Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

95. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, September 9, 1959, 7 p.m.

703. For Secretary. In strictest confidence Fujiyama tells me he has been discussing privately with Kishi desirability of Kishi coming to Washington to sign new security treaty and related documents with him about Dec 20 if that time convenient from our viewpoint. Fujiyama said he did not contemplate visit being “State visit” with all trappings and ceremonies but that in addition to signing treaty it would afford PriMin Kishi opportunity to meet with President to get President’s views on world situation. This, Fujiyama thought, was particularly important because with exchange of visits with Khrushchev, activities of ChiComs and developments in SEA (Laos), first-hand knowledge of President’s views would be of inestimable value to Kishi and him. Furthermore he intimated that a meeting with the President would also bolster Kishi’s position. I gather Fujiyama feels that if Kishi signs treaty in Washington and meets with President it will not only consolidate different factions of Conservative Party behind Kishi prior to introduction of new treaty into Diet in January but will also consolidate substantial majority of over-all Japanese opinion in support of Kishi’s treaty revision and overall policy of close cooperation with U.S. Fujiyama said that while Kishi has not reached decision on whether to come to Washington to sign treaty, he is seriously considering it.

It is of course up to the Japanese to decide who will sign the treaty for them. My own view is that if Kishi decides to come it is very strongly in our own interest that we should welcome such move. As you know, Kishi admires and respects President Eisenhower more than any other statesman in world and the President’s views have a real impact on him. At same time, Kishi has been staunch and loyal friend and despite outcries and vicious attacks from Moscow, Peking, Japanese Socialist Party and all leftist elements in Japan designed to pressure Kishi into loosening the close ties between Japan and U.S., Kishi has stood firmly on his policy that closest possible cooperation with U.S. in all fields is essential to Japan. Kishi, of course, has had to deal not only with the left but also with opportunistic elements within his own party. It would certainly be to our great advantage to do anything we reasonably can to strengthen his position within and outside his party and at same time encourage his policy of firmness towards the Communists.

But perhaps most important immediate effect of such a visit in December would be to strengthen his hand with respect to treaty revision. Now that Communists have made treaty revision basic issue of Japan’s alignment and are using every weapon in their well-stocked arsenal to force GOJ to abandon treaty revision or to defeat treaty if it submitted to Diet, it is important that we give Kishi all the support we reasonably can to help him get treaty through. He and his Govt of course are determined to push treaty through Diet, but if they should fail, all our present security relationships and arrangements with Japan would be undermined and threatened.

At present there are no really major controversial issues between GOJ and ourselves and the few but important remaining issues in connection with security treaty and related documents will be cleared up before signature. Therefore Kishi would not be coming to Washington to raise new issues which would involve substantial preparatory work for President and yourself but would be coming simply to sign treaty and use that occasion for a very good and useful discussion with President on the world situation. Burdens of entertainment need not be great and I believe that one meal at White House, which could be luncheon, and a formal dinner by you or the Vice President for Japanese signatories would be all that would be required.

Japan is of course only positive element of free world strength we have in this vitally important part of world and in Kishi we have staunch friend and ally who will need badly whatever support and help we can give him in critical debates which will open in Diet latter part of January. Our cooperation is particularly important with Ishibashi, Matsumura, Miki and Kono making pilgrimages to Peking and Moscow, etc. For all above reasons I hope most earnestly that you and President will give this matter favorable consideration.¹

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/9–959. Secret; Limit Distribution.
1. The Department replied on September 24 in telegram 697, that the Secretary had been authorized to inform Fujiyama that day that “barring unforeseen developments the President would welcome opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Kishi if Kishi decides to come to Washington in late December for Treaty signing.” The Ambassador was authorized to inform Kishi. (Ibid., 033.9411/9–2159)