793.00/10–954: Telegram
No. 333
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Bohlen)
to the Department of State
522. Reference Department telegram 252.1 Since publication Khrushchev’s speech, question of Formosa has dropped out of Soviet press which appears to support statement in Embassy telegram 4912 that Soviet Government is for moment inclined to soft-pedal this issue in order to avoid any impression of Soviet Government commitment concerning Formosa. Therefore, unless there are signs from Commie China that this campaign was being pursued with increasing intensity or in particular information from intelligence sources of any impending action, I would believe that suggestions two and three in my 4833 should be held in abeyance. Suggestion one in propaganda field should of course be pursued with vigor.
While I realize there are many other important reasons bearing on question of conclusion mutual defense pact with Chinese Nationalist Government, I do not believe in circumstances propaganda campaign re Formosa, especially as affecting Soviet Union, is in itself sufficient reason for so far-reaching a step. Main deterrent to any military action against Formosa is of course expected reaction of US. This could, if necessary, be made just as clear to Commies by unilateral US declaration as by proposed treaty. In addition to complications referred to in telegram under reference, treaty would afford Commie propaganda excellent opportunity to exploit and acerbate existing differences on China with our allies and especially throughout neutralist Asian countries. If for other reasons Department concludes that treaty is desirable at this time, I would like to emphasize extreme importance of clarity in regard to the two aspects mentioned in Department telegram 252. Any ambiguity on these points might dangerously complicate and possibly reduce effectiveness of treaty as deterrent. If, for example, implication is left that US has no definite commitments re off-shore islands, this [Page 721] might constitute open invitation to Commies to act with impunity against them. If for other reasons this treaty is to be concluded, my judgment as to utility and advisability of talks with Soviets would in large measure depend upon degree of clarity as to its scope and purpose and especially US commitments which could be introduced into treaty. I believe it would be a mistake to attempt any private clarification with Soviets in event that these points remain ambiguous.
In general, I believe that while we must watch with closest attention possible developments this campaign re Formosa from either Chinese Commie and/or Soviet sources, at present moment, with Soviet Union soft-pedaling this question, counter propaganda and possibly exploitation in GA debate when suitable occasion presents itself is all that situation requires.