Office of the Historian

Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53D444

Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine) to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Battle)

top secret
[Washington,] March 9, 1949.

With reference to the attached memorandum prepared by General Carter and the Secretary’s comment thereon,1 I have had discussions with EUR and the economic divisions of the Department. The feeling, as indicated in these discussions, is that we should offer no objections to an International Bank loan to Finland. EUR does feel that if it is possible to withhold the final approval on this loan until after the signing of the Atlantic Pact it would be desirable to do so. As you know, there is a remote possibility that the Russians might attempt to pull a coup in Finland in retaliation against the Pact. This of course is the reason EUR feels that it would be desirable, if possible, to withhold final action until after that time. However, if Mr. McCloy is faced [Page 437] with the decision to give either a yes or no immediately, the Department’s inclination would be to say go ahead with the loan.2

Humelsine
  1. The reference here is to Carter’s memorandum of March 3, supra.↩

  2. In a memorandum of March 11 to Humelsine, not printed, Battle explained that he had informed McCloy that day of the Department’s position with respect to a possible loan by the International Bank to Finland:

    “Mr. McCloy said that in the normal course of processing the loan a sufficient time would be required to put the date well after the signing of the Pact—probably late in April. He said, however, that he would be slow in pushing the loan to assure that there was ample time after the signing to gauge Russian reaction. He thanked me for the information, which he said coordinated generally with the feeling of both the British and the French.” (Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53D444)

    Regarding the International Bank loan to Finland announced on August 1, see the editorial note, p. 440.

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