97. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Haigto 3/256. Call Colonel Kennedy immediately upon receipt and Flash to Kissinger at Key Biscayne. Inform Kennedy to call Key Biscayne and have this Flash message delivered directly to Kissinger upon receipt regardless of the hour.
Bunker and I spent two hours with Thieu and Nha starting at 11:00 am Saigon time November 10.2 Thieu read the President’s letter very carefully making marginalia at key places.3 I then explained to him in detail the general character of the changes we intended to seek, covered the game plan and then expanded at some length on the [Page 373] reasons why it was essential that Thieu cooperate with us in the final stages. I hit very strongly the consequences of his failure to do so and, in effect, presented him with an ultimatum.
After completion of this lengthy presentation, during which Thieu continually conducted a conversation with Nha in Vietnamese, Thieu stated that he would like to have more details on the specific changes we were going to seek, noting that principles were not sufficient for him to make the kind of decision we were asking for. He stated that when you briefed during your last visit to Saigon things looked rather good but when they read the English text of the draft agreement, there appeared to be discrepancies between what you said and what they read. Then when they read the Vietnamese version these discrepancies grew and became more serious. He stated that this caused great difficulty not only in Saigon but in all of the capitals that you visited where oral briefings were given. Initially, most were enthusiastic but when they read the cold print they lost all confidence. Thieu stated he did not want this kind of difficulty on this occasion.
I told Thieu in no uncertain terms that we would, of course, work with him as we developed specific language but that he must understand that I was not here to negotiate with him but rather to discuss with him the contents of the President’s letter which clearly enunciated the general directions that the President intended to pursue on the important outstanding issues that remained. I stated that we had made the decision to proceed and now it was essential for us to know in principle whether or not he would cooperate with us. I pointed out that we were being subjected to countless conflicting high level viewpoints which purportedly represented Thieu’s thinking and which were being provided to the South Vietnamese press with increasing regularity. I stated that now is the time for us to be informed with respect to Thieu’s intentions, that we are prepared for either eventuality and that the President’s determination to proceed with a settlement now was unshakeable and inevitable.
Thieu seemed to back off, sensing that we were heading toward some first-class brinkmanship. He stated that he understood that we might not be able to give him chapter and verse but that it would be most helpful if we could answer some general questions which he and his advisers were concerned about, such as the size of the ICCS, when it would be in place, when the ceasefire would take place with respect to the announcement, how the political process would occur, when we visualized unification of North and South would take place, etc. He stated that he had a meeting scheduled with his NSC this afternoon in which they would discuss the situation. He would then like to have me meet sometime tonight, after 9:00 pm Saigon time, with two or three of his key advisors to see how many of the outstanding questions we [Page 374] could clarify to assist him in considering the broad question at another meeting with his NSC that would take place tomorrow morning Saigon time. Following this meeting, Thieu said he would meet with me at 3:00 pm Saigon time and provide me with an answer to the President’s letter.
My judgment now is that Thieu cannot bring himself to an open break with us. On the other hand, he will exercise every ploy in his dictionary to achieve further delay, hopefully without a commitment. All of this tends to suggest that he intends to go along in the final analysis but we have been fooled before and may be faced with a firm no tomorrow afternoon.
In the interim, given the suspicious nature of the South Vietnamese, I think it would serve our purpose to be as forthcoming as possible as we can on the questions that they have. With respect to the specific positions that you would take in the Paris meetings, we have two options. The first (Option A) is to merely give Nha a written version of the talking points which I used this morning on the major changes. These, as you know, are general in character but would be less likely to reassure Thieu. The second option (Option B) would involve our actually giving the specific changes you intend to press for on the major items contained in the talking points. In each case, we would give the minimum or fallback position as agreed upon Wednesday in Washington. The disadvantage of this is that Thieu would then have a scorecard to assess your effectiveness in Paris and before that time he may demand other changes which will be even tougher to manage. The advantage is that we would be dealing in a most forthright way with Thieu and I think take a large step toward eliminating current suspicions which are virulent.
The decision on which option to pursue depends on your and the President’s willingness to lay it on the line during my trip. In this morning’s meeting, I brought it to the point of confrontation. There is no doubt in Thieu’s mind that a negative response from him may well result in bilateral action by us. He obviously avoided, and I believe intends to continue to avoid, this kind of a rupture. If you wish me to push it to the hilt, I would strongly recommend that we take the second option. If on the other hand, you want to hold off risking a final break during my visit then the more general approach in Option A would make more sense. If I do not hear from you before our meeting tonight, I will use Option A since this is essentially a repeat of my oral presentation this morning.
I also need your guidance on how far I can go on technical questions related to how we visualize the implementation of the agreement itself. Bunker, Negroponte and myself will caveat each answer in any event to be sure we are protected. We will not make policy but when [Page 375] we have discussed an issue such as the approximate size of the ICCS I think it serves our purpose to be as forthcoming as possible. Along this line, I believe it would be of value to give Thieu a copy of the draft protocol on the ICCS prepared by Sullivan. Since he has already officially circulated this, we should probably stick with his version. We can police up possible changes at a later date and the substantive differences between our staff draft and Sullivan’s which you hold there in Key Biscayne are not that difficult to manage. I am sorry to disturb you at this hour but I am sure you recognize how important it is that I have your guidance before entering tonight’s meeting. If it is not available, I intend to proceed as outlined herein so that Thieu will have absolutely no excuses for failing to bite the bullet tomorrow afternoon.
The meeting was tense but never emotional and despite the frankness of the discussion it never lost cordiality. Thieu seemed much more controlled and confident than during the October discussions.
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (1). Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.↩
- A memorandum of conversation of the meeting, November 10, indicates the meeting lasted until 12:50 p.m. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 96.↩