Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

32. Memorandum from Dean to McCloy, August 11¹

August 11, 1961

SUBJECT

• U.S. Disarmament Plan

While I realize that the President in his speech of July 25 on the West Berlin situation has alerted the country to the possibilities of that situation, Congress is being called on for additional appropriations, bombers scheduled for deactivation are to be kept in active service, draft calls are being increased, National Guard regiments are being alerted, I, nevertheless, believe the President, in person, should make a major speech on disarmament, tied in to his speech, dated May 25, on the peaceful uses of outer space, at the United Nations General Assembly during its first week, commencing September 19.

In addition to outlining the disarmament plan, which we are now clearing with the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy and France, and later with the NATO countries, I think the President should make certain specific offers with respect to the reduction in armaments. These statements will, of course, have to be cleared with the Allies and NATO will have to be alerted to them so that there will not be cries of anguish or misunderstanding, and so there will be no misunderstanding about our ability to carry out our commitments to Canada, to NATO, to SEATO, and under our mutual security pacts with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. Foster’s panel is meeting today and plans to meet all next week and will probably come up with some specific proposals for armament reduction no later than Tuesday, the 22nd of August.

The use of these specific proposals in the President’s speech would have to be cleared by the Secretary of State and you, with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, and as mentioned above, with our Allies and NATO, and by the President himself before any decision can be made to use these specific reductions in the President’s speech. These specific reductions may involve a basic change in strategy and may cause great heart burning in the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staffs and NATO.

It is my understanding that we have agreed to notify NATO some two weeks in advance of what we propose to present to the United Nations General Assembly. If this is so, we would have to get the August 11, 1961 draft of the Joint Declaration on Disarmament: A Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World cleared here in the department, cleared with our Allies, cleared with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and cleared by the President by approximately September 1. I’m not sure how specific our agreement to clear anything with NATO is and we must be careful that the substance of what the President proposes to say in a dramatic speech on disarmament would not have been leaked prior to the time he makes his speech. Careful thought must be given as to how subdivision (d) of Stage I, that is, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, is to be explained to the NATO Council. Fundamentally, of course, this really involves a basic change in NATO strategy—the question is, Should we present the paper blandly without explaining this or should we be very careful and very explicitly explain what it precisely means? This is a very important decision.

We must, of course, get the final comments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy and possibly France to the draft of August 11, 1961 after the President has made his decision with respect to the one remaining matter not as yet cleared with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs.

As you are now scheduled to meet with Mr. Zorin in the Bilaterals in New York starting September 5 in an effort to agree upon principles before setting up a Multilateral meeting and a forum and with a number of those invited to be agreed upon, I would assume that your meeting with him would not be concluded before September 9, or possibly not until Tuesday, September 12, or one week before the scheduled opening of the UNGA. Since you will have to obtain agreement on the forum and the place for holding the Multilateral negotiations and the assent of those who are to be invited, I would assume that the Multilaterals would not be scheduled to meet until the end of the UNGA session, or at least not until after General Assembly discussions on disarmament. This, of course, raises the question as to how extensive the negotiations are going to be before the Disarmament Commission, or before the UNGA, or before the Security Council, the organization preparation, the handling of this work in the United Nations, and who is going to carry the burden of this work.

As you know, I am presently scheduled to go back to Geneva on the 23rd of August and I would assume I would be returning about September 8 or 9, or possibly one or two days earlier.

Pursuant to paragraph 6 of memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, dated July 28, referring to memorandum of decision, dated July 27, I am working on a proposed draft Presidential speech on disarmament.

While naturally I sincerely hope there will be some progress at Geneva, I think we should be outlining now what our course will be with respect to nuclear test negotiations if there is no agreement at Geneva. In other words, I think we should be planning now on requiring parties in a certain stage in carrying out the disarmament plan to agree to a nuclear test ban treaty. I don’t think we should postpone our thinking on what we will do if this eventuality happens until I return from Geneva. This will have to be discussed with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, and possibly a meeting of the Principals unless the President himself wishes to decide this matter.

It is my understanding that when the Joint Declaration was first drawn up, it was assumed that a nuclear test ban treaty would have been agreed to at Geneva and would have been signed prior to the time the Joint Declaration on Disarmament was submitted. At the present time there is a serious question as to the validity of this assumption and, therefore, the disarmament plan ought not to be silent on the subject of nuclear testing.

I still hope it will not be necessary for the President to put forward the proposal about our not testing in the atmosphere. The Soviets could conduct important tests of electro-magnetic effect, yielding approximately one kiloton in the atmosphere which we could not detect, and very important and useful information can be obtained in tests yielding about one kiloton or less. Underground tests may take much time to prepare, may be costly and while we may be able to prove out weapons underground, we may not be able to prove out the effects of AICBM or ICBM’s except in the atmosphere. Consequently, if we announce that we won’t test in the atmosphere until we find that the Russians are testing in the atmosphere, they may get very far on these low yield tests before we find out they are testing at all.

I further suggest that no announcement be made with respect to the resumption of testing until at least the end of the UNGA session. I realize, of course, that if any statement does have to be made with respect to our freedom to resume testing, the suggested statement with respect to not testing in the atmosphere becomes very important from the standpoint of assuring people against radioactive fallout.

1. Thoughts on U.S. disarmament plan proposal. Confidential. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 8/61.