Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

229. Memorandum for the Record¹

CJCS M–74–72

CJCS M–74–72 Washington, December 27, 1972.

SUBJ

• Sequence of Events, 22–25 December 1972, concerning Strikes on North Vietnam (U)

1. On Friday, 22 December, I received a call from HAK in Key Biscayne stating that “the President was outraged” over the small number of B52 sorties flown on that particular date and, even more outraged over the fact that there were only going to be 60 the following day.² Consequently, the President has ordered that, within forty-eight hours, a new Command Organization be established and that he wanted a paper setting forth the new arrangement on his desk by 0830, Sunday, 24 December.

2. HAK also said that Haig was on his way to Washington and would come over to see me. I attempted to explain the problems the B52s were having with the compression associated with the heavy attacks. But, in this I was not too successful, since HAK obviously did not particularly want to understand the problem. In any event, I told him I would provide the paper together with my concept of operations for the period following Christmas.

3. Upon completion of my telephone call I reported the substance to Laird and told him that it would be a great mistake to rearrange the command set-up at this particular time. Laird attributed the problem to the concern in Key Biscayne over the heat resulting from the bombing and said we “simply would have to ride this one out.”

4. Haig arrived Friday afternoon and stated that HAK was coming back Saturday morning and would like to see me in the White House to discuss the command and control system as well as the concept of operations for the forthcoming week. Haig said that he had never seen the President so exercised and agreed with me that it was a manifestation of his overall worry about the situation in general. At the same time, Haig said we would have to take some action in response to the President’s concern. I told him I would be in HAKs office at 0830 the next morning. I also advised Haig to drop by and talk to Murphy so that SecDef would be cut in on the problem.

5. At 0830, Saturday, 23 December, I went to the White House to see HAK. He was late coming in and attributed his lateness to the fact that he had been on a 45-minute “screaming” telephone conversation with “your boss”—meaning Laird.³ I made no comment.

6. I then very carefully explained to HAK the command set-up, emphasizing to him that no change in the command and control system would generate sorties and that, furthermore, sorties in themselves did not mean anything.⁴ The important thing was the effect of the strikes. I then explained, in general terms, what we had in mind for the coming week. This seemed to meet his approval and he asked then that I send over a concept as well as the available BDA which, in turn, could be sent to the President in Key Biscayne.

7. I returned to the Pentagon which was, at this point, very vacant with the exception of the busy people in the Joint Staff. I wrote a planning directive to the field in order to give them at least a minimum time to prepare for the operation on the following Tuesday⁵ which I was informed by HAK that the President wanted to constitute a major effort. After writing up the general directive for all commands and which was based to a large degree on many telephone conversations, I released the message which stated that “confirmation would follow.”⁶ I did this without clearing this with SecDef because, at that time, time was of the essence and I was having considerable difficulty going through the process of locating Murphy who, in turn, had to locate SecDef—neither of whom have a secure phone.

8. On Sunday, 24 December, I arrived in the Pentagon early in order to assemble all information prior to Laird’s arrival at 1030, for a 30-minute period prior to his departure for the Redskins-Packers Football Game. I had given my message to Murphy in advance with the request that he show it to SecDef at the first opportunity. When I arrived in SecDef’s office I found him in a very upset state and, to this day, I do not know whether it was over the message I had released in advance or because of some other discussion with HAK. In any event, he did say he thought it was a good message and that he was going to approve the execution. But, before he did so, he wanted to have an affirmation from the Joint Chiefs that they approved execution of the message. This being Christmas Eve, rather than calling a JCS Meeting, I had the message hand-carried to all the Chiefs who indicated their concurrence by initial. I then forwarded the JCS recommendation to the SecDef who, in turn, authorized the release of the execute and then sent a copy of my message and the execute message to the White House.⁷

9. During the course of our discussion the SecDef said that he was sure there would be Congressional Hearings over the use of the B52s and that he would probably be called back to testify. He said that about March of this year things were really going to be jumping in this town. He went on to say that people are suggesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are playing the President off against the SecDef. I told him that this was absolutely sheer nonsense and that, as a matter of fact, I wouldn’t know how to do it even if I thought it was a good idea. I asked him who in the world was saying such a thing. He said it was a previous Service Secretary who was very close to the President.

10. Since Haig had told me it was Connally who was always suggesting to the President that he change the command and control system I naturally followed that if Laird’s information was correct that Connally was involved in this allegation likewise. Consequently I said, “You must be referring to John Connally.” And Laird replied, “Yes, I am.” I repeated that such a suggestion was unworthy of anyone who made it. At this point Laird departed for the game.

11. Late Saturday afternoon I received a telephone call from HAK telling me he was sending a message to Laird directing him to execute the concept which I had presented in the form of a rough, unsigned copy, and which was more or less a “think piece” subsequently refined when I prepared the message to the field. I told HAK that Laird was sending him a copy of my planning message and execute message and that it would be improper for him to order Laird to execute my plan. A much better course of action would be simply to approve the two messages that Laird was sending over to him which he finally did on the basis of “silence means consent.” HAK also told me that my paper on command and control was a good one—that he would hold it for future reference—which he hoped would not be needed. He said the President decided to let me run the operation.

12. Things cooled off a bit after the operation got started on Tuesday but the difficulty is still it’s very difficult to clear authorities in a timely manner through the SecDef; who, on Wednesday, 27 December, will leave for Hawaii. It is first necessary to locate—and chase down—RAdm Murphy—brief him—then wait for SecDef’s pleasure as to when he is going to reply to my request.

13. This is a helluva way to run a war.

T. H. Moorer⁸

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. A typed notation indicates that this is the “Original and Only Copy.”
2. According to Moorer’s diary, he and Kissinger spoke three times that day: at 9:18 a.m., 11:35 a.m., and 12:07 p.m. At the time Kissinger and Haig were in Key Biscayne with the President. Although all three conversations discussed the sortie and theater command reorganization questions, it was the one at 11:35 in which the questions were discussed in greatest detail and in which Kissinger said: “I just came from the President and I have not seen him so outraged since I got in this job.” (Entry for December 22; ibid.)
3. No record of the telephone conversation has been found.
4. At 1:05 p.m., December 23, Kissinger called Moorer and said: “I just had a long talk with the President and I strongly recommended to him that we’ll just let you run this thing and not make too many organizational changes. I think we can get him to go along with it.” (Entry for December 23; National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974)
5. December 26.
6. Document 222.
7. Laird sent the two messages under a transmittal memorandum to Kissinger, December 24, which stated: “As directed by the President I have approved the implementation of the bombing of North Vietnam as described in the attached cables.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1134, Jon Howe Vietnam Subject Files, Air Strike Package)
8. Moorer initialed “TM” above his typed name.