Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

334. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, January 24, 1973, 4:09–5:32 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam Planning

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman: Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • William Porter
  • Marshall Green
  • George Aldrich
• Defense
  • Kenneth Rush
  • Gen. Alexander M. Haig
  • R/Adm. Daniel P. Murphy
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • V/Adm. John P. Weinel
• CIA
  • Richard Helms
  • George Carver
  • William Newton
• NSC
  • B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft
  • Richard Kennedy
  • John Holdridge
  • James Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

• —Defense will submit a plan for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. troops based on the following formula: one quarter during the first fifteen day period following the ceasefire, somewhat less than one quarter during the second period, somewhat more than one quarter during the third period and the final one quarter during the fourth period.
• —The JCS will order the minesweepers at Pearl Harbor to move to Vietnam and our members of the Joint Commission will begin discussing the removal of the mines with the North Vietnamese. However, there should be no haste in actually removing the mines.
• —There should be no reduction of our air effort in Laos and Cambodia until there are ceasefires in those countries.
• —When the anticipated ceasefire in Cambodia takes effect we will suspend our tactical air and B–52 strikes for 72 hours, however, our forces will react to any offensive actions launched by the enemy during that period. The senior members of the WSAG will prepare and send appropriate instructions to the field.
• —There are no limitations on intelligence flights or airdrops in Laos and Cambodia.
• —There are no limitations on U.S. civilian personnel in Laos and Cambodia.
• —Psywar activities are not to be conducted in North Vietnam after the ceasefire, but there are no limitations on such activities in Laos and Cambodia. The operation of the South Vietnamese radios beamed North should not be curtailed until we are certain that the North is living up to the agreement.
• —There is no limitation in the agreement on the number of carriers we can maintain in Southeast Asian waters.
• —No supplies or equipment in excess of that in South Vietnam on January 27 can be brought into the country after that date. Nothing can be transferred to the South Vietnamese Government after that date. The aircraft now outside South Vietnam for overhaul will be returned, or similar aircraft will be sent to South Vietnam prior to January 27.
• —All U.S. forces moving to Thailand must be out of Vietnam by March 29, 1973.
• —State and Defense will designate representatives in Saigon to handle liaison with the members of the ICCS and the Four Party Commission.
• —State will instruct Embassy Saigon and MACV to submit recommendations concerning the handling of the financing of the ICCS and the Four Party Commission.

Applause as Mr. Kissinger enters the situation room.

Mr. Johnson: Congratulations on a great job!

Mr. Kissinger: Thank you. Where’s Al Haig?

Gen. Haig: I’m here.

Mr. Kissinger: Come and sit at the table.

Mr. Helms: We’ve been trying to get him on this side of the table for a long time.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, first, let’s get a brief update from Helms.

Mr. Helms: We ought to just say “well done, gentlemen.”

Mr. Helms read a prepared statement (copy attached).²

Mr. Kissinger: But they haven’t launched any major attacks yet, aren’t they running out of time?

Mr. Helms: They are. However, in many places they don’t have far to go to seize at least a limited objective.

Mr. Kissinger: Admiral (Weinel), is there anything new in the military situation?

Adm. Weinel: I agree with what Mr. Helms says. There is a complete disconnect between the orders they are issuing and what their troops are doing.

Mr. Kissinger: I know the feeling!

Mr. Johnson: I certainly think they would try to grab something they (the Viet Cong) could use as a capital.

Mr. Carver: They’d like to, but they may not be able to do it.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t think they will violate the ceasefire.

Mr. Carver: We have been receiving plenty of reports of instructions they have been issuing to their forces to move rapidly in the last 72 hours to seize as much as they can. They are also trying to move two regiments across the Cambodian border.

Mr. Kissinger: I expected them to try to take as much as they could in the last 72 hours, but to avoid any big moves after the ceasefire.

Mr. Carver: Right. Oh, they will probably try some things in the dark of the moon and around the edges.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the infiltration rate?

Mr. Carver: There has been no decrease to date. Of course, they have made no commitment to knock it off.

Mr. Helms: They are continuing to move both personnel and equipment.

Mr. Kissinger: What about after January 27th?

