Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

143. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff¹

Paris, December 6, 1972, 0115Z.

Hakto 14. 1. In order to be fully prepared for possible contingencies please have Stearman compile, on an urgent basis to be available by opening of business Thursday a.m. December 7, a meticulously compiled summary of intelligence starting from October 8 which reflects Communist duplicity with respect to their intention to abide by the provisions of the draft agreement. The compilation should be structured in the following way:

A) A detailed tabbed compilation of all reports reflecting such things as instructions to cadres designed to circumvent the spirit and intent of the agreement; discussions with foreign diplomats; or reports of conversations; intercepts; specific reports on the movement of man power, equipment and logistics which would suggest flagrant violation, etc.

B) The reports should be structured for public presentation rather than strategic analysis. Thus major emphasis should be given to the most flagrant manifestations of deceit or subterfuge.

C) My recollection is that initially there were many reports urging violations for the 48-hour period following the ceasefire. Subsequently the thrust of intelligence reporting suggested a calculated abrogation of the terms of the agreement which would extend well beyond that period. It is important that the more reliable, and hopefully more flagrant, reports of abrogation be at the top of the stack. On top of the raw material should be a detailed summary of each report referring to the tab which contains the raw report. Finally, on top of the detailed summary should be a more sophisticated and briefer summary which reflects the specific character of Hanoi’s deceit. Stearman should harness whatever in-house help is required for this task. Great care should be exercised not to generate a large bureaucratic drill which would result in leaks on the fact that we had undertaken the effort. This is an absolutely essential aspect of the exercise.

2. Call Admiral Murphy and inform him that the President wants, on a most close-hold basis and using a tightly controlled JCS planning group, an immediate target-planning effort against North Vietnam. The results of this effort should be available for Dr. Kissinger at the opening of business Thursday morning. It is essential that the targeting be done in an integrated conceptual way and you should personally call the Acting Chairman and Admiral Brownell² on the secure line so that they have the first-hand benefit of the President’s thinking. Thus you will want to speak to both Colonel Taylor and Admiral Brownell to be sure there is no slippage in between. The following planning framework should be adhered to:

A) The first group of targets to be hit by fighter bombers and B–52s should include: Radio Hanoi and all known operative power plants in the Hanoi/Haiphong complex to be followed by other operative power plants in other areas of North Vietnam especially those north of the 20th parallel. Among the power plants to be struck is the one mentioned by the Chairman to Dr. Kissinger which is situated near a dike complex. Full concentration should be placed on the above target complexes until they have been completely neutralized with diversions authorized only for essential route reconnaissance work.

B) The second category of targets should be transportation targets in the Hanoi area including those on the priority list which have heretofore been restricted. Within these list of targets we should also carefully assess the Haiphong area with the view towards eliminating docks and port facilities which can be precisely struck without damage to foreign vessels. In addition to the foregoing, the JCS should prepare a plan to reseed the magnetic mines commencing as early as Saturday, December 9. They should be set for a life of four months. Finally, a target list should be prepared as a separate priority target complex which contains all key targets within the former 25 mile buffer zone up to a newly established buffer of 5 miles from the border with the PRC. It is recognized that this target list will be a substantial one which would take considerable time to cover with a continuing requirement for constant restrikes.

In disseminating the tasks outlined above the following conceptual criteria should be emphasized: the strike plan which may be authorized in the immediate future must be so configured as to create the most massive shock effect in a psychological context. There is to be no dissipation of effort through scattered attacks against a number of varied targets, but rather a clear concentration of effort against essential national assets designed to achieve psychological as well as strategic results. For example, the first priority targets which include Radio Hanoi and power plants should be decisively dealt with before the next priority targets are undertaken. B–52’s should be employed in the Hanoi area as close in as can be reasonably risked. We will need specific recommendations along these lines together with the target lists on Thursday morning. In any event, however, the first effort during the month of December should be for the first package outlined above which is primarily psychological in character. We cannot permit purely military considerations such as long-term interdiction, etc. to dominate the targetting philosophy. Attacks which are launched when the weather permits must be massive and brutal in character. No other criteria is acceptable and no other conceptual approach will be countenanced. Command and control is an essential aspect of this plan. Air Force assets, due to their more sophisticated technological capabilities are best suited for many of the high priority targets. You should not get into this problem in the initial planning which is to be completed by Thursday morning, but you should be aware that we visualize a revised command and control system which will place responsibility for the air war in the North and in the South as well as in Cambodia and Laos under MACV in much the same context that the B–52’s are now under Vogt’s control for targetting purposes. However, this is a problem of some magnitude which you should not try to take on tomorrow. Please ask Jon Howe to work closely with Blackie Burnell so that we have as good a plan as can be developed in the brief period. You should also have available Thursday morning the other contingency measures which were developed in the Haig/Howe/Burnell/Carver planning group.

Warm regards.

End of message.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXII (1). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent via Guay. Written on December 5.
2. Presumably a reference to Captain Stuart M. Brownell, Head of the Mine Warfare Branch, Directorate of Surface Warfare, USN.