Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

133. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Assistant to the President (Haldeman), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 30, 1972.

Kissinger: What the little bastard² has now said is that we should go on alone. Just our prisoners for withdrawal and let them continue fighting. I think they have to get it into their heads that, in that case, the Congress, no matter what you intend to do—the North Vietnamese will demand cutting off military and economic aid as a price for that—

Nixon: Why in the hell would they?

Haldeman: What the hell are they going to shoot? They won’t have any bullets.

Kissinger: Well, their idea is we continue to give aid, and they’ll fight alone.

Nixon: I’m thinking of going that route.

Kissinger: But tell them that the Congress won’t—

[Unclear exchange. Haldeman departed at 12:22 p.m.]

Nixon: No, I’m sorry, but fine, but I have issued—directed that Congress cut off all military and economic aid. And that’s it. [unclear]

Kissinger: But I would just say that the Congress will under no circumstances agree to that.

Nixon: Yeah. I’m not going to worry—

Kissinger: So then you’re not the villain.

Nixon: I’m going to be a villain myself, too.

Kissinger: Did you get to the Vietnamese?

Nixon: Henry, you must say that you reported to me. I’m not going to listen to it from him.

Kissinger: No, no.

Nixon: We’re going to have it straight out and get it done [unclear]. Well, the hopes that they would start to be reasonable proved to be wrong.

Kissinger: [unclear] after the agreement is made. They won’t be able to say they [unclear]—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: Well, are you going to then put the thing to him about my meeting at Midway or I’m going to tell him that?

Kissinger: Well, these guys—the major trouble is, they have this punk kid in the Palace, this 30-year-old suit—suitor, who is—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —acting out a Wagnerian drama.³ I mean, I must say when I went through the agreement this morning, I told Haig afterwards, when you listen to these guys you begin to doubt your sanity.

Nixon: No, it’s a good reason.

Kissinger: [unclear] but it’s—

Nixon: [unclear] we’ll just go ahead. And, frankly, you go ahead with the North Vietnamese and we will cut off economic aid, but, of course, it means that everything we fought for is lost.

Kissinger: Well, we can just let Congress do it.

Nixon: Yeah. I think Duc understands it.

Kissinger: Duc understands it, and the Ambassador.⁴

Nixon: It’s after what I put him through. Christ, he’s [unclear]—

Kissinger: Mr. President, you gave an absolutely magnificent presentation.

Nixon: Did it do any good?

Kissinger: You could not have—

Nixon: It didn’t do any good? That’s—

Kissinger: Oh, no. No, no, no. I—I’ve dealt with these guys. They—they’re going to wait ’til a minute before midnight.

Nixon: Well what’s—

Kissinger: I mean, this is a lot better than the—

Nixon: Then you’ll make the deal on Saturday?⁵

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: Then sign, and then what happens? You come back here again, do what?

Kissinger: And then we’ll have to put it to them and say this is it—

Nixon: We’ll have him come back here and put it to—to them and say: “Do you want to meet with the President, or not?”

Kissinger: That’s right. That’s right.

Nixon: Is that what you say? For the purpose of the agreement, that we’re going ahead on this without economic assistance? Fine.

Kissinger: Well, I’m seeing the North Vietnamese Monday.⁶ They are having a message for us now, too. Maybe they are going crazy. They’re both nuts. I mean, that’s the trouble with these Vietnamese, they’re—

Nixon: That’s right. Don’t worry. Sit down. They’ll be here. They’ll be here.

Kissinger: And they’re fighting it out—

Nixon: You think—do you think the North—huh, I guess the North Vietnamese can just break off negotiations now, too. No they can’t—

Kissinger: We’ve—why would—they can, but we’ve been playing with fire ever since we had this goddamned agreement with these two maniacal parties.

[Omitted here are closing remarks.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 817–16. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Haldeman met with the President from 12:17 to 12:22 p.m. and Kissinger met with the President from 12:22 to 12:26. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Haldeman stayed long enough to make a few comments. Beginning at 11:55 a.m., and continuing until 12:16 p.m., Kissinger and Haig had met in Kissinger’s office with Nguyen Phu Duc and Tran Kim Phuong, just before the entire group, except for Haldeman, met with the President. (Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) See footnote 2, Document 134.
2. Kissinger’s reference was to Nguyen Phu Duc.
3. Kissinger’s reference was to Hoang Duc Nha.
4. Tran Kim Phuong.
5. December 2. The deal referred to is the forging of common positions by the United States and South Vietnam for Kissinger’s upcoming December 4 meeting with Le Duc Tho.
6. December 4.