107. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger1
Approach to Soviets on Implementation of CSCE Provisions on Humanitarian Affairs
We have revised this memorandum and telegram to Moscow to take into account recent developments and your instructions that Embassy Moscow take a positive tone in its initiative with the Soviets, which would be general except for a few Basket III issues.2 Many of the points raised by Embassy Moscow are deferred for further study within the Department and with other agencies.
The Problem
Embassy Moscow has outlined an initial démarche to the Soviets calling for action on a number of bilateral problems, many of them long-standing, putting them into the context of the CSCE Final Act. This would be the first in a series of similar démarches to Warsaw Pact countries.
Background/Discussion
Pursuant to our instructions (Tab 2),3 US NATO has begun consultation with our allies, and Embassy Moscow has recommended an immediate approach to the Soviets on a series of issues in the human- [Page 384] rights/humanitarian-affairs field, such as family reunification, requests for marriages, visits by relatives, and improved conditions for American journalists, students, and businessmen (Tab 3).4 The Embassy followed this up by recommending other initiatives in the information, cultural, and educational areas for future presentation to the Soviets (Tab 4).5 Ambassador Stoessel referred to the CSCE provisions when he presented the new US Representation List in Moscow and in our renewed proposal to the Soviets for reciprocal issuance of multiple visas to American and Soviet journalists. Embassy Prague has also recommended prompt bilateral initiatives on important existing problems (Tab 5).6
We see no contradiction between multilateral and bilateral efforts to encourage implementation of the CSCE provisions by the Warsaw Pact countries and to monitor their performance. As Embassy Moscow notes, some issues within CSCE, such as CBMs, will require particularly close coordination and consultations and all will require close monitoring. Consultations will provide useful background for bilateral approaches to all Warsaw Pact nations.
As shown by the journalists’ visa cases, a well staffed-out program of bilateral initiatives toward the Soviet Union offers hope of success, and Soviet actions undoubtedly will set the tone for performance by their allies. Some visible progress by the Soviets on human rights questions would also be a shot in the arm for the Administration’s détente policies by demonstrating our intention to follow up on those elements of the CSCE agenda which are of particular concern to us. We will want to keep our allies closely informed of our efforts, and in some cases coordinate with them in areas of common interest. At the same time, we will not want to miss the opportunity of taking vigorous, speedy action at a time when the Soviets may see a potential advantage in making positive movement on some outstanding issues. We support the idea of an immediate approach in Moscow on some Basket III items [Page 385] to be followed later by an approach on other cultural and information aspects which will need more extensive study.
Recommendation:
That you approve the cable at Tab 1 authorizing Embassy Moscow to make an immediate démarche to the Soviets on the implementation of CSCE provisions in the area of human rights and humanitarian affairs.7
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lot 78 D 184, Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE). Confidential. Drafted by Melvyn Levitsky and Leonard Willems (EUR/SOV) on September 15 and cleared by John A. Armitage (EUR), Guy E. Coriden (CU/EE), and Diana J. Moxhay (USIA). Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Copies were sent to SCA and Ronald D. Palmer (D/HA). Richardson’s initials appear on the memorandum.↩
- Kissinger’s instructions were not further identified. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. Among the agreement’s four major substantive areas, or baskets, was Basket III, “Co-Operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields,” which dealt with human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations. For the text of the CSCE Final Act, see the Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Document 323.↩
- Tabs 1–5 are not attached. Tab 2, telegram 191457 to Geneva, August 13, states that “the major test of CSCE lies in the implantation of conference results.” As first steps toward implementation, the Department envisaged “early consultation with our allies at NATO. We also foresee bilateral approaches in Moscow and East European capitals, calling attention to specific provisions of the CSCE Final Act in relation to local situations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)↩
- Tab 3, telegram 12127 from Moscow, August 26, is ibid.↩
- Tab 4, telegram 12308 from Moscow, August 28, notes that “information, culture, and education provide promising fields for post-CSCE bilateral initiatives vis-à-vis Soviets.” Among the Embassy’s suggested initiatives were: placing more “U.S. films, TV material and radio items in Soviet media;” expanding the “distribution of American newspapers, journals and other periodicals in the Soviet Union;” increasing the “translation of each country’s literature, and especially in connection with the Bicentennial;” and widening other educational and cultural exchange programs. (Ibid., D750299–0306) CU’s preliminary proposals for implementation of relevant portions of the CSCE Final Act are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lot 78 D 184, Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE).↩
- Tab 5, telegram 2168 from Prague, August 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975.↩
- Tab 1, telegram Secto 14005 to Moscow, was sent on September 28. (Ibid.)↩