338. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig)1
H: Hello, Henry.
K: Yes, Al. I just wanted you to know I told Richardson to put you in charge of a Vietnam Task Force and he said he’s already talked to Moorer about that.2
H: Yeah, yeah. Well, Moorer’s sort of goosey about it I guess. I got this late today. He mentioned it and he didn’t know whether it had come from you or Richardson. And, you know, he did a lot of bitching about it.
K: Why should he be bitchy about it?
H: Well, he’s worried about his authority I think and the chain of command and what have you. But, you know, that just happens to be the building problems.
K: Well, how they set it up—Now, have you seen that paper of what he wants to pull out of there?
H: Oh, the Chairman?
K: Yeah.
[Page 1175]H: No, but I told Richardson yesterday that he shouldn’t pull a damn thing out.
K: Well, he wants to reduce the B–52s to 52 and the Tac Air Wings to 9.
H: I think that’s very foolish, Henry.
K: Well, I won’t hold still for it.
H: I think the B–52s should stay where they are, unless they change some models, that’s all right. The Tac Air should stay where it is. And maybe we could take a carrier or two out because that’s a real—You know, you could have some mutinys or something there.
K: Yeah. I don’t mind them taking carriers out. I don’t mind if after three months, they draw down a little bit.
H: No, that’s right. Well, I told that to all of them. In fact, I told that to the Chairman. They’re just pushing to see what they can get. We’ll just have to stay tough on that.
K: No, there’s no question about our staying tough. What I would like is a Defense Department that doesn’t send such crap over here.
H: And they knew better cause I explained to them exactly. I said, we not only have the 60-day period,3 which is essential that we stay strong, but we have a period thereafter that is even more critical.
K: Yeah. Okay.
H: The only problem is in the Navy where they—I think we probably will save ourself some difficulty if we go ahead and take a carrier or two away.
K: Oh, yeah. Well, I don’t object to that.
H: Yeah.
K: Okay, good. Well, I think Richardson has every intention of making some runs at us.
H: Oh, I don’t doubt that, Henry. I don’t doubt it. Although he asked me to come over yesterday and he made some runs on personnel.
K: Like what?
H: Well, you know, on Jonathan.4 And I said: Well, I don’t know. I knew Mr. Haldeman felt quite strongly about it and I thought the President did. So he said, well, if they just call me, I’ll fold. But if they leave me hanging in the air, I’m just going to assume that I can bluff them out and that’s the fact of it.
K: Yeah.
[Page 1176]H: So I think Bob ought to call him up and say, hell, no. And that will close it out and then he can get—I think he’s having problems with his man. You see, Jonathan is holding him accountable.
K: Yeah.
H: But what he was concerned about and his discussion with me was his number two and how he could prevent the wrong kinds of stuff coming through. Well, you know, what directorate he was talking about.
K: Yeah.
H: Figures number two will be too tough. And then he said he wanted to do some contingency studies on rules of engagement for the whole settlement period. Well, that doesn’t hurt if he’s doing your work for you.
K: Oh, no, that’s fine. Okay.
H: Everything else all right?
K: Everything else is fine.
H: Good. Well, I think everything—you know, the press and everything has been great.
K: Yeah. It’s done very well.
H: Yeah, it has. Are you going to the Vietnamese Embassy Monday?
K: It depends on when the President gets back?
H: Yeah, they’re trying to make up with us all now.
K: Yeah, probably. Well, the poor bastards are in trouble.
H: That’s right. Okay. Fine, Henry.
K: See you soon.
H: Good. Bye, bye.
K: Bye.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 18, Chronological File. No classification marking.↩
- On January 24, Kissinger called Laird to ask that he make Haig the Pentagon’s contact point with the White House on Vietnam matters. Since he would leave the job on January 29, Laird demurred, believing that the matter should be handled by the incoming Secretary of Defense, Elliot L. Richardson. (Transcript of a telephone conversation between Laird and Kissinger, January 24, 5:58 p.m; ibid.)↩
- Under the agreement the almost 600 United States prisoners of war would be released within 60 days of the treaty’s signing.↩
- Commander Jonathan T. Howe, USN, then a National Security Council staff member.↩