793.00/10–1054
No. 336
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and
Security Affairs (Bond)
Subject:
- China Item; Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
- Mr. Niles W. Bond, UNP
- Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
- Miss Barbara Salt, First Secretary, British Embassy
- Ambassador Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand
- Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
- Mr. M. J. C. Templeton, New Zealand Delegation to the UN
The persons listed above met today at 4:45 p.m. at the Secretary’s home to continue discussion of the subject item.
Sir Robert opened the meeting by stating that he had received a reply from Mr. Eden which he wished to convey to the Secretary. He said that Mr. Eden, who fully understood the difficulties involved and admired the statesmanlike way in which the Secretary had been approaching the problem, agreed in general to go forward with the item, subject, however, to three comments.
The first of these comments was that Mr. Eden disliked the restriction on voting which had been written into the draft Minute,1 since he regarded it as “unnecessarily binding”. Sir Robert said that Mr. Eden, who recognized that in pursuing this item we were walking a narrow path between the dangers of expanded war on the one hand and exacerbated Anglo-American differences on the other, believed that the restrictive language in question (“vote against any amendment of substance to the draft resolution”) was apt to increase rather than decrease the likelihood of bringing to light the basic divergences between U.S. and UK policies with respect to China. He added that Mr. Eden thought the point which we had been trying to make in that clause was adequately conveyed by the immediately following language, to the effect that we should “make every effort in the handling of this item in the UN to confine discussion” etc.
The Secretary said that what he had had in mind in this connection was that our efforts to prevent an enlargement of the discussion would almost inevitably be futile, and that it was therefore necessary to do everything within our power to restrict the action to be taken, which was something we could hope to control. The most effective way to accomplish this end, the Secretary said, would be to reach firm agreement on the form of a resolution and then to stick closely to it. He added that he too was anxious to prevent an accentuation of our differences, which he believed would be [Page 726] exactly what would happen if we did not adhere firmly to an agreed resolution.
Ambassador Munro interjected that he had received a brief telegram from his Ministry of External Affairs saying that, while they had been unable to reach the Minister on this subject, they felt we were going in the right direction.
The Secretary then reiterated that unless we could go into the Security Council with an agreed resolution, he regarded it as highly questionable whether we should go in at all. Sir Robert said he was certain that Mr. Eden would agree in principle with the Secretary, but that he, Mr. Eden, had given the Embassy no latitude in his instructions. He mentioned that one of the things which appeared to be troubling Mr. Eden was his concern over our being able to reach agreement on what was and what was not an “amendment of substance.” He repeated that Mr. Eden felt that our objective of holding the line on the resolution was adequately safeguarded by the above-quoted language.
In response to the latter point the Secretary pointed out that the restrictive language in question applied only to discussion of the item and did not refer to any action which might be taken. He said that one of the things that he had been trying to do was to separate these two things in the draft Minute. Sir Robert expressed the opinion that this distinction might not have been made adequately clear to Mr. Eden, and said he believed the Embassy would have to go back to Mr. Eden to make sure there was no misunderstanding on this point. The Secretary agreed that this would seem to be advisable.
Sir Robert said that he had been trying to think of some language on which we might reach agreement and suggested the following as a possible substitute for the phrase which Mr. Eden had sought to have deleted: “make every effort in the handling of this item in the UN to prevent any amendment of substance to the draft resolution and to confine discussion” etc. After a brief discussion it was the consensus that this suggested language should be referred to the respective Governments for consideration. (For amended text of draft Minute see Tab A.)2
The Secretary urged that Sir Robert make clear to Mr. Eden the Secretary’s conviction that if we were to allow ourselves to be split in the Security Council over questions of China policy, to proceed further with this item would be dangerous indeed. Ambassador Munro said that his Government was most anxious not to be faced with a situation in which, after having introduced a resolution on [Page 727] the subject, it would find that resolution a bone of contention between the U.S. and the UK. He added that it was of vital importance to his Government to avoid such a situation, and asked that Sir Robert convey this thought to Mr. Eden.
