Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

961.53/10–654: Telegram

No. 329
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

secret
priority

Washington, October 8, 1954—2:19 p.m.

217. Taipei 251,² Paris 1448,³ Usun 62.⁴ Following are Department views FYI on French good offices in Tuapse case: Department appreciates tactical advantage in UN which Chinese acceptance French good offices gives for postponing active discussion Tuapse case. However, concerned lest French through cases such as Tuapse should come to view selves as impartial mediators East-West conflict. View wobbly stand French in past on voluntary repatriation issue doubt advisability encouraging French act as arbiter on genuineness crew member defections. (Department has indicated to Counselor French Embassy US concerned lest unwilling crew members be forced return USSR.)

Department continues favore release Tuapse. However release non-defecting crew members or movement Tuapse defectors from Formosa prior final closing off of UN debate on piracy agenda item would provide USSR propaganda material which they could exploit in UN. Believe release Tuapse and its crew (as well as Gottwald non-defectors) might be delayed until after General Assembly debate on this item, but no later. US intends seek private Chinese commitment return ship at that time. (Taipei: Instructions follow this regard).⁵

Action Moscow, information other addressees:

We see following possible motivations Soviet move. Soviet aim promote French neutralism. Overriding Soviet concern with repatriation Tuapse or crew. Also note apparent inconsistency between this unprecedented Soviet indirect approach Nationalist China and Khrushchev speech Peiping backing up Chinese Communist stand on Formosa. If Soviet move had Peiping concurrence, on what basis might it have been obtained? Comments invited.⁶

USUN:

Tactical suggestions in response Delga 62 follow.⁷

Dulles

1. Drafted by David L. Osborn of the Office of Chinese Affairs and Robert O. Blake of the Office of Eastern European Affairs; cleared by Murphy, among others. Also sent to Moscow, Paris, and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.
2. Telegram 251 from Taipei, Oct. 6, reported that on Oct. 1, the Chinese Government had received a French offer of good offices with regard to the Tuapse; the offer had been made at the request of the Soviet Union. (961.53/10–654)
3. Telegram 1448 from Paris, Oct. 6, reported that the French Government had not undertaken to initiate or participate in any negotiations but had merely offered to act as a conduit for communications between the Soviet and Chinese Nationalist Governments. (961.53/10–654)
4. Delga 62 from the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, Oct. 6, reported a conversation with Tsiang, who stated that the Chinese Government had accepted the French offer and that he thought this was sufficient reason to keep the proposed Soviet item concerning the Tuapse (see footnote 3, Document 317) off the General Assembly’s agenda. (961.53/10–654)
5. Telegram 228 to Taipei, Oct. 13, instructed the Embassy to make a new effort to obtain a firm confidential commitment that the Chinese would release the Tuapse not later than immediately after the end of the General Assembly debate on the Soviet item. (961.53/10–1354)
6. Telegram 519 from Moscow, Oct. 9, stated that the Embassy thought the primary Soviet motive was to regain possession of the Tuapse and its crew. (961.53/10954)
7. Gadel 43 to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, Oct. 14, recommended that the delegation try to obtain further postponement of consideration of the question whether the Soviet item should be included in the agenda. (961.53/9–1854)