Gen. Haig: We have received some intercepts from Saigon; local instructions have gone out in Binh Thuan to knock things off on the 27th and then to have a high period for 24 hours after the 27th. Apparently they expect this period after the ceasefire to be fuzzy and confused, and want to take advantage of it.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand they may try to seize some seaports. This could be either an attempt to violate the ceasefire or to implement it. If they intend to honor the restrictions on use of the trail, they may want a seaport to bring in supplies.

Mr. Johnson: I heard they wanted to use a Cambodian seaport.

Mr. Kissinger: We were prepared to let them use a Cambodian seaport for sixty days, but it is not in the agreement. Now it is an issue to be worked out between North and South Vietnam. They will have to negotiate that between themselves, but it is inconceivable to me that they will agree to anything.

Mr. Porter: Where do they plan to have their administrative base, at Long Binh?

Mr. Kissinger: What administrative base?

Mr. Porter: For the GVN.

Mr. Kissinger: The GVN plans to have all their administration in Long Binh. They want to keep it out of Saigon.

Mr. Porter: That makes sense.

Mr. Kissinger: They have redesigned the city of Saigon to extend the city limits beyond Long Binh. (Foreign Minister) Tran Van Lam was so enthusiastic about that idea I told him to be sure to stop short of Can Tho. Incidentally, the President wants the State Department to know that our relations with Australia have not improved, despite stories to the contrary that have been circulating. (Prime Minister) Whitlam is not being invited, and if he comes anyway you can be sure that he will not be received.

Mr. Johnson: Can you tell me why we are so tough on the Australians and not on the French? I think Pompidou’s behavior has been outrageous.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, he’s not enthusiastic about Pompidou either, but even less so about Mitterand.

Mr. Johnson: We can accept that.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the ICCS?

Mr. Johnson: We made a presentation of the agreement and protocols to the ICCS members this morning. They were overwhelmed by the mass of material and asked for time to read it before having a discussion. The Secretary said he would see them again after they review it. The Poles readily agreed and the others said they would let us know. A meeting has been set for five-thirty this evening.

Mr. Kissinger: They are supposed to be there on Monday (January 29).

Mr. Johnson: There is a pretty tough transportation problem.

Adm. Murphy: Have all four countries accepted?

Mr. Johnson: No, none of them have.

Adm. Murphy: None of them?

Mr. Johnson: Well, we pretty well know they are going to accept, but they haven’t done so officially yet.

Mr. Kissinger: The initial teams should be there Monday (January 29) and the others within 48 hours.

Mr. Aldrich: Within 24 hours.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right, 24 hours. I saw something on the ticker about the Indonesians participating.

Mr. Johnson: I have no doubt they will, it’s just that we haven’t received formal notification yet.

Mr. Green: Malik (Indonesian Foreign Minister) arrives here tomorrow (January 25), we can probably get official word then.

Mr. Johnson: Will MACV need instructions to support the Four Power Commission?

Adm. Murphy: We have made plans for either a 400 or an 800 man commission, but we have received no instructions as yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Do you need instructions?

Adm. Murphy: Yes, we do. We have no instructions at this point in time. We will have no problem increasing our support to handle 1,160, though.

Mr. Kissinger: Have the orders for the ceasefire and withdrawal been issued?

Adm. Murphy: For the ceasefire yes, but not for the withdrawal.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to emphasize that we are not trying to set a world record in getting out. If we are going to withdraw in tranches, I would rather do it with the heavy tranches at the end rather than at the beginning.

Adm. Weinel: If we do it in equal increments for the whole sixty day period we will be withdrawing 400 per day. However, we could start with 200 per day and then increase the amount later.

Adm. Murphy: We can start with 750 per day, if you wish.

Mr. Kissinger: No, that’s too many.

Mr. Aldrich: An important factor to remember is that the rate of withdrawal we establish will apply to the Koreans, too.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s important. Our tendency has been to do these things ahead of schedule. If we have sixty days to withdraw, we are likely to do it in 32, but I don’t want that to happen this time.

Adm. Weinel: That’s the second time you told us that.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to make sure it’s clear. Can you withdraw one quarter during the first fifteen day period, a little less during the second and then more thereafter? If we present a plan like that, it will appeal to their convoluted minds.

Adm. Moorer arrives at meeting.

Mr. Kissinger: I need a plan for withdrawals by Saturday (January 27). Let’s bring out one quarter in the first tranche, less than that in the second, a little more in the third and one quarter in the fourth. That last quarter will be a trump for us.

Adm. Murphy: I understand what you want.

