793.00/10–454: Telegram
No. 331
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in the Soviet
Union1
252. From urtels 4832 and 4913 it would appear Soviets still maintaining certain degree official detachment from Formosan issue. However we agree Chinese Communist momentum re Formosa—which certainly not checked by exuberant Krushchev statements—has critical implications. We are therefore giving careful consideration to your three suggested measures.
Your first suggestion has already found expression in current propaganda efforts which can be stepped up without difficulty.
Re suggestion No. 2 it would appear most effective kind of formal warning would be early conclusion mutual defense treaty with Chinese Nationalist Government. Department currently considering how such treaty might be formulated without appearing to support Chinese Nationalists beyond their present territorial limits and also without assuming definite commitments re off-shore islands.
Should decision be taken proceed with treaty, it may be assumed Commie propaganda would try exploit treaty negotiations as “aggressive” move. We can also assume Peking would attempt so to portray treaty in whatever current efforts they are making to extract maximum support from Soviets. Would appreciate your view whether in this context private talks with Soviets at opportune moment your suggestion No. 3 could serve any useful purpose, i.e., [Page 716] in clearly setting forth what treaty means and primarily what it does not mean.
- Drafted by Ray L. Thurston, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs and approved by Dulles.↩
- Document 315.↩
- Telegram 491, from Moscow, Oct. 4, reported that the Soviet Government appeared to be trying to avoid further public commitment to the Chinese Communist position regarding Formosa. (793.00/10–454)↩