Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 6, 1973.

SUBJECT

• USIA Director Reports on European Trip

USIA Director Jim Keogh has sent you the memorandum at Tab A reporting on impressions he gained during a recent conference of USIA public affairs officers in Western Europe. He also reports on the highlights of his visits to Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

He reports the impression of his officers at USIS posts in Western Europe that at present they are not faced with any deep anti-American issues. This, he notes, includes the subject of Watergate which, while widely reported in Western Europe and the subject of considerable conversation, has not produced moral indignation or deep-seated anti-American feeling.

In Eastern Europe, Director Keogh was left with the definite impression that the East European Governments desire better relations and expanded communication with the United States.

In Romania, Keogh unexpectedly was invited to President Ceausescu’s seashore residence for an hour’s talk. He reports that the conversation covered many subjects and that Ceausescu expressed concern lest the United States and USSR take decisions without sufficient regard for the destinies of the smaller East European countries. He also expressed his hope for continued and expanded good relations between the US and Romania and asked Keogh to give you his best wishes. (This is fully in keeping with the very warm gestures President Ceausescu continues to make to visiting Americans, and further evidence of his desire to keep a good line of communications with you.)

This memorandum forwards Director Keogh’s report for your information. I have already sent him a note of acknowledgement expressing your appreciation.²

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Keogh) to President Nixon ³

Washington, July 20, 1973.

On two recent trips overseas, I picked up some reactions which I believe are interesting enough to pass on to you.

1. At a conference of all of the USIA public affairs officers from Western Europe, we had a panel of the most experienced men develop a discussion which sought the answer to the question: “What are the deep anti-American issues that we face in Western Europe?” The group’s answer—and I will admit that it surprised me—was: There are none.

Not long ago, they said, the Vietnam war was such an issue. A radical element that wanted to stone a U.S. installation or burn the American flag could rouse a mob to do so about the war. Now that is no longer possible. (Only the PAO from Sweden demurred. There, it is still possible to stir up trouble about Vietnam.)⁴

How about Watergate? The conclusion was that while Watergate is being played to the hilt in the West European news media and is a subject of fascinated conversation, it has not produced moral indignation or deep-seated anti-American feeling. The PAOs saw the possibility that it might ultimately leave some tarnish on the American image since the Europeans expect such developments in their own political structures but did not expect them in the United States. Among people involved in public affairs, there is a concern that Watergate might work to the disadvantage of the President in conducting his for-eign policy. It was clear that they fervently hope that this will not be the case.⁵

How about the economic issue—dollar devaluation, trade, etc? All agreed that this has not yet become a popular anti-American issue. It is widely discussed at the professional level and in the news media but has not taken hold among the general public. The conclusion was that it would become a widespread issue affecting feeling against the United States only if there is a deep recession in Europe which creates unemployment. Then the general public might be inclined to blame the troubles on the United States.⁶

2. On a trip through five Eastern Europe countries—Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland—I found what seemed to be a genuine reaching out toward the United States by journalists and government officials. While they were inclined to bring up some troublesome issues—the crown in Hungary, the gold in Czechoslovakia, the attacks by Radio Free Europe on Eastern European governments—they nevertheless left the definite impression that they deeply care about better relations and expanded communication with the United States.

Let me cite just two examples.

In Romania, I presented a moon rock and round-trip-moon Romanian flag to the Deputy Foreign Minister. At the presentation and at a lunch which he hosted later, I recalled having been with you on the visit to Romania in 1969. I spoke of the historic nature of that visit and of how deeply it impressed me. At mid-afternoon the Deputy Foreign Minister interrupted another meeting in which I was participating to tell me that President Ceausescu wanted me to fly to the seashore to call on him and to repeat the presentation of the moon rock and flag. I spent about an hour that evening with President Ceausescu talking about many subjects but principally United States-Romanian relations. He took the occasion to express concerns—very familiar to you—that the United States and the Soviet Union at Helsinki and Vienna may be making decisions that affect the smaller countries of Eastern Europe without sufficient regard for the opinions and the destinies of those countries. I assured him that the United States had no such intention. His reaction was: “Yes, but isn’t it too bad that we have reached the point at which you must reassure me?” When I told him that I would take full word of his concerns back to Washington, he delivered one of those sly smiles with which you are familiar and said with a wave of his hand: “Oh, we’ve just had a free-flowing discussion.” As I left he asked me to take his best wishes to you and left no doubt about his hope for continued and expanded good relations with the United States.

