Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

224. Message From the Air Attaché at the Embassy in France (Guay) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Paris, December 26, 1972.

The following message was obtained from customer at 3:15 pm this date.

Quote:

Message of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in reply to the U.S. messages of December 18 and 22, 1972.²

1. On December 18, 1972 the United States handed to the D.R.V.N. side a message proposing a private meeting of Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy with Dr. Kissinger, at the same time, U.S. planes including B–52’s carried out extermination bombing against many densely populated areas in Hanoi capital city, Hai Phong port city and several provinces in North Viet Nam. This is a most serious escalation of the war, an act of intimidation and pressure by the United States with a view to negotiating from a position of strength. The U.S. side has violated the undertaking of President Nixon himself to cease all bombing, shelling and mining of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam north of the 20th parallel and reducing bombing and shelling south of the 20th parallel during the negotiations and until the negotiations are concluded. The D.R.V.N. side vigorously condemns the U.S. war escalation and resolutely rejects the ultimatum language used in the U.S. message. The U.S. side must bear full responsibility for the consequences of its acts.

2. On October 8, 1972, the D.R.V.N. side presented a very important peace proposal which broke the deadlock of the negotiations and led to an agreement on the text of the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet Nam”. But the U.S. side has sought dilatory means to refuse the signing of the agreement on October 31, 1972 as had been agreed between the two sides, and proposed another meeting to discuss the wording and a number of details. Meanwhile, the United States on the one hand intensified the war in South Viet Nam and massively introduced into South Viet Nam tens of thousands of tons of armaments and war material, tens of thousands of disguised military advisers; on the other it arranged for Nguyen Van Thieu to completely reject the agreement and, at the same time, to intensify the campaign of terrorism against and massacre of patriots and peace-loving people in South Viet Nam.

3. At the private meetings from November 20 to December 13, 1972, the U.S. side insisted upon many changes in the principles and substance of the agreement that had been reached. Because of the goodwill and efforts of the D.R.V.N. side, on December 13 in the text of the agreement there remained only two unsettled major questions: the way of signing the agreement and the modalities for movement across the provisional Military Demarcation Line; besides, there were a number of very important understandings not yet agreed upon. The two parties agreed that the above-mentioned outstanding questions should be settled through exchange of messages or, if necessary, in further meetings; in the meantime, the representatives and experts of the two parties should immediately begin the discussion of the protocols. The U.S. side also proposed that the two parties should not divulge the substance of the questions discussed during the private meetings. The D.R.V.N. side agreed and kept its promise. Yet, the U.S. side has acted contrarily to this agreement. On December 16, 1972, the U.S. side unilaterally made public part of the content of the private meetings, distorted the facts, and shifted the responsibility onto the D.R.V.N. side for creating obstacles to the negotiations.³ What is particularly serious, the U.S. side escalated the war, launched unprecedentedly ferocious air attacks against Hanoi, Haiphong and many other places. On December 22, 1972, while further intensifying attacks against many places in North Viet Nam, the U.S. side sent a message saying that it would stop the bombing north of the 20th parallel as of midnight December 31, 1972 if a private meeting took place between Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, Minister Xuan Thuy, and Dr. Kissinger on January 3, 1972.

4. The D.R.V.N. side resolutely demands that the U.S. side put an immediate end to its acts of war escalation against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, give up threatening manoeuvers in an attempt to negotiate from a position of strength. After the situation has returned to what it was before December 18, 1972, the meetings between the representatives and experts of the two sides will pursue the discussions of the protocols, and the private meeting proposed by the U.S. side between Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, Minister Xuan Thuy, and Dr. Kissinger will take place. However, in view of the present health conditions of Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, the D.R.V.N. side proposes that this private meeting take place on January 8, 1973.

The D.R.V.N. side reaffirms once again its constantly serious negotiating attitude, and it will endeavour to settle the remaining questions with the U.S. side. The U.S. side should also have an attitude of good will; only then can the coming negotiations get results and the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam be rapidly concluded.

Whether the negotiations will be continued or not, whether peace will be promptly restored in Viet Nam or the war will be prolonged, this completely depends on the U.S. side.

End quote.

Comment: Customer called at 9:30 am (Paris time) and asked for a 5:00 pm appointment, I agreed. He called again at 2:00 pm asking if I could make it a 3:00 pm. He explained that he had been summoned by Schumann⁴ and would not be able to make the 5:00 pm meeting. I accepted the new time and met him at the usual place at 3:10 pm, he was late. When he arrived he again excused himself for the change and also for being late. He felt compelled to again explain that the reason for the change was because he had been summoned to the Quai. He seemed very excited and in a great hurry. After I read the message, he jumped up saying that if he understood correctly, there would be an answer to the above. I told him that I would contact him if the need arose and left. Contrary to his usual custom he did not wait for me to precede him by a few minutes but left the house right behind my heels and almost beat me back to Paris.

End message. Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [1 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2. See Documents 185 and 215.
3. See Document 182 and Bernard Gwertzman, “Kissinger Says Talks Have Not Reached ‘Just And Fair’ Agreement; Blames Hanoi,” The New York Times, December 17, 1972, p. 1.
4. Maurice Schumann, French Foreign Minister.