Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

100. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Keogh) to the Ambassador at Large (McCloskey)¹

Washington, January 8, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Voice of America and U.S. Policy

From the very beginning of the existence of the Voice of America, there has been recurring controversy about its relationship to U.S. policy. On the first VOA broadcast in February, 1942, a statement inspired by OWI Director Elmer Davis² promised that “the news may be good or bad but we shall tell you the truth.” This original precept has been the symbolic basis over the years for contentions that VOA should stay as free as possible of U.S. policy considerations. There have been intermittent storms around the issue of USIA management of the Voice. Both Henry Loomis and John Daly departed as Directors of the Voice because they felt their authority was encroached upon by Directors of USIA.³

Under my predecessor as Director of USIA, the Voice was given an almost absolute freedom to do what it wished. He was essentially interested in only one issue: an ideological cold war battle against communism. So long as the Voice was in line with him on that issue, he was little concerned about its policy or programming.

My point of view is entirely different than that of my predecessor. I consider the Voice of America an instrument of U.S. policy. In the past two years we have tightened the policy reins to a considerable degree. This has involved a number of key personnel changes in important positions at the Voice. It has been my effort to change the Voice’s approach from that of an international CBS into a consciously government-related communications entity. This has not been done without some trauma. The most recent example is the story in the December 16, 1974, issue of Time which was inspired (as I mentioned to you) by a disgruntled former VOA staffer who was removed from his post because he was doing a bad job.⁴ While his removal was related to management rather than policy, he was the leader of the element that believed in “the sanctity of the news” and felt that the Voice should indeed be an international CBS or NBC and should not be sensitive to U.S. foreign policy considerations.

For some time our efforts to create a sensitivity to U.S. policy at the Voice have been greeted by the “sanctity of the news” people with charges of censorship, “news management” and warnings that we were undermining the Voice’s credibility. A favorite tactic of this group has been leaking to the press complaints that USIA management is interfering with free journalism at the Voice. However, I believe we are gradually bringing the situation under reasonable control.

We are not indulging in censorship. I have taken the position that when the Voice says “This is the news . . .”, we cannot avoid reporting legitimate news that may be bad for the United States. However, I have sought with some success to convince the professionals at the Voice that the matter of selection, timing and tone of news stories involves not censorship but sense. I have laid down guidelines which make clear that they are not to take on the obsessions of the private sector media. We require double sourcing on all news stories and do not indulge in our own speculation.

On the matter of policy, the most sensitive area of our programming is what the Voice calls “Analysis”—which is essentially the editorial page. Here we have a procedure through which the USIA policy office advises the Voice staff and carefully monitors its output. We have tightened this process substantially in the past two years—again not without some outcry at the Voice—and we are now tightening it further in ways which hopefully will not provoke too much counterproductive criticism in the press about “censorship.”

One of our serious problems with respect to policy is that at times we do not have enough inside guidance to know exactly where and how to place the emphasis on a given issue. Our officers at desk level are in constant contact with Department officers. We carefully monitor the White House and Department press briefings. We pay close attention to the statements that have been made by the President and the Secretary of State. From these general sources of information we can usually do quite well. Nevertheless, I must admit there are times when we are uneasy because we feel we do not really know enough from the inside councils to be certain that our nuances are what they should be.

In the Voice’s total broadcasting (777 hours a week in 36 languages), approximately 43% is devoted to feature materials—such as science, education, sports, music, and other cultural subjects reflecting American life; 29% is devoted to newscasts; and 28% is devoted to news-related subjects, such as analyses, discussions, roundups of editorial opinion in the United States and abroad, speeches and press conferences by the President, the Secretary of State and, at times, other U.S. Government officials. Much of this last area of our programming has both opportunities and sensitivities with respect to policy. We can and I believe do make many policy points through the manner in which we use speeches, statements and press conferences of the President and Secretary of State.

In total, I see VOA—as I see the rest of USIA—as a communications instrument whose mission is to present a fundamental picture of the U.S. to the rest of the world and to support the foreign policy of the United States. While doing this, we must be careful to maintain the Voice’s credibility as an international news medium. (I have been convinced that it must be a news medium in order to attract and hold audiences.) However, we must not allow credibility to be used as an excuse for irresponsibility. We must maintain credibility as a tactic. It is necessary for us to reflect all relevant areas of opinion in the U.S., with particular attention to areas of important Congressional opinion. On the other hand, our own analyses should be used as tools to make points for U.S. policy. While there are occasional lapses and aberations in the mass of material broadcast by the Voice, I believe we are doing much better in all this than the Voice was doing two years ago.

As we go forward I hope that we can work out additional and better means of communication and consultation between the Department and USIA to refine and enhance the contribution of VOA and all of USIA to the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lot 78 D 184, Stanton Panel, 1975. Personal; Eyes Only.
2. Director of the Office of War Information, 1942–1945.
3. Henry Loomis was Director of the VOA, 1958–1965. John Daly was Director, 1967–1968.
4. Time Magazine reported that VOA journalists alleged that Keogh and USIA Assistant Director for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe John W. Shirley had “allowed political considerations to mute the Voice” by censoring stories about popular dissent behind the Iron Curtain that ran counter to détente. Keogh rejoined, “Détente has changed what we do in USIA. Our program managers must be sensitive to U.S. policy as enunciated by the President and the Secretary of State. That policy is that we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. We’re not in the business of trying to provoke revolutions.” (“Muted Voice of America,” Time, December 16, 1974) In a June 16, 1972, memorandum to Kissinger, VOA Acting Director Henry Loomis outlined the USIA’s planned post-Moscow Summit output. Haig responded to Loomis by memorandum, June 29: “The policies you are proposing for USIA/VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union definitely appear to be in the right direction. We would agree, with regard to internal Soviet developments, that you should continue to place the emphasis on reporting, at the same time continuing the VOA’s policy of eschewing polemics, not seeking quarrels and not attempting to magnify small incidents in your broadcasts to the Soviet Union.” Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [1 of 2].