Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

67. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)¹

October 24, 1972, 8:53 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Hello, Henry.

K: Ellsworth, how are you?

B: Fine.

K: Ellsworth, I’m getting in touch with you by cable.

B: Right.

K: On that one matter you sent me which I just received about the misinterpretation. Now if that stuff is put out it is total suicide.² This is what we are fighting in the press here. Now if they say that’s what it is, we’re dead.³

B: Yeh.

K: Then whether words are taken in or out is immaterial.

B: Right.

K: They are giving this thing—first of all there is no talk whatever of the lower level stuff. I don’t know where they get that from.

B: Well, what they’re talking about is what was in the—what was in some of the previous proposals. That’s what Lam is talking about.

K: Yeh, but if he wants to be able to play in some achievements he ought to see that this is not the current thing and that they should stay a million miles away from that sort of an accusation. They’re committing total suicide here. I mean not with us, we’re trying to be helpful but in the way the public debate is going to be shaped here.

B: Yeh. Yeh.

K: The reason I call you so urgently is just if there is any chance of getting to them tonight to calm them down.

B: I doubt it very much Henry.

K: Well, at least first thing in the morning.

B: Yes, well I think of what is taking place here now. There are mass meetings being organized all around the country and people are getting stirred up against—all of the talk is against a coalition government and they are against a three-segment coalition government.

K: Well, it’s either—

B: They are given the impression that this is what’s trying to be forced on them.

K: This could either be very clever or very insane. It depends on how they then represent the outcome.

B: Yes, that’s right. That’s what I say. That’s what I said in that message.

K: Yeh. Ellsworth, you’ve been a tower of strength and we’ll be getting in touch with you by cable with details, of course.

B: Right. All right. Fine.

K: But it’s essentially here the way I told you it would be.

B: It is.

K: Yeh.

B: Well, I’ll probably get a cable from you in the morning, would I?

K: No doubt.

B: OK. All right, fine Henry.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 16, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Bunker was in Saigon.
2. Kissinger was referring to Foreign Minister Lam’s plan to send a briefing paper to Vietnamese Embassies around the world spelling out the three major reasons for rejecting the negotiated agreement: (1) North Vietnam failed to recognize the DMZ as the line separating North from South and thus did not recognize the existence of a separate South Vietnam; (2) North Vietnam refused to withdraw its forces from the South; and (3) the agreement created a disguised coalition government to supplant the legal government in the South. (Telegram 15223 from Saigon, October 24, 0910Z; ibid., NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (1))
3. At Bunker’s direction, Whitehouse persuaded Lam to radically revise and moderate the briefing paper. (Telegram 15220 from Saigon, October 24, 0830Z; ibid.) The new version omitted all references to rejecting the agreement and instead stated that South Vietnam desired modification of the three essential points detailed in footnote 2 above. (Telegram 15224 from Saigon, October 24, 0911Z; ibid.)