Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

319. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 10, 1982, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Marjai

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • John D. Scanlan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • John R. Davis, Director EUR/EE (notetaker)

• HUNGARY

  • Deputy Prime Minister Jozsef Marjai
  • Janos Petran, Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Ambassador Ferenc Esztergalyos
  • Mr. Gyorgy Banlaki (interpreter)

The Secretary welcomed Deputy Premier Marjai, who in turn, expressed his appreciation for the invitation to the United States and the hospitality he has received during his visit. Marjai said Hungary is interested in seeing improvement in the world situation and that they say this not as a slogan but as a matter closely tied to Hungary’s national interest, taking economic and political factors together. They are interested in determining the factors which have brought about current tensions and striving for their improvement. Hungary says the same thing to its allies all the time.

HUNGARIAN VIEWS ON EAST-WEST TENSIONS

Hungary wants to continue policies based on the Helsinki Final Act and Kadar underlined this factor in his recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is important to Hungary that the deteriorating and grave world economic situation should improve. Hungary considers it a source of great anxiety in all major regions of the world. Political and economic factors do not currently offset each other; instead they are pushing each other in the wrong direction. Hungary does what it can to exert pressure in the other direction. The present state of affairs cannot be maintained for long and Hungary wants to suffer as little as possible. Understandably it doesn’t wish to suffer lasting harm and demands the opportunity from the world to be able to conduct the policy it has chosen in the political, cultural, human relations and, of course, economic field. This is the message Hungary wishes to convey to the world. Those who understand it, support it. Although Hungary is a small country, if it gets the opportunity to continue its policy undisturbed, it could have a positive effect in the world, not only in its own region, but beyond.

DIFFERENTIATION

The Secretary said that Marjai came with a reputation for direct talk and that he would be equally frank. The President’s policy is one of differentiation and we continue to conduct political and economic relations based on our assessment of each individual country. Accordingly, we supported Hungary’s entry to the IMF and are pleased that its membership was formalized during the Vice Premier’s visit.

Marjai interjected that Hungary was grateful for United States support in the IMF.

The Secretary said we would seek to renew most favored nation treatment for Hungary this year. Hungary could rely on the support of this administration and President Reagan.

Marjai was right in saying the political situation was dangerous for the economic situation. Especially troublesome has been the recent situation in Poland which provoked negative effects in the West and here in the United States in both trade and monetary affairs involving Eastern Europe. Even the concept of differentiation has been attacked. The Secretary said he was confident we will not permit the situation to change but would still prefer not to have the policy challenged, which brings us to the political problem of the situation in Poland. He asked for Marjai’s assessment of the Polish situation and said we have been waiting for General Jaruzelski to make improvements but he has been so slow in doing so that the frustration of the Polish people has again made itself evident.

HUNGARIAN VIEWS ON POLAND

Marjai said that in Hungary generals have rarely been good politicians. The situation in Poland is not so unambiguous. Marjai said he was not as pessimistic as the Secretary because earlier he had been much more pessimistic. He believed the crisis in Poland had been around for 25 years and had led to repeated explosions, the most recent of which was now two years old. While the U.S. regarded the events of December 13² as very negative, the Hungarians view it as the start of a process which may, if not made much more difficult, bring positive and progressive changes by resolving basic Polish problems which had resisted all attempts at resolution for 25 years. In this he had the personal assurances of General Jaruzelski who was a close acquaintance. If he can get a team all working in the same direction, then Poland would be able again to become a significant factor in Europe and an element which is not a dividing factor between East and West.

The disturbances to which the Secretary was referring appear in one way when viewed from a great distance. On the basis of Hungary’s intimate knowledge of Poland, it has another view. Although it may sound strange, it regards the recent events in Poland, after five months of martial law, as merely mild aftershocks of the earthquake of December 13. It is evident that neither the working class nor the peasantry took part. Although some countries tend to scold or curse the Polish Church, in relative terms it is displaying good and responsible behavior. He did not consider the situation frightening. It would be totally unrealistic, after only five months of martial law, after the incidents of this week, and after 25 years of crisis, to expect that political and economic consolidation should already have taken place.

What can be decided now is the direction which this consolidation takes. That is not an indifferent matter to Hungary. We don’t say to the Poles, “follow the Hungarian model”. Under present conditions in Poland, adopting the Hungarian method of economic management would lead to the destruction of the remaining traces of fundamental order in that country. We recommend to them if they want to study something in Hungary, they should study the Hungarian path and direction and way of thinking, not concrete and specific forms. They must create their own model.

The Secretary agreed that Poles are not Hungarians but it is a great tragedy that they have not chosen to move in the direction of the three conditions which the West has specified. If they were to do that they would find a positive response from the West in economic terms. Marjai said he would not debate the three conditions, but he must protest the required order of events. They cannot be preconditions or they will never happen. The Secretary noted that the Russians often say we should make the first move on some problem and then we will see what their response is. It becomes a question of credible signals. Marjai said the whole matter must be perceived as a parallel process. The Secretary responded that the danger and the difference is that time is running out and economic chaos in Poland is worsening. General Jaruzelski does not have the luxury of waiting for his visitor to open the door; he must open it himself.

