Over many months I have felt that sooner or later the time would come
to consider whether the European Advisory Commission had any further
function to perform, since its work has been confined in practice to
German and Austrian questions. It has always seemed to me that the
Commission could not continue to work side by side with the Control
Council which is to be set up to run Germany and which will have the
widest knowledge and complete responsibility for what is done in
Germany. It would not be practicable to have a separate body sitting
in London and negotiating agreements on policies which are conducted
on a day-to-day basis by the Control Council. I have assumed that
the heads of Governments will wish, as soon as the Control Council
has begun operation, to make provision for closing out the work of
the European Advisory Commission, although they might wish to use
the experience of the members of the Commission in carrying out your
plan for a Council of Foreign Ministers.
I cannot submit my Summary Report on the work of the European
Advisory Commission without expressing my appreciation for having
been given the responsibility of taking part in a body concerned
with coordination of Allied policies in a critical field of common
concern.
[Enclosure 1]
The Work of the European Advisory
Commission (January 1944–July 1945)
secret
[London,] July 12,
1945.
a summary report
1. Origins.
One of the principal decisions of the Moscow Conference of
October 1943 was to set up a European Advisory Commission to
work on the principal political problems arising from the
termination of the war in Europe.1 At the
time of the Teheran Conference the three heads of Governments
appointed their representatives on the Commission, which held a
first informal, organizing meeting on December 15,1943, and its
first formal meeting on January 14, 1944. In November 1944 the
three Governments invited the French Provisional Government to
join the Commission as a fourth member. Since its inception the
E. A. C. has held 95
discussion meetings and 10 meetings for signature of
agreements.
2. Range of
Responsibility.
At the Moscow Conference the U. S. and Soviet Governments
maintained that the E. A. C.
should deal with problems arising from the surrender of the Axis
countries in Europe. The U. K.
Government urged that it should deal with any political problems
arising out of the war in Europe, including problems of
liberated countries. The terms of reference laid down for the
E. A. C. were broad, but in
practice the U. S. and Soviet views have prevailed, as the
Commission has dealt almost exclusively with problems concerning
Germany and Austria. The E. A.
C. did substantial work on the terms of Bulgarian
surrender, but did not deal with the surrender terms for
Finland, Rumania and
Hungary, which were negotiated in Moscow. The E. A. C. has not been authorized by
Governments’ to consider problems of liberated areas.
3. Method of Work.
Under its terms of reference the E. A.
C. was designed to be a recommending body. In
practice it has been a negotiating rather than an advisory
organ. Its discussions have been conducted, and its decisions
reached, on the basis of detailed instructions from the
Governments. None of the agreements recommended by it has been
rejected or amended by the member-Governments.
Because the Commission has been a negotiating body its pace has
varied. Speed of work has depended upon all three, later four,
Governments
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being
prepared to negotiate on a particular subject at a particular
time, and on their being willing to make the adjustments and
mutual concessions necessary to reach an agreed policy. The
Commission has had periods of intensive work, and other periods
when, either through indifference on the part of some one of the
Governments or because of its reluctance to undertake
commitments at a particular time, the Commission was unable to
reach decisions. The E. A. C.
has never failed to meet when any one Government had any matter
to bring forward.
In general, the U. K. Government
has made the most sustained effort to make the E. A. C. a center for arriving at
agreement on major policy toward Germany. The support given by
the U. S. Government has been uneven, partly because of the
difficulties of formulating, within the Government, a unified
policy towards Germany. Since joining the E. A. C. on November 27, 1944, the
French Delegation has shown a desire to facilitate four-Power
agreement and to avoid raising issues which might impede the
work of the E. A. C. The Soviet
Delegation has at times worked hard and cooperatively to reach
agreement on a limited series of subjects, but it has never
shown the range of initiative of other Delegations. Its ability
to negotiate effectively has been restricted by rigid
instructions and by an apparent absence of instructions over
several extended periods.
Continuous contact of the four Representatives has enabled them
to consider informally a range of problems considerably wider
than that of the agreements which have actually been formalized,
and to acquaint their Governments with the views of the other
Governments on many aspects of the treatment of Germany.
Messages exchanged with the State Department number
approximately nine hundred and fifty. Mutual confidence, built
up over many months of face-to-face dealing, has facilitated the
removal of misunderstandings which might otherwise have led to
serious difficulties in the work of the Allied coalition. The
E. A. C. has perhaps been as
useful in the misunderstandings which it has forestalled or
removed as in the actual agreements which it has drafted.2
. . . . . . .
5. Organization of the
European Advisory Commission.
The Commission consists of four Representatives, one appointed by
each Government. Each Representative is assisted by Political,
Military and other Advisers as directed by his Government. The
U. S. Representative has had the assistance of a Political
Adviser provided by the Department of State, and of Military,
Naval and Air
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Advisers
appointed by their respective Services. Final responsibility for
the work of the U. S. Delegation rests with the
Representative.
The E. A. C. has made use of a
Secretariat, consisting of a Secretary-General and a small staff
of interpreters and clerks, with its headquarters in Lancaster
House, which is also the meeting-place of the Commission.
Expenses, which have been negligible in amount, have been shared
equally between the three, later four, Governments.
6. Work of the U. S.
Delegation.
In addition to advising the U. S. Representative on matters under
negotiation, the U. S. Joint Advisers have conducted a large
amount of work in preparation for negotiation. In the absence of
agreed directives from Washington concerning post-surrender
policy toward Germany, the U. S. Joint Advisers surveyed the
field in which Allied agreement would be useful in the immediate
post-surrender period and prepared 36 draft directives, designed
to provide agreed policy guidance to the Allied
Commanders-in-Chief in Germany, and 5 draft agreements. After
consideration by the appropriate authorities in Washington 24
draft directives and the 5 draft agreements were transmitted,
with slight revisions, to the U. S. Representative, for
circulation and negotiation in the Commission. In carrying on
their work the Joint Advisers have held 76 formal meetings, many
of which were also attended by U. S. civilian experts in London
and by officers of the U. S. Control Groups for Germany and
Austria, as the Advisers dealt with subjects of concern to them.
In this work the Joint Advisers made full use of policy
documents and studies made available to them by their respective
Departments and Services. To assist in their work the Joint
Advisers organized a Planning Committee, consisting of junior
members of their staffs, which has held approximately 150
meetings. Through their initiative in the preparation of
directives, the Joint Advisers helped to keep to the fore both
in London and in Washington the need for developing a consistent
U. S. policy for Germany.
Although the draft U. S. directives have not been negotiated in
the E. A. C., principally
because the Soviet Delegation, despite repeated promises and
assurances, has never been instructed by its Government to
proceed with their negotiation, they have met a number of
important needs. Their circulation in the Commission has served
to inform the other Allied Governments of U. S. policies toward
Germany and has had a strong influence on the policies of those
Governments. The draft directives also provided the U. S.
Control Group for Germany with its first systematic guidance for
preparatory planning and were incorporated, in large measure, in
the General Directive for Germany, which, on instructions from
Washington, was circulated to the E. A.
C. for information, in May 1945.
[Page 295]
[Editor’s Note.—A second enclosure,
giving a statistical report on the work of the Commission, a
list of documents signed, and a partial list of papers
circulated, is not printed.]
