893.00/14835: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:56 p.m.]
22. Reference Department’s No. 6, January 3, 7 p.m. As the situation clarifies we do not consider the recent government changes as indicating any schism in the government or party on the policy of resistance, or as a weakening of the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The appointments suggest simply an emphasis upon extending and strengthening party control.
The Kuomintang is a congeries of conservative personalities and cliques representing varying shades of opinion or indifference with [Page 193] regard to resistance to Japan, cooperation with the democracies, internal administration, and reform in both economic and political spheres. The common denominator of these various elements including the Generalissimo and his intimate associates is their determination to preserve Kuomintang control of the Government and people. Party tutelage as a means to an end has in great measure given way to one party control as an end. Leaders of the party appear to have a very real concern that the failure to solve internal problems such as those connected with local administration, land tenure, and the “people’s livelihood” may after the war result in a formidable popular reaction against the party control. The party has for years given lip service to reform and improvement but little of tangible character has been accomplished. The strengthening of party control therefore has now become a matter of primary concern.
The following individuals and groups are prominent in the party: the “CC” clique (Chen Li-fu, brother, and adherents) who believe in a close party supervision over social affairs; Chu Chia-hua and adherents who work for strict party regimentation of a totalitarian type; the military element headed by Ho Ying-chin which is inclined toward party domination and military conservatism and is strongly anti-Communist; Tai Li who operates a formidable secret political police system; and the so-called political science group the adherents of which have the common characteristic of being predominantly Chinese in outlook. All of these groups recognize leadership in the Generalissimo who, also conservative, holds the dominant position but tempers his leadership toward harmony with all groups while insisting as a fundamental principle on resistance to Japan.
I am sanguine with regard to the role China will play in this war but I define the reasonable limits of that role until we ourselves turn back the tide of Japanese aggression as continuance of military resistance along the lines of the past four years and resistance to Japanese peace overtures or compromise.