, could hold the off-shore islands without U.S. commitment to full-scale war. This, as pointed out by Mr. Robertson, President Eisenhower is convinced, the Congress would not support if the off-shore islands were involved. Another point made by Mr. Robertson is that it is only a matter of time until someone raises the subject in the UN, possibly under less favorable circumstances. It should be recognized that the Government of New Zealand is well disposed even if you differ on the wisdom of this proposal. We must not suffer a reverse on the psychological factors. We must maneuver to maintain our position in the UN. The way the item is handled and the timing is important. It offers an opportunity to improve our joint position. Mr. Rankin added that while he did not like it and shared with President Chiang considerable unhappiness over the present situation, he believed President Chiang would be well advised to follow the course outlined by Mr. Robertson.

General Chang Chun remarked that the ostensible reason for Mr. Robertson’s hurried trip was to discuss the assistance program. Many persons would doubt this, and the Communists would know better. Mr. Robertson is in charge of Far Eastern political affairs in the State Department, not economic and military aid. The Communists will know his real subject of discussion is the off-shore islands. This knowledge they may capitalize on unless we work very hard in the interim. The ideal course would be for the pact to be signed before the resolution is passed. That would create a better situation. A cease-fire would not be helpful, but undoubtedly a pact would have a good psychological impact.

President Chiang agreed that it was imperative to work very hard on the language of the pact—”beginning this moment.” He expressed misgivings that the New Zealand Government may have been misled into proposing the resolution. He did not think they were knowingly playing the Communist game. He accepted their good faith and good intentions but perhaps they had been duped.

Mr. Robertson said there were two good reasons for thinking that the New Zealand proposal had not been inspired by the Communists: (1) The Communists would have worked for a different and much broader kind of resolution. The New Zealand resolution covers only one narrowly defined point. (2) New Zealand looks to the U.S., not Great Britain for her security in the Pacific. New Zealand is in ANZUS, while Great Britain is not. New Zealand is not naive. New Zealand well knows that it is not in her interest to conspire with the sympathizers of Red China in trying to put anything over on the United States.

General Chang agreed that New Zealand itself is not influenced by the Communists. But he said that their proposed action would tend to achieve a Communist objective. However, he preferred not to discuss this futher.

Mr. Robertson said that as to the reason for his visit, he of course could not say anything which would not be in harmony with the State Department press release which mentioned that he would discuss the aid programs. There was nothing inconsistent about this since the economic assistance programs for all countries are subject to the policy guidance of the Secretary of State. Basic foreign economic policy is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, not Mr. Stassen. Mr. Robertson said he would prepare some sort of supplemental statement for the press which he would show to the Generalissimo.

Mr. Robertson remarked that the New Zealand proposal might never come to a vote. He would recommend to the Secretary that we proceed with the negotiation of a treaty regardless of the disposition of the New Zealand proposal. It is the U.S. opinion that the U.S. delegation should support the New Zealand proposal. If we have a firm agreement with New Zealand to limit the item to the one point, we would be prepared to use all our influence to get other Security Council members to agree to exclude everything except this one point.

The U.S. has already told New Zealand that we would not support any resolution which would permit discussion of wider political questions such as those mentioned this morning. To show the current state of U.S. public opinion on the issue of a UN seat for Communist China, Senator Knowland has said that in response to his statement that he would resign his Senate seat if necessary to fight the Chinese Communists’ admission to the UN⁴—he had received the heaviest mail in his experience—thousands of letters, more than 90 percent supporting his position.

The Generalissimo said that because of Mr. Robertson’s long record of friendship for China and his frustrating experiences with the Chinese Communists, he hoped for good results from Mr. Robertson’s visit. Some way must be found to solve the problems. He knew that all three Americans present had had experience with the Communists and shared a deep dislike and distrust of them. All three knew the tricks, intrigues, subterfuges and deceptions of the Communists. But perhaps not fully enough. He said that he did not agree that we would gain anything from the resolution. If adopted, it would be as great a blow to the armed forces as when General Marshall⁵ attempted to mediate. Mr. Robertson should know. The Chinese people would think after a cease-fire that the Chinese Government had no hope. So they would tend to turn to the Communists. The adverse reaction in the Army would be immediate. The soldiers would be inclined to say “The U.S. is again trying to prevent us from fighting the Communists.” The natural result would be the eventual loss of Formosa to the Communists. The armed forces and the people would lose confidence and hope in their Government and the U.S. Government as well. They would say, “It is better to surrender to the Communists.” This is the kind of consequence that would occur internally. He did not know whether Mr. Robertson had considered this. Next the U.S. probably could limit the scope of the text of the New Zealand resolution. But the U.S. could not prevent the Communists from attaching conditions to their acceptance. The Communists never accept unqualifiedly what you propose. Suppose the Chinese Communists do agree conditionally. There would be cease-fire talks and cease-fire inspection teams. While this is going on, the Communists would not stop their drive towards objectives. They would proceed just as they did during Geneva to get Hanoi and Haiphong. He was sure of this from his experience with the Communists. If it did not prove to be so, Mr. Robertson need never believe him again. This is sure to be the consequence. They will not deviate from their established objectives.