Premier Marjai said the Polish economy faces continuing problems, having come in the last ten to fifteen years to depend on Western technology. Hungary had always been critical of the Polish choice not for ideological, but for economic reasons. They had told Jaroszewicz ten years ago that Poland was adopting an adventurous policy but their warnings were ignored. Now Poland has lost the mother’s milk of Western technology and faces a massive economic and industrial realignment. It is possible for the West to ruin the Polish economy further but who profits? The Poles have to live afterward. It is not Hungary’s role to define American interests, but over the long term a forced realignment of Poland’s economy would lead to the weakening or loss of U.S. influence in that country, a development which would not give Hungary any joy. What worries the Hungarians is that these questions seem to be judged here on a day-to-day basis, not on a long-term view. True, there are headaches in 1982 but Hungarians look back on a thousand years of history and have lots of experience built into their genes. They are interested now in what 1990 or the year 2000 will look like. Hungarians want to live their second 1000 years in their own way. A significant state of differentiation exists in Europe and this process is a natural process which will last longer. Perhaps the U.S. does not sense in this respect to what a great degree the tolerance of the Soviet Union has increased. Look back ten, twenty, or thirty years ago in Europe. We in Hungary are doing something completely different from what you believe is the Soviet model. We are not completely identical in foreign policy as put in the West in an oversimplified way. However, this makes it to no extent doubtful to which alliance system and economic system we belong. But our identity is much stronger, bolder, and more characteristic than in any period before and the Soviet Union accepts it, even if it doesn’t understand it in all its aspects. In this respect we seem to be subject to greater threat from you than from the USSR.

However, the Secretary noted, Poland’s internal difficulties are spread on all of us. Marjai said that was true but in a peculiar way for Hungary. Not having adopted Poland’s adventurous economic policy, Hungary was not suffering except indirectly. In fact, the popularity and support of the Hungarian regime had increased to the extent that their policies had been proved correct. Its reforms must now be accelerated by extending socialist democracy, decentralizing and reducing the power of the government. The Secretary said Mr. Marjai was a Reaganite. Yes, Marjai responded, he had told the visiting Time-Life group some months ago that in many respects the two countries were conducting the same economic policy. Although Hungary recognized the necessity for reducing social expenditure, it found it nearly impossible to do so.

The Secretary said Hungary’s economic policies made good sense but, in the near term, Poland’s problems have created a lack of confidence in financial institutions which limits our ability to differentiate as much as we would like. Soviet economic failures which are growing, not decreasing, result in pressure from the East on your liquidity indirectly, and sometimes directly. With the economic situation in Poland now the exclusive burden of the Soviet Union, the problem is further aggravated. We all must do what we can to urge the Polish Government within all the restraints you outline to attempt more positive moves. Military men prefer never to take risks but in history those who have been successful have taken risks. Jaruzelski should take risks because the danger is not that he will move too fast but too slowly. His friends in Moscow who are the conservatives in the world today and chief protectors of the status quo continuously counsel caution. Marjai said they could advise Jaruzelski to proceed as fast as possible. From one side this looks too slow, from the other too fast. Achieving the optimum is not easy.

ARMS CONTROL

Marjai asked about the future of Soviet-U.S. talks, saying it would be good if the sense of being threatened and the lack of confidence felt in Europe could be resolved. The Secretary reviewed the misjudgments of the 1970’s and our failure to insist clearly on certain standards of international conduct which may have led Moscow into the mistaken belief they could engage in an expansion of Soviet influence. This has resulted in a sharp reaction here and has not really proved successful from the Soviet point of view. Having thrust forward into Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere, the Russians had to learn that there are limits to a superpower’s ability to influence events. If the Soviets come to understand and accept this, they will find welcome cooperation here. We are proceeding with arms control talks and, despite some comments from media in the U.S., he could assure Mr. Marjai that our proposals are serious and designed to be negotiable: to require equal concessions on both sides. We are equally prepared to move in areas of political concern: Afghanistan, Southern Africa, in this hemisphere. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet side is prepared for a new chapter. In the last sixteen months we have been more restrained in action than perhaps in rhetoric.

Mr. Marjai said he thought, on the basis of personal knowledge, that the Soviets had the willingness and the desire to move forward but the whole matter cannot move without talks. A stronger willingness to enhance mutual understanding is needed. Small powers are more comfortable when world powers don’t seek to exploit each other’s weak points. Talks on strategic arms control must go forward because, although Hungarians are certain they will survive anything, they would find life boring all by themselves.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary Haig and Shultz Memcons, 1981–1986, Lot 87 D 327, SEC Memcons—May 1981. Secret; Exdis. Cleared by Michael Klossen (S) and Katherine Shirley (S/S). Shirley initialed for Klossen. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. Martial law was declared in Poland on December 13, 1981, as a response to political opposition, particularly that of the Solidarity movement.