196. Editorial Note
On June 14, 1972, Ambassador William J. Porter in Paris talked by telephone with Major General Alexander M. Haig, the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, and then sent Henry A. Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, a message. Concerned about how best to prepare those outside the government for a return to the talks, he wrote: “This matter requires careful preparation in view of the tough line that we have been following in that regard. Sudden announcement of intent to resume, without adequate preparation of media and public, would probably evoke accusations that we are capricious and playing domestic politics. As matters stand now we are in better position if decision is made to resume.
“Generally speaking I prefer to speak softly when we are swinging a big stick, as we are these days. Mild words mix well with strong actions, and later speak their own language. I believe it is possible Thuy will return with some kind of proposal designed to restart Paris talks. If he does, I think we will have to go in and listen to him. Le Duc Tho will probably want to take it from there. Part of their design will be to affect U.S. domestic politics over coming weeks.” (Backchannel message 780 from Porter to Kissinger, June 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 419, Backchannel, Backchannel Messages, 1972 Paris—Watson and Porter)
Later the same day, Kissinger sent a backchannel message to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon to give him the President’s current thinking on the Paris talks. Kissinger wrote: “On the negotiating front, we are still awaiting a response from the other side on our proposal that we meet privately on the 28th. [See Document 187.] In the event they refuse to meet or insist that the private meeting be preceded by a plenary session as with the last round, we would then propose to attend a plenary on July 13th providing they agree to a follow-up private meeting on or about July 18.
“You should also inform Thieu of the negotiating game plan stressing that the President wants him to know that we have not made the great sacrifices that the recent enemy offensive has incurred merely to concede at the negotiating table what the enemy has been unable to achieve on the battlefield. Assure him that the President continues to [Page 691] support him fully but at the same time can muster maximum domestic support through a continuing blend of forceful action on the battlefield combined with demonstrated flexibility on the negotiating front.” (Backchannel message WHS 2077 from Kissinger to Bunker, June 14; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 44, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Cables, 3 April–15 June 1972)
On June 19, Colonel Georges R. Guay, Air Attaché at the Embassy in Paris and point of contact with the North Vietnamese, received a request from Vo Van Sung, one of their diplomats, to meet the next day. When they met on June 20, Vo Van Sung handed Guay a note that replied to the American proposal to restart the private talks. Haig in Washington sent the North Vietnamese note to Kissinger, who was in Beijing to discuss the recent Moscow Summit with the Chinese. The note contained the following counterproposal:
“The American side now proposes a private meeting for 28 June 1972. The RDVN side clothed by its good will, agrees to private meetings and deems it necessary to resume as usual the plenary sessions of the Paris Conference on Vietnam which serve as a base for the private meetings as has been previously agreed. From now til the end of the first week of July, Special Counselor Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy are engaged in work previously scheduled in Hanoi. Consequently, they will be prepared to meet Dr. Kissinger privately on 15 July 1972 at the usual place, after the resumption of the plenary sessions of the Paris Conference not later than Thursday, 13 July 1972.
“Once again the RDVN side reaffirms its disposition to seek a peaceful solution, just and reasonable to the Vietnamese problem.” (North Vietnamese note, June 20, enclosed in message Tohak 71, June 20; ibid., Box TS 48, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Peace Talks, Chronological File, 2 June–31 July 1972)
In message Tohak 71, Haig told Kissinger that in late June or early July the North Vietnamese might begin an additional offensive push to better position themselves before they returned to the talks. Haig concluded: “You will want to consider this carefully in preparing your reply. I await guidance.”
Upon receipt of the message and the enclosed note, Kissinger replied to Haig as follows: “Colonel’s message fits right into my preferred game plan. Next week, after my return, we should accept plenary for the 13th and private meeting for around the 18th. But do not position message until I can see it. This will enable President to announce resumption of plenaries at his June 29 press conference without being accused of playing politics.” (Message Hakto 10, June 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 855, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XIV) About the North Vietnamese reply Kissinger [Page 692] later wrote: “Contrary to the predictions of our critics, bombing and mining had greatly improved Hanoi’s manners.” (Ending the Vietnam War, page 294)
On June 24, Haig sent the U.S. response to Paris for transmittal as a note to the North Vietnamese. The note agreed to July 13 for the plenary meeting but noted that July 19 was preferable for the private meeting. The note concluded: “The U.S. will enter these talks with the intention of bringing about a rapid, just and reasonable solution to the war.” (Message from Haig to Guay, June 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 869, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Camp David Cables, January 1–July 31, 1972) In response to the note, delivered by Guay on June 26, the North Vietnamese agreed to the dates. (Message from Guay to Haig, June 29; ibid., Box 867, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Camp David 1972 HAK II, May 2–October 7, 1972 [5 of 5])
On June 29, President Nixon announced at his evening press conference: “We have returned to the negotiating table, or will return to it on the assumption that the North Vietnamese are prepared to negotiate in a constructive and serious way. We will be prepared to negotiate in that way. If those negotiations go forward in a constructive and serious way, this war can be ended, and it can be ended well before January 20. If they do not go forward on that basis, the United States will continue to meet its commitments. Our bombing, as far as that is concerned, our mining, is for the purpose only of preventing Communist aggression from succeeding, to protect the remaining Americans, 40,000 or so, that are still in Vietnam, and to have some bargaining position in getting our POW’s back.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, page 706)