It has been said that if the Chinese Communists contemptuously reject the proposal and continue to fight “the responsibility will be on the Communist side.” But what does this mean? The responsibility was on their side before, but it did not keep them from winning. The responsibility did not hurt them. During the Marshall Mission, the Government did almost everything requested of it. The Communists defied the mediation attempt and eventually won. If Formosa should be lost to the Communists, would the fact that the Communists were “responsible” bring it back? He said he had already talked several hours and would stop. He hoped that Mr. Robertson would quote these points to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. He felt that something more concrete could and should be accomplished today.

Mr. Robertson said that he was somewhat confused by the President’s remarks. The effect of the New Zealand resolution on the Chinese people would in his opinion depend on what kind of a resolution it was and what it said. He asked President Chiang what he thought the position of the U.S. should be, bearing in mind its responsibilities as a member of the UN and the Security Council when the resolution merely called attention to the undoubted fact that the attacks on Quemoy and the counter-attacks on the mainland resulting therefrom threatened international peace and security.

President Chiang said that he would reserve comment on that. But the reaction of people on Formosa would be that the Americans must be behind the resolution. So it is the same as if the Americans introduced the resolution themselves. The Chinese reasoning is that the Americans do not like war. So rather than run the risk of war, they are willing to take action which may let the Communists take Formosa.

Mr. Robertson said he must not have made himself clear. The U.S. intention is to defend Formosa. This has been made clear to all the world.

President Chiang said that Mr. Robertson has talked about Formosa. But the off-shore islands are involved also. The Chinese people will only think about the simple facts. He said that he did not want to dwell on the dark period of Sino-American relations:—the Marshall period, the White Paper⁶ and other unpleasant events. The situation has now improved. U.S. aid is generous. The Government hopes for increased aid to help it fight back to the mainland. The people do not want a cease-fire and will be disappointed. It would be more appropriate if the U.S. reserved its position on the resolution and China opposed it. The press would criticize a failure of the Chinese Government to oppose the resolution. If the Chinese Government does not oppose the resolution, its position will be hard to justify. On the mainland, the Government took the risk of trying to cooperate with the Communists. At that time the Government was not experienced in the ways of the Communists. The people excused the blunder, but they would never excuse the same blunder again.

Mr. Robertson said he thought we were talking about two different things. Both countries are UN members. China as a party to the dispute, can reasonably reserve her position. But can the U.S. say it would not support a simple resolution intended to stop hostilities. To do so would make it seem that we want to bring on war. A refusal could not be squared with our obligations under the Charter.

President Chiang said he believed the U.S. has sufficient influence with New Zealand to cause it to withdraw its proposal. If the U.S. wants such a resolution, that is a different matter. But the Chinese Government must decide for itself what it will say to its own people.

If the U.S. prompted New Zealand to propose the resolution, in order to clear the way for a bilateral defense treaty, that would be another matter. But if New Zealand acted entirely independently, there is no favorable aspect to the resolution. It is entirely harmful to the interest of China and should be opposed.

Mr. Robertson said that in the absence of UN action, the Chinese Government is in danger of losing the islands. If the resolution is not vetoed, the effect will be to leave the islands in the possession of the Nationalist Government. If concurrently we start defense treaty negotiations, Free China will be in a stronger position. It will have the off-shore islands plus a treaty protecting Formosa. If the New Zealand proposal is suppressed and an all-out assault resulted in the loss of the off-shore islands would not the psychological effect be much more harmful to the morale of troops and people? It seems to the U.S. Government that a very bad situation would exist, resulting in the loss of more prestige than would be caused by a cease-fire resolution.

