Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/10–854

No. 328
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bond)

top secret

[Washington,] October 8, 1954.

Subject:

• China item; Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand

Participants:

• Mr. Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser
• Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
• Mr. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Niles W. Bond, UNP
• Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
• Miss Barbara Salt, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. M.G.L. Joy, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy

Sir Robert Scott stated that his Embassy had received Mr. Eden’s comments on our draft Minute¹ and that he wished to pass those comments on to us at once. He said that Mr. Eden regarded the Minute as unduly restrictive, since he had been under the impression that the original purpose of this exercise, and its main attraction, was that it looked toward a wider settlement; Mr. Eden therefore felt that the draft Minute should be amended. Sir Robert said that Mr. Eden had expressed the fear that if the item were handled on the proposed restrictive basis it would be regarded as merely another cold-war gambit rather than as a “cautious first step” toward a wider settlement. Sir Robert emphasized, however, that Mr. Eden clearly wished to avoid any discussion of the political aspects of the China problem. He went on to say that Mr. Eden was agreeable to confining the resolution itself to the hostilities in and around Quemoy, but that if a more general cease-fire should be proposed, he felt that the UK would find it difficult not to “make sympathetic noises” with respect to the principle of ending any armed clash anywhere between the two Chinas. He said that Mr. Eden had also raised the legal point that if the Quemoy hostilities were to be represented as a threat to international peace, any armed clash elsewhere initiated by the Nationalists would also have to be so regarded, and that therefore more latitude was needed for the consideration of such other clashes. Sir Robert then enumerated the specific changes which Mr. Eden wished to have made in the text of the draft Minute (See Tab A).²

Mr. Robertson said that the Secretary had wished closely to restrict the item to the Quemoy hostilities, although the possibility of later developments toward a durable settlement if this particular initiative should be successful could not, of course, be entirely precluded.

Sir Robert emphasized that while his Government was willing to confine the terms of the resolution as we proposed, it did want to be in a position to support the principle of the termination of any armed hostilities wherever they might take place.

Mr. Robertson said that it was his impression that the Secretary wished to be very careful that we did not enter into any agreement with anyone, express or implied, which could be interpreted as treating the present initiative as the first step toward a general settlement of the Formosa problem in the UN. Mr. Phleger observed that the proposed UK amendments to the draft Minute would constitute a clear invitation to open the larger issues involved. At this point Sir Robert interjected that it was not the UK which was pressing for an agreed Minute. Mr. Phleger acknowledged this and said that the U.S., however, attaches much importance to it.

Sir Robert then reiterated that Mr. Eden’s view was that, while the UK wished to avoid being drawn into a discussion at this time regarding a general settlement of the China problem, it would have to be free to express its sympathy in principle for any proposal which would extend the scope of a cease-fire to other areas in which armed hostilities might take place, as well as for the idea of an eventual general settlement. Mr. Phleger said that we regarded it as unrealistic to try to achieve any broader settlement, and that we were merely trying to solve a limited problem which we believed could be settled within its own limits. Mr. MacArthur expressed the view that there was the fundamental issue here involved and that it was essential to reach a genuine meeting of the minds as to the direction in which we were heading, and not merely to gloss over our differences with ambiguous language.

Mr. Wade at this point stated that his Government would find it most difficult to oppose a “do-gooder” amendment designed to support the principle of an eventual general settlement. He added, however, that New Zealand would oppose any effort to lay down the lines of such a settlement.

Sir Robert asked how the U.S. would propose to cope with this problem. Mr. Robertson replied that we could state merely that we were dealing with a limited situation and that we were not prepared at this time to discuss the larger aspects of the problem.

Sir Robert then asked whether, if we all agreed to the Minute as proposed by the U.S., the latter would regard it as a breach of that undertaking if the UK should express sympathy with the principle of terminating all hostilities wherever found and the principle of the desirability of an eventual general settlement. Mr. Robertson expressed the opinion that this would be inconsistent with the terms of the Minute as drafted.

Mr. MacArthur and Mr. Robertson expressed the opinion that there was here involved an issue which we could not finesse and on which we should have to have a genuine meeting of the minds as to how to proceed if we were to prevent our basic differences from emerging.

Mr. Phleger then proposed a paragraph which he suggested be added to the draft Minute in substitution for the proposed British amendments (Tab B).³ Sir Robert and Mr. Wade expressed the opinion, after hearing the proposed paragraph read aloud, that it would go far toward meeting their wishes.

In response to a question from Mr. Wade as to our views on the duration of the effectiveness of the Minute, Mr. Phleger expressed the opinion that it should probably be regarded as binding until such time as our resolution had been acted upon.

Mr. MacArthur suggested that the next move should be to place the draft Minute and its various amendments before the Secretary for his comments, after which we could again be in touch with the UK and New Zealand representatives. Sir Robert stated that he would also appreciate clearance on the UK draft instructions before the U.S. initiated consultations with the Chinese Nationalists.⁴

1. The U.S. draft minute, attached to a memorandum by Bond of an Oct. 7 conversation of MacArthur, Phleger, Robertson, and Key with Salt and Wade, stated that the three governments agreed to make every effort to limit the discussion of and action on the New Zealand resolution in the United Nations to the hostilities around Quemoy and efforts to terminate them and prevent their extension to other islands near the China coast. (793.00/10–754)
2. Not printed. Eden’s revisions included the addition of phrases stating agreement that the “initial phase” of the UN discussions should be limited “so far as possible” and indicating that the three governments were “looking toward an eventual settlement in the area.”

3. The proposed paragraph reads:

   “This would not prevent the parties, in the event the question is raised, from recognizing the desirability of a larger settlement, or the prevention of other armed clashes, but they would accompany this by the statement that these discussions and this resolution should be confined within their original stated limits and objectives; any future action, if any, to be taken in the light of any results accomplished by the adoption of this resolution and in the light of conditions as they may develop in the future.”

4. A memorandum by Key of a conversation that evening with Salt and Wade stated that Secretary Dulles had instructed Key to advise them that he preferred to revert to the U.S. draft minute, with the addition of (1) a clause stating that the three governments would vote against any amendment of the draft resolution and (2) the paragraph proposed by Phleger. Dulles had also stated that the British instructions to their Ambassadors in Peking and Moscow were a British responsibility, and, similarly, the United States would be responsible for what was said to the Chinese Nationalists. (793.00/10–854)