251. Memorandum from McNamara to President Kennedy, January 21
SUBJECT
- Reorganization of Army Divisions
Last April, the Chief of Staff of the Army recommended a reorganization of Army divisions. This recommendation served as a basis for the material provided you for your May 25 address to Congress. Since that time, the Army has translated the new concept into detailed tables of organization and equipment. My recommendations for the implementation of the Army’s program are set forth here, preceded by a discussion of the proposed reorganization and its resource implications.
The Proposed Divisional Organization
The proposed reorganization of Army division (ROAD) is intended to remedy what the Army considers three deficiencies revealed by five years’ experience with the current pentomic structure of infantry and airborne divisions. (Armored divisions were little changed in the 1956 reorganization and little change in this division is now proposed.)
First, the current division structure lacks organizational flexibility. There is a single table of organization for each type of division. In contrast the proposed ROAD divisions are to be more flexible. The basic elements of the ROAD divisions are a division base (artillery, reconnaissance, headquarters, and support elements) and four kinds of maneuver battalions: tank, infantry, airborne infantry, and mechanized infantry (equipped with armored personnel carriers). Divisions of various types will be formed by combining varying mixes and numbers of the standardized combat maneuver battalions with the division base. This will permit the tailoring of a division to terrain and mission. Thus, for example, divisions composed largely of infantry battalions could be deployed in Korea where the terrain does not favor tracked vehicle operations, whereas divisions composed largely of mechanized battalions could be used in Europe. Similarly the number of battalions in a division might be as few as six or as many as fifteen depending on mission and availability.
[Typeset Page 913]This kind of tailoring of divisions is done currently by deletions and augmentations to standard TOE’s. The use of relatively standard division basis and battalions as building blocks in the proposed divisions is intended to facilitate such tailoring.
Within the division, the introduction of a new command echelon, the brigade, to control the maneuver battalions is intended to facilitate the creation of combined arms teams. The battalions are relatively self- [Facsimile Page 2] contained units logistically and can be shifted from brigade to brigade as the tactical situation requires. This kind of internal divisional tailoring is a wider application of the current practice in the armored division. In the pentomic division, combined arms teams are formed around the battlegroup. However, since the battlegroup has logistical as well as tactical functions, the size and composition of these teams is restricted because of inelastic support capabilities.
Second, the Army considers the commanders’ span of control in the current division to be overextended. There is only a single echelon (the battlegroup) between the company and the division. In the pentomic division, commanders control five principal elements (companies for battlegroup commanders and battlegroups for the division commanders). In addition, other units such as artillery, engineers, and armor often increase the number of tactical units reporting to a commander to as many as twelve. The proposed divisions will have in the brigade another echelon of command. Adding a command echelon reinstates the triangular structure of the World War II division (each level of command having three principal maneuver elements). The Army considers that the reduction in the commanders’ span of control will improve the combat effectiveness of the division, particularly in non-nuclear battles requiring the close coordination of combat elements.
The divisional commander’s span of control also would be reduced by the creation of a divisional support command composed of all the divisional supply and maintenance activities under a single commander. The support command will be organized on a functional basis rather than on technical service lines. This change has been frequently recommended and the concept has been tested in several of the current divisions.
Third, the present division is not as self-sufficient as the proposed division. Tactically, the proposed division has more artillery, armor, and reconnaissance elements in order to reduce reliance on non-divisional troops. In peripheral wars divisions are less likely, especially during the initial phases, to be part of a balanced corps or field Army so that divisions must be more self-sufficient. The proposed reorganization also involves increases in support personnel and equipment to permit a division to be more logistically self-sufficient. The divisions [Typeset Page 914] would increase in strength from about 14,000 men to about 15,500 men to make possible this increased self-sufficiency.
These proposed changes in divisional organization are evolutionary developments from the World War II and Korean division, rather than from the current pentomic structure. While the changes do not reflect a markedly new tactical concept of how the division will be maneuvered in combat, it does reflect an emphasis upon the increased likelihood of peripheral wars and of sustained non-nuclear combat.
Finally, the proposed division, with its brigades and triangular structure, is more like the divisions of our major NATO allies. Similar divisional organization may simplify NATO operations by increasing the comparability of divisions and the interchangeability of divisional units.
[Facsimile Page 3]Resources for the Reorganization
In addition to changes in command structure, the ROAD concept proposes substantial increases in the equipment and personnel authorized the division.
For equipment, the Army has estimated that under current logistic guidance and divisional organization, the equipment requirement remaining unfunded after FY 1962 will amount to approximately $8.0 billion. With the new divisional organization, the Army estimates that this deficit will increase by about 20% to $9.5 billion.
Most of the increase in requirements is not directly associated with the ROAD organizational changes. Rather they are increases which in the absence of a proposal to reorganize divisions well might have been proposed as additions to current Tables of Equipment.
Furthermore, most of these increases in equipment are not essential to the reorganization of the divisions. There are, of course, exceptions. Adding an echelon of command, for example, generates a requirement for more communication equipment merely to keep intra-divisional communications at its current level.
Finally, there are acceptable substitutes for many of the items for which there are added requirements under ROAD. For example, the deficit under ROAD of 7,600 M–60 tanks would be met by operating an equivalent number of the 10,000 serviceable M–48 tanks now in the Army inventory. In view of the availability of substitute items and the fact that many of the increased requirements are not essential to reorganizing the division, I believe that we will have the critical equipment to permit the ROAD reorganization.
Similarly, it is possible to reorganize divisions within the present planned Army end strength of 960,000 men. The additional personnel (about 2,000 men for each division) will become available partially from reducing the number of non-divisional combat battalions and [Typeset Page 915] brigades, partially from the augmented strength already authorized for the European deployed divisions and partially from the reduction in personnel in training centers as the build-up levels off.
Recommendations
The review I have made of the Army’s proposal supports their contention that the new divisions would have improved combat effectiveness. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the reorganization and recommended its implementation.
I do not agree, however, with the Army that the reorganization of all divisions should be approved for completion by the end of FY 1963. I am reluctant at this time to accept the reduction in the combat readiness which would result from such a schedule. Furthermore, I feel that field testing during the next twelve months is desirable before the [Facsimile Page 4] new organization is adopted throughout the Army. Previous reorganizations were preceded by extensive field testing and these field tests have customarily resulted in substantial modifications in the new organizational structure. In a period when there should be a minimum of disruption of the combat ready divisions, it is important to establish that the new organization has the same superiority in the field as it appears to have on paper.
For these reasons I recommend that the 15th and 16th divisions be activated with the new organizational structure. Following the organization and field testing of these divisions, your approval of the reorganization of the remaining active and reserve divisions will be requested.
May I have your approval to activate the 15th and 16th Army divisions with the new organizational structure.
- Recommendations on implementation of Army reorganization proposal. Secret. 4 pp. Washington National Records Center, Record Group 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470.↩