President Chiang said that he believed the Chinese people would prefer to fight for and lose the islands rather than accept the principle of cease-fire contained in the New Zealand proposal. But if the proposal was intended to lay a foundation for a defense pact, it would be viewed differently. To the Chinese man in the street and in the Army, acceptance of a cease-fire without sufficient explanation would result in the eventual loss of the islands. Like all Asians, the Chinese have watched the situation in Indochina closely. After the negotiations at Geneva, all of Indochina was surely doomed. The beginning of negotiations with the Communists will eventually lead to the loss of Formosa.

Prime Minister O.K. Yui spoke at the invitation of the President. He said the Chinese Government recognizes that the objective of the U.S. and the New Zealand Governments is peace. We all want peace. But the best way to obtain it is through a firm attitude, a positive policy toward the Communists. The best way is through a bilateral treaty.

Mr. Robertson asked the Generalissimo what his attitude toward the New Zealand resolution would be if he were in the U.S. position, bearing in mind the obligation imposed upon members under the UN Charter?

President Chiang said he was not inclined to discuss this. The problem was how to prevent New Zealand from introducing the resolution. Then the question raised by Mr. Robertson would not be presented.

Vice President Chen Cheng said he hoped that Mr. Robertson could find a solution. Both Governments had the same objectives but the Chinese Government believes that a strong attitude and harsh measures against the Communists were called for, rather than the conciliatory New Zealand approach.

Mr. Robertson recalled that over a year ago the U.S. Government tried to get the French to bring the Indochina question before the UN. They refused. If they had, there might well have been no Dien Bien Phu and no loss of Indochinese territory. There was no parallel between the Indochina case and the proposed action as to the off-shore islands.

The former was not brought before the UN. Mr. Robertson said he did not have and never had had any illusions about the Communists going all the way back to 1945.

President Chiang said he did not blame the U.S. for the reverses in Indochina. He only blamed the French. He considered that the U.S. policy as to Indochina was correct.

Mr. Robertson said in answer to a question raised earlier by the Generalissimo that no inspection teams on the off-shore islands to enforce any UN resolution were envisaged. The resolution would in effect be directed principally against the Chinese Communists.

President Chiang said that his view was different. He thought Communists would welcome the resolution. If he were Vyshinsky,⁷ he would start with something like this. He thought the Communists, before showing their real attitude, would dilly dally, using delaying tactics until Formosa fell to the Communists.

Mr. Robertson said he thought it more likely that they would reject it. He asked if the New Zealand resolution were introduced and the U.S. announced the opening of bilateral treaty negotiations, did President Chiang not agree that the combined courses of action would be in China’s interest?

President Chiang said that if the treaty announcement were made simultaneously, it would not fully offset the bad effects of the New Zealand action. But if the announcement were made before the resolution was introduced, the net effect perhaps would be helpful. If the announcement came after, the overall result would be harmful to both our Governments. Hence for the good of the two Governments and the maintenance of the morale of the people he hoped that, if the New Zealand action came next week, the treaty announcement could come this week.

Mr. Robertson said he thought the New Zealand action was planned for the end of this week.

President Chiang said in that event, he hoped the treaty announcement could come today or tomorrow.

Mr. Robertson said that if the two actions were taken simultaneously, they would be in the news at the same time. This would appear to serve the purpose which the Generalissimo apparently had in mind.

(At this point, approximately 1:50 p.m., conversations were recessed, with the understanding they would be resumed at the Presidential residence before the President’s dinner for Mr. Robertson.)

7:30 p.m.

Continuation of Conversations

Place: Presidential Residence, Taipei

Participants: Same as at 11:00 a.m.

President Chiang asked Mr. Robertson if he had any new ideas. Mr. Robertson answered negatively saying he had pretty well covered the field from his standpoint in the previous discussions. He would strongly recommend to the Secretary that we announce negotiations for a defense pact at least at the same time as the New Zealand action. Since the Secretary may now be isolated on Duck Island,⁸ it is doubtful that it is possible to announce anything in regard to a treaty before the New Zealand proposal, but he did hope for simultaneous action, which he thought would have the same effect. The wording of the New Zealand resolution would not diminish the force of a defense pact announcement.

