Office of the Historian

95. Summary of Conclusions of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, November 8, 1972, 2:08–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam Planning

PARTICIPANTS

  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • U. Alexis Johnson
    • William Sullivan
  • Defense
    • Kenneth Rush
    • G. Warren Nutter
    • R/Adm. Daniel J. Murphy
    • Roger Shields
  • JCS
    • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
    • V/Adm. John Weinel
  • CIA
    • Richard Helms
    • George Carver
    • William Newton
  • NSC
    • M/Gen. Alexander Haig
    • Richard Kennedy
    • John Holdridge
    • James T. Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

  • —The JCS will prepare a check list of items that should be covered in the next negotiating session with the North Vietnamese.
  • —DOD will prepare a brief paper on the POW situation that states clearly what we want and when we want it. A separate paper will be prepared on MIAs.
  • —CIA will prepare a paper outlining proposed U.S. intelligence operations in Vietnam following a ceasefire.
  • —All U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam after sixty days following the ceasefire will be designated attachés.
  • —There is to be no further public speculation on the possibility of U.S. civilian personnel replacing U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam.
  • —Civilian personnel, regardless of nationality, should be hired and paid by the South Vietnamese Government.
  • —No public statements will be made on the subject of inspection of POW facilities.
  • —The Navy may begin removing the mines as soon as the agreement is signed, but they should not all be removed until all of the prisoners have been released. The withdrawal of troops should also be timed so that it will not be completed until all of the prisoners have been released.
  • —The President wants a major unilateral U.S. intelligence effort to monitor the enemy’s compliance with the agreement.2
  • —There should be no reduction in our military personnel in Cambodia.
  • —There should be a time interval between the first international conference and the separate conference on reconstruction and development.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–117, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 7–27–72 to 9–20–73. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are attached.↩
  2. During the meeting Kissinger said: “I want to assure you that the President does not consider this exercise a road leading to a bugout. He fully plans to enforce the agreement. He has every intention of maintaining the present structure in South Vietnam and of putting a unilateral effort behind it. Your activities in the intelligence field must be based on that objective. I want a grade A effort in the collection and analysis of intelligence in Vietnam. We don’t want people down there who are going to waffle around or depend on information from the Control Commission.” Helms responded: “This is extremely useful guidance for us. It is exactly what we need to know.”↩