Mr. Kissinger: With regard to the mines, I want your (Defense Department) spokesman to say that the mines can be removed, not deactivated.

Adm. Moorer: We are meeting the press today and we will tell them that we have no definite plan for the removal of the mines as yet and that there is no date certain for the completion of the mine removal effort. We will talk about removal rather than deactivation.

Adm. Murphy: I can guarantee you that we will not have them all out in sixty days.

Adm. Weinel: But we are supposed to start on January 27. What should we do?

Mr. Kissinger: You can start doing something, can’t you? I asked that Commander you (Adm. Moorer) sent to brief me what was the slowest he could remove the mines and he said May 1. Then I asked him what was the fastest he could do it and he said May 1. If we take that position with the North Vietnamese we will be in good shape.

Adm. Moorer: We can start moving the minesweepers from Pearl Harbor, get the tenders in position and then get a list from the North Vietnamese of the locations where they may have attempted some minesweeping.

Mr. Johnson: Are the North Vietnamese going to see you actually removing the mines and taking them away?

Adm. Moorer: No, we won’t take any away.

Mr. Kissinger: Then what do you do? They have to see you doing something.

Adm. Moorer: We will destroy them.

Mr. Johnson: So they will see them explode?

Adm. Moorer: That’s right.

Mr. Johnson: Well that’s O.K., so long as they see something happen.

Mr. Kissinger: Then go ahead and start moving the minesweepers, get the tenders in place and start talking to them about it.

Mr. Aldrich: I think from our discussions in Paris it’s pretty clear that they expect to see ships out in the harbor on January 27, starting to remove the mines.

Mr. Kissinger: Can’t our members of the Joint Commission tell them what we plan to do?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, the Commission will give the North Vietnamese a schematic of what we plan to do.

Mr. Kissinger: O.K., that’s the best we can do. Now, they have agreed that the POWs will be released in Hanoi, with the exception of those being held in the South. With regard to those, they will tell us when they will be released.

Adm. Moorer: We can send our planes into Hanoi?

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right.

Adm. Moorer: To which airport, Gia Lam?

Mr. Kissinger: I assume so, they told me Fukien was out of commission.

Adm. Moorer: I’m not surprised. Will we be able to take them directly to Clark (in the Philippines)?

Mr. Kissinger: I doubt they’ll let you take them out over the Gulf. They said the only air corridors open are the ones to Laos. The Four Party Commission can raise that question.

Mr. Johnson: Why wouldn’t they want us to fly out over the Gulf?

Gen. Haig: I think they just don’t want our planes coming in over the sea approach to Hanoi.

Adm. Moorer: It’s no big problem. We can fly them from Laos to South Vietnam and then out to Clark.

Mr. Kissinger: They will give us a list of POWs on Saturday (January 27) at 4 p.m. The GVN is getting its list to Paris by courier. Can we give them our MIA list?

Adm. Murphy: Yes, we will have it ready.

Mr. Kissinger: We should give them our MIA list Saturday and ask them for an accounting of the MIAs.

Adm. Moorer: Are they going to show us where the graves are of those who died in North Vietnam?

Mr. Kissinger: The agreement and protocol cover that.

Adm. Murphy: Sullivan wants a copy of the GVN list to give to them in case the official GVN list doesn’t get to Paris on time. He’s afraid it may be delayed.

Mr. Kissinger: Just a minute! We are not handing over any GVN list. That’s their business and we should stay out of it.

Adm. Murphy: All right.

Mr. Johnson: We’d better get back to Sullivan on this.

Mr. Kissinger: Tell him we don’t want him to do that.

Mr. Johnson: But our people in Paris should have a copy of our list of POWs to compare with the list the North Vietnamese give them.

Mr. Kissinger: Right, they should. But not to give to the North Vietnamese.

Adm. Moorer: How are they going to release the POWs, the longest held first?

Mr. Kissinger: We told them two methods were acceptable to us. We preferred that they release the sick and wounded first and then those who have been held the longest. The other method would be to release them camp by camp.

Mr. Aldrich: They indicated they would probably do it camp by camp.

Mr. Kissinger: It would certainly be easier for them that way.

Adm. Moorer: What should we do about our effort in Laos and Cambodia after the ceasefire in Vietnam?

Mr. Kissinger: We have told the North Vietnamese there will be no reduction of our air effort over Laos and Cambodia until there are ceasefires in those countries. It is a major pressure on them to agree to an early ceasefire in those areas.