President Chiang said that he had spent the afternoon in consideration of the problem. Could Mr. Robertson tell him the attitude of Admiral Radford on the matter. Mr. Robertson said that Admiral Radford knew of the proposal. He could not represent Admiral Radford’s views and would not endeavor to quote him. He had not heard Admiral Radford express any opposition.

President Chiang said that something had happened on the Communist side since Mr. Robertson left Washington three days before. He was referring to a joint statement by the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.⁹ He thought this statement changed the situation and recommended that the American Government reconsider its position in the light of the statement. He said that according to the statement, the Soviet Union would return Port Arthur to the Chinese Communists and help build two railroads, one in Mongolia and one in Sinkiang. There were other important items. The statement demanded the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet¹⁰ and also the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan.¹¹

The President remarked that there was always united action on the Communist side. The anti-Communist countries always lagged behind the Communists. Right now the U.S. was hesitating as to a defense pact. He urged Mr. Robertson in the light of the joint statement to make a recommendation against the New Zealand proposal to Secretary Dulles. The best way to deal with the present situation was to stop the New Zealand resolution. He was talking not only in terms of Chinese interests, but also the best interests of the U.S. The New Zealand proposal would eventually get the United States in a dilemma. The Communists are the aggressor. The Chinese Nationalists, as the representatives of China in the UN, are recognized as having sovereignty over China. It cannot be disputed that the Chinese Government has been attacked on the offshore islands. A cease-fire would recognize the “belligerency” of Communist China. It would treat Communist China as a full equal of Nationalist China and no more to blame for the hostilities. As in the case of Korea, a cease-fire would bring no benefit—only harm. He hoped that New Zealand would decide not to submit the resolution. If New Zealand did go ahead, he hoped the resolution would be worded to the effect “Communist China should stop aggressive action against the offshore islands, which are part of the territory of the Chinese Republic, a member of the United Nations.” Such wording would offset the damage and might do some good. Without such wording, his Government and the Chinese Communists would appear merely as two equal belligerents.

Mr. Robertson said he did not follow the President. The Nationalists and the Communists are the ones who are fighting each other. A resolution designed to stop the hostilities would have to refer to both parties. He could not see that the technical question of belligerent status made any difference. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles had reviewed the situation carefully and believed that the UN move presented a possible means of insuring continued retention of the islands by the Chinese Government.

President Chiang asked three rhetorical questions:

1. Does the UN recognize the Chinese Republic?

2. Is the Chinese Republic a member of the UN?

3. Does the Chinese Republic hold the offshore islands?

He said he hoped that the obvious answers to these questions would be taken into account. If encroachment by the Communists on the territory of China is not recognized as aggression, he wondered about the adequacy of the UN Charter. The assault on Quemoy was an act which breached the peace. He considered it in the same category as the attack on South Korea. At that time the UN took sanctions. Here a quite different course is proposed. This does not seem consistent with the Charter. He said he understands the importance of recognizing realities and the importance of holding these islands. But a cease-fire proposal will make the Chinese armed forces think the offshore islands are not worth fighting for. They would no longer have any meaning to the armed forces. “If we lose the islands after making a good fight, there would be no fatal effect on the morale of the armed forces.” But to support a cease-fire is to look for trouble. The best course is to persuade New Zealand not to act.

Mr. Robertson said it is a matter of record that the U.S. recognizes the National Government as the Government of China and the rightful representative of China in the UN. But many other nations recognize Red China. We don’t like it, but it is a fact. The U.S. Government is constantly fighting to maintain the position of the National Government in the UN.

We think that New Zealand has fully decided to submit the resolution. We cannot infringe its unquestioned right to do so. We cannot deny that the hostilities around the offshore islands are a threat to peace and may lead to war in the area. The Communists do not know that the President does not have the right to extend the Seventh Fleet orders to include the offshore islands, but they may find this out through a series of probing actions if nothing is done in the UN to stop them. The Communists might launch attacks which would result in the loss of all the islands. This would be a serious reverse.

President Chiang said that whether the U.S. would assist in the defense of the islands was up to the U.S. But he would say resolutely that “Our people would fight alone to the last.” He said his people would rather fight and lose the offshore islands than see the New Zealand cease-fire proposal adopted. His forces had orders from him clearly stating the Chinese Government determination to fight even without the Seventh Fleet.