Sir Robert then said that Mr. Eden’s second comment was that he would like to feel that the U.S. Delegates in presenting this item would not present it in a way solely designed to protect the Chinese Nationalists. The Secretary pointed out that the initial presentation would be by New Zealand on the basis of its letter to the President of the Security Council, the stated purpose of the item being to bring about a termination of hostilities. He added that he saw no reason why the U.S. could not present the problem in the same light. Ambassador Munro said that this would obviously have to be the motif, and that he was not unduly concerned on this point.
Sir Robert stated that Mr. Eden’s third point was that we have not yet agreed on what action we should take if the Communists do not cooperate. He said it was Mr. Eden’s view that if the resolution should fail because of Communist actions, the UK would not be committed to do anything beyond agreeing to leave the item on the Security Council agenda, in addition to which, the UK would of course, confer with the other interested Governments on possible further steps. After mentioning the possibility of a Chinese Nationalist veto, the Secretary said he saw no reason why any of us should be committed to any particular course of action if this initiative should fail, adding that Mr. Eden’s position seemed reasonable. He said that although it might be possible to take the item to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution, this would be dangerous because of the difficulty of controlling the General Assembly; this was generally agreed.
Sir Robert said that Mr. Eden had further stated in his instructions that, if there were a favorable response to his three comments, we should get on as rapidly as possible with the matter, and particularly with our Formosa consultations. He said Mr. Eden envisaged a meeting with other friendly delegations in New York not later than Wednesday the 13th and that, while his instructions were somewhat ambiguous on this point, he believed Mr. Eden had in mind notification to the Soviets and Communist Chinese on Thursday just prior to transmittal of the New Zealand letter to the President of the Security Council. With respect to timing of the Formosa consultations, the Secretary said that Mr. Robertson had already left and should be at that moment in Honolulu. He expressed doubt, however, whether he could finish his consultations in Formosa in time to permit the Wednesday meeting envisaged by Mr. Eden, and said he thought it would be more feasible to plan for [Page 728] such a meeting on Thursday. Sir Robert said that Mr. Eden was particularly concerned about the danger of leaks arising out of the Formosa consultations, adding that if such a leak should occur prior to their notification to Peking, the whole operation would be derailed. After some discussion it was agreed that a Wednesday meeting with the other friendly delegations was probably out of the question and that it would be more realistic to plan such a meeting for Thursday. It was also agreed that in such event it would be desirable if the notifications to Moscow and Peking and transmittal of the New Zealand letter could all be accomplished also on that day. Ambassador Munro pointed out that should Mr. Robertson accomplish his objectives in Formosa earlier than we believed he would, the schedule might still be moved up to permit our moving ahead on Wednesday instead of Thursday.
At this point the Secretary was called away to another appointment.3
- See footnote 3, Document 332.↩
- Not printed. The substantive portion of the amended draft minute is identical to that quoted in footnote 3, Document 332, except for the amendments discussed here.↩
-
A message from Secretary Dulles to Robertson (in Okinawa, en route to Taipei), transmitted in JCS telegram 969213, Oct. 11, 1954, reads in part as follows:
“Eden has accepted ‘Agreed Minute’ slightly amended, so you should proceed with presentation to Chiang per your instructions.
“We are hoping to have word from you by Wednesday October 13 (Washington time) on results your conversation, which would permit us to proceed with transmittal of letter to Security Council Thursday.” (793.5/10–1154)
A copy of the “Agreed Minute”, together with a draft letter from the New Zealand Representative to the President of the Security Council, the draft resolution, and a cover sheet headed “Documents on China Item (Agreed texts as of October 12, 1954)”, are filed with a memorandum of Nov. 1, 1954, from Walter K. Scott to Admiral Radford. (793.00/11–154) The “Agreed Minute” is identical in substance to the amended draft minute cited in footnote 2 above.
↩