Adm. Moorer: We plan to continue. In fact, we can step the effort way up in Laos and Cambodia once we stop bombing in Vietnam.

Mr. Kissinger: I’d better talk to the President about that. I don’t know if we want 100 B–52s bombing Laos as the ceasefire takes place in Vietnam. I see no problem with continuing at your current level, though. If there’s anything I’ve learned about the North Vietnamese, it’s that they become friendlier and friendlier the more you hurt them. You should have seen Le Duc Tho! He was cool toward me in mid-December, but when I returned to Paris after the bombing resumption he was all over me. I couldn’t keep him away from me, he was so friendly.

Adm. Moorer: That’s right. That’s the way they always are. What about intelligence flights?

Mr. Kissinger: Intelligence flights should continue over Laos and Cambodia in any case. Isn’t that your understanding, George (Carver)?

Mr. Carver: That’s right. They can continue over Laos and Cambodia, and within twelve miles of the North Vietnamese coast. Those are the instructions we are operating under.

Adm. Moorer: When should we plan for our Air Force to stand down in Cambodia? When will the ceasefire there take effect?

Mr. Kissinger: It will be effective whenever Lon Nol announces an end to his offensive actions.

Mr. Johnson: The word we have is that FANK will cease all offensive activities as of January 29 or 30. The exact date is not yet clear.

Mr. Kissinger: Then we should do what we have been doing up to that time. When the Cambodians stop, we will stop for 72 hours, so far as tactical air strikes and B–52s are concerned. This does not apply to intelligence flights or airdrops.

Adm. Moorer: Then what? Do we resume after 72 hours?

Mr. Kissinger: It depends on what happens. You understand the rules; we don’t launch any offensive actions during the 72 hour period, but we can react to any offensive actions they launch. We don’t stand by and do nothing if they launch an attack.

Mr. Johnson: Do you want to give authority to the field to react if there are attacks in Cambodia?

Mr. Kissinger: We have to.

Adm. Moorer: I’ll get out an operational message tonight.

Mr. Johnson: There is a message in from (Ambassador) Swank on this. I think he’s confused about it.

Gen. Haig: I have a copy of that cable. It’s the same exercise we’re talking about. We’re saying we’re going to turn our effort off for 72 hours unless they attack.

Adm. Moorer: Who will make the determination that the enemy is launching a new attack?

Gen. Haig: The people on the ground are the only ones who can do that.

Mr. Kissinger: Our local commander should be ready to assist if the Cambodians are attacked. However, he has to understand that we want to show restraint, but not to the extent of endangering FANK units.

Adm. Moorer: There is a judgment here that has to be made in the field.

Mr. Johnson: That’s right. Who will prepare the message to the field?

Adm. Moorer: Admiral Weinel will put it together.

Mr. Kissinger: Haig should see it before it goes out.

Mr. Johnson: I want Marshall Green to work on it, too.

Adm. Moorer: What is the situation regarding the civilian contractors?

Mr. Kissinger: As I said at the last meeting, we can’t increase the number of advisers.

Mr. Carver: The current number is 1,139. I assume we can keep that number of DOD civilians so long as we don’t exceed it.

Mr. Kissinger: So long as you don’t exceed the number that is in-country on ceasefire day.

Adm. Weinel: Actually, we rounded off the figure and agreed on 1,200.

Mr. Kissinger: We are talking only about those attached to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces.

Adm. Murphy: We are planning to move some around as advisers to civilian agencies.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s O.K., but you can’t call those F–5 mechanics employees of civilian agencies. You’ve been planning this a long time. When are you going to do something?

Mr. Carver: We’ve been talking to NSA and DIA for about two months. I’ll get on it right away.

Mr. Kissinger: Have it done before Saturday (January 27). Don’t work on it any later than Friday night.

Mr. Johnson: We can do that.

Mr. Kissinger: George (Carver), can you get it done? If you do, your people can stay there forever. That’s usually a good incentive to get some action out of a bureaucracy.

Mr. Carver: I’ll work on it as soon as the meeting is over.

Mr. Johnson: What about AID people working for the Armed Forces?

Mr. Kissinger: AID people working for the Armed Forces will be limited like everybody else. If the government units they are assigned to are not in the Armed Forces, there is no problem, but it won’t work for those assigned to the Armed Forces.

