Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

330. Message From the President’s Military Assistant (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 23, 1973, 0047Z.

Tohak 19. Subject: Vice President Tran Van Huong’s Comments on the National Security Council Meeting of 20 January 1973.

1. According to Vice President Tran Van Huong, the National Security Council (NSC) with the additional presence of Senate President Nguyen Van Huyen, Chairman of the Lower House Nguyen Ba Can, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Tran Van Linh, met on 20 January 1973 to consider and discuss President Nixon’s letter of 18 January. Huong commented that the letter was President Nixon’s reply to President Thieu’s letter of 17 January. Huong stated that at the meeting President Thieu asked those present for their comments on President Nixon’s letter and for their opinion whether South Vietnam should sign the ceasefire agreement. Huong commented that the atmosphere of the meeting was extremely tense and that not one soul present at the meeting dared express his opinion. Huong stated that he was very much aware of President Thieu’s difficult position and that in his opinion, President Thieu will be blamed by certain portion of the South Vietnamese population for signing the ceasefire agreement. However, failure to take the latter action will result in the cutoff of U.S. economic and military aid. Huong stated that because of the delicate situation it was his decision to speak before President Thieu had a chance to express his opinion on the matter at hand. Huong stated that by so doing, he had provided President Thieu an avenue of escape from this difficult situation. Huong commented that it was President Thieu’s desire to have someone else express an opinion supporting South Vietnam’s participation in the signing of the ceasefire agreement. If, in the future, the criticism about signing the ceasefire agreement became extremely difficult for President Thieu to cope with, he could then point his finger at Vice President Huong as the one who had strongly insisted that South Vietnam sign the ceasefire agreement. Huong explained that it was President Thieu’s intention to use the NSC as the body that made the final decision for South Vietnam’s participation in the signing of the ceasefire agreement and not he (Thieu) alone.

2. Huong said his statment to the group was consistent with the previous decision of participation in signing of the ceasefire agreement. Huong told the group that “South Vietnam’s position is analogous to a carriage that is standing in the middle of a narrow bridge that is ready to collapse if the first step taken is in the wrong direction. South Vietnam has no other alternative but to agree to sign the ceasefire agreement since this course of action is the lesser of two evils.” (Source comment: Vice President Huong was very emotional and was weeping when [he] was explaining the events that took place during the meeting.) Huong said that after he finished his comments President Thieu took the opportunity to support fully the Vice President and the NSC and stated that the government of South Vietnam has no other choice but to agree to sign the ceasefire agreement.

Subject: Comments on the Ceasefire by Joint General Staff Assistant J–2 Colonel Cao Xuan Ve

1. At 0900, 22 January, Colonel Cao Xuan Ve, Assistant to the Chief of J–2 of the Joint General Staff, said that the Republic of Vietnam Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam had departed for Paris, France, on 21 January. Lam is going to Paris to be on hand to discuss with Dr. Kissinger anything special that may come up pertaining to the last minute arrangements concerning the ceasefire agreement.

2. Colonel Ve also said that Lam has been empowered by President Thieu to sign the ceasefire agreement as the official representative of the Republic of Vietnam. If the ceasefire agreement is as General Haig presented it to President Thieu, Lam is authorized to sign the agreement with Madame Binh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

3. Colonel Ve said that President Thieu is not insisting on the removal from South Vietnam of North Vietnamese army elements but that Thieu expects the U.S. to demand that North Vietnam respect the 17th parallel demilitarized zone as a dividing line between the two countries. Colonel Ve commented that personal friends of his in high positions in the Foreign Ministry have stated that President Thieu does not wish to make a controversy over the presence of North Vietnamese army elements in South Vietnam. According to these friends, Thieu wants the U.S. to try to convince the North Vietnamese to respect the 17th parallel and to suggest to the North Vietnamese that they clandestinely remove North Vietnamese army elements from South Vietnam.

4. Foreign Minister Lam is also empowered to discuss and resolve the prisoner of war problem.

Subject: Briefing of GVN Military Components on Ceasefire Negotiations

1. Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam held ameeting at the Ministry of Defense on the 20th of January from 1600 to 2330 hours. The purpose of the meeting was to brief a group of selected officers on the status of the ceasefire. Among those present at the meeting were Buu Vien, Special Assistant to the Minister; Colonel (FNU)² Huu, from J–5; Colonel Lu Mong Chi, Chief of the Studies Branch in the Ministry of Defense; and Colonels Nguyen Tu Doa and Tran Tin, who are presently attending the National Defense College. Lam stated that there are many portions of the protocol section which are disadvantageous to the Government of Vietnam, but this is offset by the fact that the basic agreement is advantageous. There are also assurances from the United States Government that there is little need to worry about the protocol section since the protocol portions must be solved by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Government of Vietnam. Since the Government of Vietnam is stronger than the Communists, an advantageous solution for the Government of Vietnam can be forced. The preamble and the basic agreement will be signed by all four parties, but another agreement concerning the prisoners of war and related problems will be signed only by the Government of North Vietnam and the United States. President Thieu does not want any agreement in which a provisional government (sic) appears. Further, President Thieu believes he has a guarantee of United States support because General Haig visited him after being appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army and thus spoke from a firm position.

2. On Friday, 19 January, Lieutenant General Tran Van Minh, Chief of the Vietnamese Air Force, spoke to the air division commanders and told them to keep all aircraft on ground alert starting the 24th of January. The aircraft are to be ready to respond to calls for tactical and troop transport support for the military region commanders.

3. The air operations commander stated that the United States will station an air cavalry division in Thailand. The mission of this division will be to intervene along the Laos and Cambodian borders in the event of serious ceasefire violations.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 28, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris Trip Hakto & Tohak & Misc. Memos, etc., January 22–23, 1973. Top Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. First name unknown.