In Czechoslovakia I raised with the Minister of Culture the possibility of having a USIA exhibit there. We have not had one in this era. He and his aides reacted warmly and positively. I then suggested that we might have our exhibit on progress and the environment in Czechoslovakia since the subject is of deep interest to both countries. To my considerable surprise, the Czechs literally leaped at the possibility and offered us cities and early dates for the exhibit. We are now at work on the project.

Throughout the five countries I found that the news media were saying little or nothing about Watergate. Thus there is no general public reaction to the affair and our Missions say that it is having no direct effect on their operations. However, it is obvious that the sophisticated people in government and the news media are getting a great deal of information about Watergate and are talking about it among themselves. One or two tried to use it with me. In Yugoslavia, the Minister of Information pointed out that the Yugoslavian news media are being “held down” on Watergate and suggested that I should see to it that the United States news media stop printing unfavorable things about President Tito.⁷ I tried to educate him a little bit on that point but I’m not sure I succeeded. In Poland a Deputy Foreign Minister pointed out that government-controlled Polish news media have been saying little or nothing about Watergate and suggested that we ought to stop Radio Free Europe from attacking the Polish government. I tried to spin that one off without answering his point.

In the end the general approach of the people I talked to—mostly government officials and journalists—could be summed up very sharply: They almost desperately hope that the President will weather this storm and continue to carry forward the foreign policies he has developed and established since 1969.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [1 of 2]. Administratively Confidential. Sent for information. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to Kissinger on July 31 with the recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid.) A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “The President Has Seen,” and an attached correspondence profile indicates that Nixon noted it on August 8. He wrote a note on the memorandum addressed to Keogh: “Thanks. Excellent report.”
2. A copy of Kissinger’s August 6 note is attached but not printed.
3. No classification marking.
4. A July 2, 1975, study, “U.S. Standing in Foreign Public Opinion Following Recent Indochina Developments,” drafted by Leo P. Crespi of the USIA’s Office of Research, found that public opinion surveys taken “some weeks after the fall of Vietnam—indicate major declines in U.S. standing.” Although “a fair amount of trust continues to prevail,” the USIA study concluded that “both trust in the credibility of U.S. defense commitments and confidence in U.S. wisdom in world affairs have declined to record lows in some of the countries surveyed.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Records, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1964–1982, Entry 1009 B, Box 15, S–39A; 39B–73) For criticism of VOA’s handling of the American evacuation from Vietnam, see footnote 2, Document 105.
5. The USIA made a major push to promote foreign “understanding” and “fair coverage” of the Presidential transition in August 1974. According to a paper, “USIA Accomplishments and Assessments, 1974–1975,” forwarded to Keogh by USIA’s Assistant Director for Research James Moceri on April 15, 1975, the agency “had two all-important messages to get across in the period of the Nixon–Ford transition: the continuity of U.S. foreign policy and the strength of the American democratic system in the face of basic challenges to its institutions. Inextricably intertwined, the messages could not be separated and assigned to different media (fast vs. slow) or to different staffs (information vs. cultural). An integrated effort, utilizing all media and our network of overseas posts, was required to place developments in perspective while the events were taking place.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Records, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 (1066), Box 40, Research Reports, 1974–1975) For more on Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s assumption of office, see Document 199.
6. Two reports prepared by USIA’s Office of Research in early 1973, one dated February 6 and the other April 12, found that, while the American economy was still held in high regard, foreign public opinion foresaw that it was entering a period of decline and U.S. economic policy was embarking on a protectionist course. The reports are in the National Archives, RG 396, USIA Records, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1964–1982, Entry 1009 B, Box 14, S–34–73, and Box 12, S–10–73, respectively. USIA’s Executive Committee met at least twice in 1973—on March 6 and on March 27—to discuss the agency’s role in developing and distributing economic information. The records of the meetings are, respectively, ibid., Executive Committee File, 1971–1973, Accession 306–89–0042, Meeting No. 175, and ibid., Executive Committee File, 1973, Accession 306–89–0043, Meeting No. 180. According to a November 19 memorandum to USIA Assistant Directors, the Executive Committee inaugurated campaigns to promote U.S. exports, foreign investment in the United States, and foreign tourism to the United States. (Ibid., Meeting No. 189)
7. Josip Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia.