Office of the Historian

156. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 23, 1971.

SUBJECT

  • Country Program Memoranda (NSDM–112)
[Page 325]

Secretary Laird has responded enthusiastically to the Country Programming NSDM (112)2 and your accompanying memo. His memorandum (at Tab A)3 makes the following points:

  • —CPMs can be a “most significant step in implementing the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.”
  • —CPMs options offer an opportunity to mesh U.S. force planning and aid budget decisions.
  • —DOD has a major contribution to make to all seven proposed CPMs except India, and DOD would like to chair the CPM committees on Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Korea where U.S. support of increased local defensive strength will directly impact on planning of U.S. force levels, overseas deployment and DOD budget requirements.

Comment: While DOD’s enthusiasm for what it may see as the opportunity to win back from State some measure of control over security assistance planning is the other side of the coin of State’s disinterest, DOD interest in country programming is genuine (although of recent origin with Secretary Laird), and DOD has demonstrated a greater capacity (in OSD/SA and JCS) to do country programming than State has shown.

In the meantime, the longer State continues to oppose implementation of NSDM–112 the more difficult it will be to do seven major CPMs by the budget deadline.

My understanding is that Colonel Kennedy is trying to work out an arrangement that will accommodate State’s objections within the general framework established in the NSDM. If a compromise can’t be worked out, I have no doubts that the analysis will not be done and that the country will be the real loser in this fight over bureaucratic prerogatives. You will want to assess this situation by July 1st and possibly consider other alternatives. A formal reply to Laird’s memo can await that assessment.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. Sent for information.↩
  2. Document 151. ↩
  3. Laird’s June 21 memorandum is attached but not printed.↩