Mr. Robertson asked if he understood correctly that the Chinese Government would rather lose the islands than see the UN proposal adopted, supplemented by a mutual defense pact. The New Zealand proposal seemed to give a good sound reason for negotiating a defense treaty which would be complementary to the resolution. He added that he had assumed the Chinese Government considered it important to retain possession of the offshore islands.

President Chiang said that before he answered he would like to make an observation as to what should be done if it proved impossible to persuade New Zealand to refrain from introducing the resolution. He had already said that harm rather than benefit would result from the resolution. But if the resolution were submitted, a study should be made as to what should be done to minimize the harm to China and to the U.S. He had told General Marshall in 1945 that the directive given to him would harm the U.S. He felt certain that the projected resolution would harm the U.S. also—although it would take time to prove it. It was important to expedite the signature of the defense pact and to defend the offshore islands. The pact would do much to restore the confidence of the Asian people in the U.S. The timing was very important. It should be announced before or in any event simultaneously with the New Zealand action. It was even more important that it be signed before the adoption of the New Zealand resolution. If it were signed afterwards, the good effects would be dissipated.

Mr. Robertson said nobody knew whether the Security Council would adopt the resolution. The Soviet Union might veto it. He asked President Chiang if he would state his idea of the purport of the New Zealand resolution?

President Chiang said, as he understood it, the main idea of the resolution was to seek to preserve peace by stopping the hostilities. But, in his view, the resolution would bring no benefit. President Chiang asked whether, in the event of a Soviet veto, the U.S. would still undertake to negotiate a defense treaty?

Mr. Robertson said he thought the answer was yes. That would be his strong recommendation. He was satisfied that the intention was to proceed with treaty negotiations. This would be subject to confirmation from the Secretary of State when he reported the Generalissimo’s views. It was the strong U.S. desire to assure the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. He did not see that the New Zealand proposal, whether adopted or not, would change the existing situation as to the prospect for a defense treaty.

General Chang Chun remarked that it would seem strange for New Zealand in its resolution to treat the two parties as equal belligerents. New Zealand recognized Nationalist China. If they did not, the equal treatment would be more understandable.

Mr. Robertson reiterated the resolution would call only for the cessation of hostilities—without prejudice.

Mr. Robertson then said he would like to restate and obtain confirmation of his understanding of President Chiang’s position:

1. The Chinese Government would prefer to leave matters as they are—that no resolution be introduced in the UN.

2. If New Zealand introduces the resolution, it should be announced, either beforehand (which would be preferable), or simultaneously that we are opening negotiations for a bilateral defense treaty.

3. If physically possible, the Chinese Government would wish the defense treaty to be signed before the Security Council vote is taken on the New Zealand resolution (recognizing that no one can know when the vote will be taken).

4. If New Zealand does bring forward the proposals and if we announce we are entering negotiations for a bilateral mutual defense pact, the Chinese UN delegation would not oppose the resolution and would reserve its position while ascertaining the reaction of the Communists.

General Chang Chun interposed a question. He asked whether, if there was no way to prevent the resolution, it could be worded to show the Communists as the aggressors. If so, there would be no question of the Chinese Government’s position. The Government would not only not object—it might support the resolution.

Mr. Robertson said he could make no commitment for New Zealand. He understood the resolution as now drafted merely cites the fact that hostilities have taken place and calls for a cessation.

President Chiang said he understood of course the U.S. could make no commitment on behalf of New Zealand, but some U.S. action might have the same effect. Could the U.S. delegate stand up and say that this is an act of aggression on the part of the Chinese Communists? This statement on the record could have a good effect. He said his Government knew the U.S. representative could not say all that a Chinese delegate could say. If the U.S. could do merely what had been suggested, the Chinese delegate would reserve his position—he would say nothing at the outset.

Mr. Robertson asked what the Chinese position would be without the suggested U.S. statement?

President Chiang said he hoped the U.S. would find it possible to make such a statement. Clearly the Chinese Communists had committed an act of aggression.

President Chiang said he hoped the treaty could be signed irrespective of the outcome of the New Zealand resolution. He felt that if a treaty had been signed several months ago when proposed by the Chinese Government, the hostilities against Quemoy might never have started.

Mr. Robertson said the treaty should cover Formosa and the Pescadores but we do not want to convey any information as to the limitations of the treaty to the Communists. The problem is how to keep the Communists in the dark as to our intentions with regard to the offshore islands.