Adm. Murphy: What about getting those crypto people out of South Vietnamese units?

Mr. Carver: We’re working on that.

Adm. Moorer: What about civilian contractor personnel?

Mr. Kissinger: I want to see how well the agreement is being kept before we start worrying about contractor personnel.

Adm. Moorer: There are no restrictions in Laos and Cambodia?

Mr. Kissinger: Right. Only the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. I don’t interpret that to mean Embassy attachés. We should not reduce our effort in either Laos or Cambodia, at least until we have ceasefires there.

Adm. Moorer: What about psywar activities?

Mr. Kissinger: It’s off in North Vietnam, but don’t do anything to reduce the effort in Laos or Cambodia until there are ceasefires there. Don’t turn off the South Vietnamese radios beamed at the North until we see what they are going to do during the ceasefire. One thing I will say, the liberal ideology certainly doesn’t work in Vietnam. The liberals have been saying we should show good faith. Everytime we showed good faith we got nothing. The only time we have ever gotten anything out of them is when we hurt them. An example of their convoluted thinking is the way they treated the question of the number of personnel on the International Control Commission. We presented some reasonable proposals to them and got absolutely nowhere. So we decided to make a ridiculous proposal, and they responded by immediately agreeing to quadruple the number they had been insisting on. Every time we gave them our minimum position they killed it. You know, when I left Paris they took away the English versions of the agreement, with the seals and ribbons all attached, because they were afraid I would take off the seals and ribbons and slip in two or three extra pages between the time of the initialing and the signing. They kept the English version and gave me the Vietnamese language version to hold. What an expression of confidence!

Mr. Johnson: Do they accept that we have dismantled our bases?

Mr. Kissinger: We have nothing left to dismantle. (to Admiral Moorer) Isn’t there something out there you can scrap?

Adm. Moorer: We already scrapped Cam Ranh Bay and a number of other facilities. Let me put it this way; they won’t be able to find anything that we are using.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to reiterate that nothing can be transferred to South Vietnam after January 27.

Adm. Moorer: There has been some speculation about a reduction of our carrier force. Did you discuss reducing the carrier force from six to three?

Mr. Kissinger: No, there was no such discussion. I said in my press conference³ that as peace returns to the area it is natural that in time we will return to normal peacetime operations. But there is no limit on the number of carriers.

Adm. Weinel: We will have to send some additional people to Vietnam on TDY to help with the withdrawal. Will we have a problem doing that?

Mr. Kissinger: How many are you talking about?

Adm. Weinel: About 200.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s nothing. If you’re bringing out 400 a day, 200 going in on TDY won’t even be noticed. I would just go ahead and do it and say nothing about it. If anyone questions it, the answer is simple, they are going in to help expedite the withdrawal. I don’t think anyone will complain about that.

Adm. Weinel: We have one ship that is not yet in port.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get it in before the ceasefire?

Adm. Murphy: No, it will be on the high seas for ten or twelve more days.

Mr. Kissinger: We have a problem, then.

Adm. Murphy: We have a large shipment of ammunition going in that will arrive on January 30. It is mostly 500 pound bombs and is intended to replace bombs the South Vietnamese have expended. If the shipment is not permitted in, it will result in a net reduction of their supply of bombs below what they have had on hand. There’s a lot of bombs in that shipment.

Mr. Johnson: But if it brings them above the January 27 level it will be a violation of the agreement.

Adm. Murphy: It would do that.

Mr. Kissinger: Can you speed up the shipment?

Adm. Murphy: No.

Adm. Weinel: What is the rule, that they can’t take what is not offloaded by the 27th?

Mr. Kissinger: No, it must be in port by the 27th. What can you do about this ammunition?

Adm. Moorer: We can work something out. We can divert it to U Tapao.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, you can do that.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the intelligence plan?

Mr. Johnson: We have our 45 FSOs ready to go. They will start moving out over the weekend.

Adm. Murphy: We have at least twenty planes that belong to South Vietnam temporarily out of the country for overhaul. There are 12 C–47s and 8 A–7s at Clark Field for engine overhaul. Will we have any problem bringing them back in?

Mr. Johnson: My understanding is that what is in-country on January 27 is all that can be brought in.

