103. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Haigto 13. Have just received Tohaig 41 enclosing a copy of your message to Bunker.2 Since I am on way to meeting with President Park, I will have to keep my comments brief and as a result somewhat imprecise.
As I pointed out in my reporting telegram after my second meeting with Thieu,3 I have a feeling that he will go along only if we at least explore the issue of North Vietnamese troops in the South at the meeting. He used the term explore on several occasions. In this context, he wanted a reference to timing and some means of verification. Like you, I am very uncertain that Hanoi will accept this. On the other hand, in the short term, without Thieu’s acquiescence, I am not sure I understand where we are. If he refuses to accept the ceasefire negotiated for him by us under conditions which are unacceptable to him, have we really settled anything?
I hope you are under no illusions that I did not press Thieu absolutely to the wall or gave in any way. On the other hand, Thieu in effect gave on every issue except his request that we explore the troop issue with Hanoi.
It seems to me we have two options. We can send Bunker back in with a flat uncompromising ultimatum and a refusal to discuss preliminary measures further with Thieu or we can throw Thieu a few more bones and ask him to support our initial position going into the meeting. As far as the task force is concerned, I think the task force can be Bunker informing Thieu precisely what changes we intended to seek and using the next two or three days to try to line them up. If we do less and Bunker implements your instructions literally, I think we will have put Thieu in a position in which he will have no alternative but to break with us before, during and after your Paris sessions.
A second factor which concerns me mightily is the simple knowledge that Hanoi knows it can now split us from Thieu and that it will most likely enter the next round in a tough stance, with the view [Page 388] toward accomplishing this. If they know we are dedicated to a “hell bent for leather” schedule, I suspect they will be all the tougher.
I see two very difficult tasks ahead. One is to exercise some patience with Thieu and attempt, through Bunker, to give him a few more initial positions with the caveat that we may not be able to attain them and with a blow-by-blow communications arrangement during the talks themselves. I, of course, made the point strongly to Thieu that we could not be insured that we would get even the points contained in the President’s letter so I think he understands completely that we are negotiating, not setting inflexible terms.
Secondly, I think you will have to consider very carefully your tactical approach to the talks, vis-à-vis the other side. I am not sure it is of any value for them to gain the impression that we are dedicated to their time schedule or rather our revised time schedule.
After all, they can play for two objectives. Barring no settlement, there are obvious advantages for them in continuing a protracted conflict in a situation where we have broken openly with Thieu. This appears to me to be the worst alternative. The second option is, of course for them to settle under the terms of a revised agreement. I recommend that we satisfy the task force requirement by instructing Bunker to inform Thieu immediately that he and Whitehouse are prepared to meet on an urgent basis with Thieu’s representatives in Saigon, with the view toward coordinating our initial negotiating position for the first day of the talks in Paris. We should shade our instructions to Bunker very clearly on each substantive item so that he does not leave the impression that each point is inflexible and must be attained in all instances. What I am referring to here are the other proposed changes in the draft agreement which we have not shared with Thieu.
We are now dealing with a razor’s edge situation. Thieu has firmly laid his prestige on the line with his entire government and I believe if we take a totally unreasonable stance with him, we may force him to commit political suicide. I am not sure that this would serve our best interests and therefore, recommend the scarier approach of trying to work this problem with Thieu right up to the wire, to include daily consultations at the end of each session in Paris. After all, you may be faced with a total North Vietnamese stonewall in which situation you would have burnt both bridges. The price of keeping Thieu aboard is of course risky but I do not believe unacceptable at this juncture.
The course of action which we select should be accomplished through the means of a carefully worded Presidential response to the Thieu letter which you now hold. The letter, I believe, should be tough and conditional with respect to the changes but at the same time somewhat sympathetic to Thieu’s own problems. There is no doubt in my mind that he knows that total intransigence would be fatal.
[Page 389]I have not sent this to Bunker but strongly recommend you call him telephonically and tell him to hold up until you have had an opportunity to consider my view. I should not be put in a position of giving instructions from here within the time frame you have given.
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1019, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Gen. Haig’s Saigon Trip, Tohaig/Haigto & Misc., November 9–13, 1973 [2 of 3]. Top Secret;Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.↩
- Dated November 12, 2009Z. (Ibid., [1 of 3]) The enclosed Kissinger message to Bunker is Document 102.↩
- Document 99.↩