President Chiang asked if the U.S. intended to negotiate a treaty regardless of (a) New Zealand action, or (b) Soviet action on a New Zealand resolution.

Mr. Robertson replied, “that will be my recommendation.”

President Chiang said that treaty talks have been going on for some time, and New Zealand had never entered the picture before. The Chinese draft treaty had been submitted to the Department many months ago. No answer had been received. He wondered what was the reason. He said that compared with the Communists, we are terribly slow. The Communists work as a smooth team. They have jointly put in a demand for U.S. withdrawal from Japan and Formosa.

Mr. Robertson observed we have not withdrawn from either place and if he knew anything, we would not withdraw.

President Chiang said that he was only citing an example of positive Communist tactics.

Mr. Robertson agreed that Free World divisions can be a source of trouble. He said that one of the difficulties in prompt negotiation of a treaty is how to define the area which is to be protected. We do not want a treaty which would give a green light to the Communists to take the offshore islands. It is very desirable that the offshore islands remain in Chinese Nationalist hands.

President Chiang said that perhaps appropriate language can be worked out acceptable to both sides which would make no mention of the offshore islands. There were also two understandings which his Government wished to incorporate in a separate exchange of notes:

1. No offensive action is to be taken by the Chinese Government without the consent of the U.S.

2. If the enemy attacks the offshore islands, the U.S. will assist in the defense of the islands.

Mr. Robertson said he could make no commitment whatever on the second point. President Eisenhower feels that the Congress will sanction U.S. participation in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores but not the offshore islands.

President Chiang said he did not ask for a definite reply just now. He merely asked Mr. Robertson to take the request back to the President and the Secretary of State.

General Chang Chun said that Ambassador Rankin had made some useful suggestions as to the scope of a defense pact in discussions with Foreign Minister Yeh last June.

Mr. Robertson said that the Secretary of State had felt that as things have stood, the President’s directive to the Seventh Fleet gave the Chinese Government more freedom of action than would a defense treaty. The carefully considered position is that the President does not feel justified in asking the Congress to commit the U.S. to go to war over the offshore islands.

President Chiang said that it was his hope that, assuming both Governments to be sincere, formal negotiations could be opened immediately after Mr. Robertson’s return. He said that he would appoint Foreign Minister George Yeh and Ambassador Wellington Koo as his plenipotentiaries with full authorization to enter into negotiations with the U.S. Government.

Vice President Chen Cheng said that he thought there was something of a contradiction in the U.S. position. President Eisenhower feels it is not possible for the U.S. to support action in defense of the offshore islands. On the other hand, if the New Zealand proposal should be adopted, the U.S. presumably will participate in the provisional UN protection of the islands.

Mr. Robertson said there was no contradiction. The U.S. could make no commitment to go to war in defense of the islands. The UN action does not require us to do so.

President Chiang said that since he became the head of the Chinese Government, he has tried hard to follow the policy of the U.S., sometimes at a sacrifice. The interests of the two countries have been essentially the same, so he has never tried to go counter to the interest of the U.S. In 1945–46 on the mainland, he knew that if his Government did as General Marshall requested, the result would be disaster. “But we took it.” This is evidence that the Chinese government has not disregarded the wishes of the U.S. He now regrets that he did not speak to General Marshall as he has today spoken to Mr. Robertson. He did not know General Marshall as well. He did not talk vehemently to him. He did not say that the policy would lead to much trouble for the United States as well as disaster for China.

Today the New Zealand proposal is put forward. It is very important. If we follow the policy implicit in that proposal, Formosa is gone and there is no hope for a free China. He could not remain silent because it was his duty to speak. So he would say very candidly and frankly that if the proposal is adopted and nothing is done to offset it, the Chinese Government would be forced to take its own course. That would be the course of justice and right. The course he would choose would be in the true interest of the U.S. also. He hoped this was very clear. If anyone else had been sent from Washington on this mission, he would not have said this, but Mr. Robertson, as his old friend, knows him well and there is no reason for a lack of candor. The opportunity afforded by Mr. Robertson’s coming is a rare one for both sides to make themselves as clear as possible.

Mr. Robertson said that he did not understand a remark made by the Generalissimo as they went in to dinner to the effect that it might have been better if he had not come at all with such a proposal. Mr. Robertson remarked that he could have saved himself a long tiresome trip and devoted his time to other pressing matters. But he wanted to come because it would have been impossible to have had this discussion by cable.