Mr. Kissinger: We have a problem. The ICCS inspectors will be checking these things and they’ll be watching for a net increase. After January 27 you can take planes out for overhaul and bring them back in later. Can you bring these in before the 27th and then take them back out again?

Adm. Murphy: Some of them are all torn down. I doubt that we can get many of them back in before the 27th. All told, there are more than 20.

Adm. Moorer: Perhaps we can send some other planes in and then replace them later with the ones that are being overhauled.

Gen. Haig: They’ll never believe it if you say they were just out for overhaul.

Mr. Kissinger: I tell you, they are paranoid. If we tell them we have fifty planes in the Philippines being overhauled, they’ll never accept it.

Mr. Rush: This will also give them an excuse to bring in some of their equipment, too. They’ll try to move in those tanks that are on the trail.

Mr. Kissinger: Sure, they’ll want to bring in 100 tanks. They’ll say they were just out of South Vietnam having their engines overhauled.

Adm. Weinel: We’ll bring in some other planes and replace them later with the ones being overhauled.

Mr. Kissinger: They will have to be the same kind. You can’t send in training planes and replace them with Phantoms.

Adm. Weinel: Oh, yes, we’ll use the same kind.

Adm. Moorer: We’ll have to check to see how many are out for overhaul and how many are part of Enhance Plus. Some of these planes are in the U.S., from National Guard units, being overhauled before initial shipment to Vietnam.

Mr. Kissinger: If you can arrange a one for one exchange, you’re on easy street. Would you look into that, Dan (Murphy)?

Adm. Murphy: Yes, sir.

Mr. Carver: Three of those C–47s are COMINT planes (EC–47s). We have to get them in.

Mr. Kissinger: Can you put in the same kind by the 27th?

Adm. Murphy: We’ll take care of it.

Mr. Porter: Our friends the Canadians will monitor these things carefully.

Mr. Kissinger: Is the move of MACV to Thailand all set?

Adm. Moorer: I talked with (Gen.) Weyand about this last night. He wants to get the command at NKP (Nakhon Phanom) set up right away and start operating out of there by February 15, with responsibility for air operations transferred first. Then after 60 days MACV will disappear and everything will be handled out of NKP.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s see, sixty days from January 27 is March 29. They have to be all moved by March 29.

Adm. Moorer: They will be.

Mr. Aldrich left to attend a meeting at State between Secretary Rogers and the ambassadors of the ICCS countries.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the Four Party Military Commission? Has that officer, Major Miles, been sent to Paris?

Adm. Murphy: Who’s Major Miles?

Mr. Kissinger: He’s on General Woodward’s staff.

Adm. Moorer: I don’t know if he has gone, we’ll check. Are there now seven regions?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes. They didn’t want to accept ours nor we theirs, so we settled on seven.

Adm. Moorer: We have seven colonels all set to go out to head the regional units.

Mr. Kissinger: Good.

Mr. Johnson: Do you want to discuss the economic program?

Mr. Kissinger: We don’t want to do a bloody thing about the economic program until we get all the POWs out.

Adm. Moorer: Our people in Vietnam will be under pressure for space when the ICCS members and the Four Party Commission members all arrive. They’ll have to find room for the Canadians, Indonesians, Romanians….

Mr. Kissinger: The Hungarians, not Romanians.

Mr. Johnson: It’s all the same.

Mr. Kissinger: They’ve given us a list of the things the ICCS will need. You should have a liaison fellow in Saigon ready to take care of these matters.

Mr. Johnson: There should be two. One from State to handle the diplomatic matters and one from Defense to handle the military requirements.

Adm. Moorer: Who’s to pay for it?

Mr. Johnson: We are required to pay 23%. That’s another matter we’ll have to look into in a hurry, how the funding is to be handled.

Mr. Kissinger: It’s in the protocol that we pay 4.3 million francs.

Mr. Johnson: But we have to decide how to handle the details.

Gen. Haig: We should ask Bunker and Weyand to come in with their recommendations.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, can you do that Marshall (Green)?

Mr. Green: Yes, I’ll take care of it.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 80, National Security Council, Washington Special Actions Group, June 1972–Mar. 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
2. Helms’s briefing, “The Situation in Indochina,” January 24, is attached but not printed.
3. Kissinger held a news conference in Washington on January 24 following the release of the agreement and protocols. The transcript was printed in full in The New York Times, January 25, 1973, pp. 19–21, and in the Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1973, pp. 155–169.