Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, April 15, 1958, 11 p.m.

2707. For Robertson from Ambassador. Appreciate very much Deptel 2186.¹ I fully agree with soundness of underlying reasoning of proposal, namely that we seek stable long-term political basis for safe use of our bases in Ryukyus. I also believe that GOJ would agree to proposal along lines suggested in reftel (except for blank check that we have right to pre-empt any land we may feel we need in future). However, I feel that proposal in reftel is premature for immediate present for following reasons:

1. [2 lines of source text not declassified]. I believe that notwithstanding fact that technically we would, under proposal in reftel, have unrestricted use of base areas in Okinawa, GOJ, under present political conditions in Japan, might come under great pressure to attempt to impose on us limitations on use of bases similar to those which now exist de facto in Japan.

2. [8 lines of source text not declassified]. What GOJ needs most at this time is that we should exercise our administrative rights in Ryukyus so that inhabitants are reasonably contented. This would result in substantial reduction of difficulties in Japan until such time (which GOJ hopes will be in next several years) as we are able to work out satisfactory way to turn over administration of Ryukyus to Japan without impairing our basic security interests there.

3. While it is risky to make long-range predictions re Japanese attitudes, I believe there is good chance that within several years time if we handle our trade problems with Japan properly and if we make necessary adjustments in security treaty to make our security relationship a mutual one, situation may evolve favorably so that we will be able to have unrestricted use of bases in Ryukyus with Japanese concurrence. [7 lines of source text not declassified]

In light of above, I am convinced it is essential that we first take urgently necessary measures to arrest unfavorable trend in Okinawa. This would give us time we need to work out longer term solution, possibly along lines suggested in reftel.

Minimum measures which I believe must be included in any program which is to succeed in stabilizing situation in Okinawa are the six recommended in Embtel 2548² which are:

a. Prompt action to change land policy from lump-sum settlements to some such system as five-year renewable leases. I cannot emphasize too strongly importance of moving forward promptly with this since we will fritter away benefits of recent announcement and intense disillusionment will set in here if review not followed soon by tangible results. (I fully agree with Naha’s 169³ that changes which HICOM had in mind would not solve problem. In fact, they would compound it by trying to get GRI to put into effect on our behalf plan which will seem to be substantially equivalent to discredited lump-sum payment system.)

b. Assurance to Ryukyuans of substantially greater economic and financial assistance looking to long term development of Ryukyuan economy. (This would not only be responsive to deep desires of Ryukyuans but also could be played in Japan as helping to put islands on sound basis where they would not become excessive burden when they were returned.)

c. Decision to send competent civilian economic mission, which is essential to implement b above.

d. Giving Ryukyuan people substantially greater voice in their own administration and involving withdrawal of USCAR to maximum extent feasible from exercise of responsibility in local Govt matters.

e. Recognition in practice of legitimate and inescapable Japanese interests in Ryukyus and desire of Ryukyuans for ties with Japan. This could be effected through establishment of some kind of consultative mechanism allowing GOJ views to be presented and discussed in cooperative spirit while making quite clear that administrative authority for time being continues in our hands.

e [f]. Finally, I believe it is essential that in Washington some arrangement be put into effect (preferably through new executive order amending present one so as to give new arrangement the President’s approval) which would give State Dept full and equal voice with Defense, including veto powers over all policies toward Ryukyus and all actions by High Commissioner, and since both policies and actions of HICOM have, as we have learned hard way, deepest and most profound effect on our foreign relations and attainment of our foreign policy objectives in Far East and Asia. I continue to believe that it basically unsound to continue military Govt in Okinawa for reasons set forth in my letters of Feb 1 and March 10⁴ to Secretary and you. However, if it is not possible to install civilian administration at present, I think it is essential to have some agreement fully approved by President along lines suggested in this paragraph.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/4–1558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections.
1. Telegram 2186, April 11, requested an evaluation of the feasibility and desirability of returning administrative rights in the Ryukyus to Japan. (Ibid., 794C.0221/4–1158) See Supplement.
2. Dated April 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 794C.00/4–158) See Supplement.
3. In telegram 169 Naha reported that High Commissioner Moore had cabled the Department of the Army for permission to announce to the Legislature that he was considering a change in the lump sum policy such that the GRI would handle acquisition of and payment for land. (Department of State, Central Files, 794C.0221/4–958) Dulles discussed land policy with Irwin on April 9. (Memorandum of conversation by Martin; ibid., 794C.0221/4–958) That same day Dulles discussed Moore’s suggestion in a phone conversation with the President but suggested delay; Eisenhower agreed: “tell him to keep his damn mouth shut.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Telephone Calls) All documents cited are in the Supplement.
4. In a March 10 letter MacArthur reiterated his view that it was unsound to perpetuate military administration in the Ryukyus and that the Ryukuan problem was a political, not a military one. In addition, MacArthur thought that Japan had legitimate interest in the islands. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers) See Supplement.