President Chiang said he felt that the subject had not been exhausted but the main points had been covered.

Mr. Robertson said he assumed that the President had reference to a defense pact when he referred to delays and deplored the fact that nothing was being done.

President Chiang said of course that was what he meant. He said the Chinese Government was prepared for the eventuality that the US might not sign. It has seemed that the US does not intend to sign. Even at this moment he has doubts.

Mr. Robertson said that he had no doubts. If it was stipulated that there would be no offensive action except, as agreed, he would have no doubts.

President Chiang said that his Government had agreed many months ago to refrain from offensive action unless US approval were obtained. But there was no answer. Now the New Zealand proposal comes very suddenly.

Mr. Robertson said that the Secretary had explained his reluctance to proceed with the treaty. He did not want to freeze the Chinese Nationalist position. He felt that the Chinese Government had more freedom of action without a treaty than with one.

President Chiang said there were many things he could say, but the hour was late, he did not want to repeat, he did not want to embarrass—

Mr. Robertson said “there is no embarrassment”.

General Chang Chun said that Mr. Robertson knew China and the Chinese better than anyone. He was in charge of Far Eastern affairs for the US Government. He was a good friend. The Chinese Government believed that he could influence the President of the United States.

Mr. Robertson said he considered that the Chinese Government has been a staunch, loyal, cooperative ally of the United States. Both Governments have made mistakes, but “we think the US has proved its loyal friendship for China”.

President Chiang said that he agreed.

General Chang Chun said it was a pity that Mr. Robertson did not accompany Secretary Dulles on his recent stopover in Taipei. All were sorry for the illness which prevented it. He said Mr. Robertson was a friend of China, and was able to formulate U.S. Far Eastern policy. He said he knew Mr. Robertson had great influence in making Far Eastern policy, especially as to China.

Mr. Robertson said he had always expressed his views as to China with the greatest frankness both publicly and privately. There were differences of opinion as to the right policy in the US as in China. US–China policy has been controversial for many years. So one can do only what can be done. One cannot ignore what is impossible.

President Chiang agreed. He said we must consider the limitations imposed by reality, but also the consequences.

President Chiang wished Mr. Robertson every success and a good return trip as the meeting ended at approximately 11:15 p.m.

1. The conversations recorded here took place during Robertson’s and McConaughy’s visit to Taipei, Oct. 12–14. According to a letter of Oct. 18 from McConaughy to Rankin, Secretary Dulles read this memorandum of conversation on Oct. 17. (FE files, lot 64 D 230, “Correspondence with Foreign Service Officers”)
2. Political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Minister Yeh was in the United States as the head of the Chinese Delegation to the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly.
3. Presumably the draft given to Rankin on Dec. 18, 1953; see footnote 2, Document 161.
4. For text of Knowland’s statement, made in the Senate on July 1, 1954, see the Congressional Record, vol. 100, part 7, p. 9426.
5. For documentation concerning Gen. George C. Marshall’s mission to China, December 1945–January 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 745 ff., and ibid.. 1946, volumes ix and x.
6. For documentation relating to the publication of the China White Paper, United States Relations With China, in August 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, pp. 1365 ff.
7. Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative at the United Nations, 1953–1954.
8. An island in Lake Ontario; Secretary Dulles’ vacation retreat.
9. The People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union issued several statements on Oct. 12, following negotiations during the Khrushchev delegation’s visit to China. These included a joint declaration on Sino-Soviet relations and international affairs; a joint declaration concerning the question of relations with Japan; and communiques announcing agreements on new Soviet credits and economic aid, the transfer to China of the Soviet share of four Sino-Soviet companies, the completion of new rail connections between China and the Soviet Union, new arrangements for Sino-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Port Arthur. The texts of these statements are printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1951 pp. 321–328.
10. The declaration on Sino-Soviet relations and international affairs, cited in footnote 9 above, declared that “the continued occupation by the United States of a part of the Chinese People’s Republic’s territory, in particular the island of Taiwan (Formosa),” was “incompatible with the tasks of maintaining peace in the Far East and lessening of international tension.”
11. The declaration on Japan, cited in footnote 9 above, charged that Japan was still a “partly occupied country,” her territory “covered with numerous United States military bases.”