89. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0
117. CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD and Adm Felt. COMUS/Japan exclusive for Gen Burns. Embtel 42.1 As follow up to my talk with Kishi and Fujiyama July 6, Fujiyama asked to see me yesterday afternoon in order to give detailed report of meeting of key party and cabinet leaders last week, especially with respect to timing of signature and ratification of new Mutual Security Treaty and related documents.
Fujiyama said he had made report at meeting with cabinet and party leaders on treaty and Admin Agreement and PriMin had thereupon asked Naka Funada, Chairman of LDP Policy Research Committee and former Chairman of Foreign Policy Research Committee, whether negotiations reflected guidelines drawn up by party May 2. (Embdes 1292.)2 Funada replied in affirmative. Deputy PriMin Masutani, who had been Chairman of General Affairs Committee when LDP guidelines were adopted, also endorsed results of negotiations. Kishi stated that Fujiyama had also raised with me questions in which other cabinet ministries had an interest thus carrying out his responsibilities to the cabinet. Meeting then turned to discuss question of timing.
Consensus of meeting, Fujiyama said, was that while it was most important that no announcement re timing should be made at this time (since it would only give aid and comfort to Socialists), new treaty and related documents should be introduced not into extraordinary Diet session but into subsequent regular Diet session which will be convened in December. This is necessary for reasons of parliamentary tactics and time schedule necessitated by constitutional provisions. Fujiyama said Vietnamese reparations agreement, which was signed May 13, must [Page 205] take precedence in ratification process over new security treaty. Cabinet and party leaders have decided that it would be most unwise for GOJ to sign treaty or introduce it into Diet while Vietnamese agreement is being debated. In view strong Socialist opposition to any agreement with South Vietnam, extraordinary Diet session in autumn will inevitably spend considerable time on that agreement and GOJ wishes that issue to be safely out of the way before engaging final battle over security treaty.
In terms of parliamentary calendar, Fujiyama said, GOJ strategy has in mind article 61 of constitution which provides that a treaty becomes effective 30 days after passage by lower house, regardless whether it has been approved by upper house. GOJ is calculating that for Vietnamese reparations agreement to become effective it must allow 40 days for lower house debate, followed by period of 30 days during which it can be debated in upper house. Since extraordinary Diet must close by December 10 or December 15 at the very latest, Vietnamese reparations agreement must therefore be introduced toward end of September at the latest. In light of fact that ratification of Vietnamese agreement will thus take about 70 days if the US-Japan security treaty were to be introduced into extraordinary Diet, session would have had to be convoked very shortly after Kishi’s return and even then might not complete action on both Vietnamese accord and security treaty by mid-December. Furthermore, party leaders have judged that such extended extraordinary session would be unwise and that such tight schedule might have involved excessive risk of being upset by opposition maneuvers. It would be better, Fujiyama reported, to introduce new treaty and Admin Agreement into regular Diet session which will be convoked latter half Dec, which will then recess for one month and get down to business in latter half of January.
Under this time schedule, Fujiyama said, it is envisioned that new treaty and related agreements could be signed some time between end of extraordinary Diet in early or mid-December and convocation of regular Diet later that month or possibly during Diet recess from late December to late January. Signature during extraordinary session would risk entangling new treaty with acrimonious debate over Vietnamese reparations. Japanese still believed signature in Washington preferable. Fujiyama said he was personally considering possibility of our initialing all the agreed documents at an earlier time if this seemed indicated but he had not discussed such a possibility with either cabinet or party.
Fujiyama said he greatly regretted inability to sign new treaty in July as he had hoped, and apologized for heavy pressure of work that had been placed on Washington and Embassy in hope of completing negotiations [Page 206] prior to Kishi’s departure. He said he hoped we could continue negotiations on the few remaining issues at steady pace in next few weeks.
I urged Fujiyama to use delay of signature to initiate major positive campaign of public enlightenment to counter Socialist and Communist misrepresentations about the new treaty and to marshal public opinion in favor of ratification. I said Communists and Communist-influenced groups were prepared to make treaty revision a battleground which would determine Japan’s future for many years and that GOJ exertions must be adequate to this challenge. Fujiyama said he fully agreed and intended make every effort in weeks ahead to rally public support behind new treaty.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/7–1459. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.↩
- Telegram 42, July 6, reported on MacArthur’s discussion with Kishi and Fujiyama on the timing of signature and ratification of the new mutual security treaty. Kishi reported that he planned to have the ratification debate during the regular Diet session, which would start in December, and that his government favored signing the treaty in the fall. MacArthur concluded that the United States would try to accommodate the time favored by the Japanese. (Ibid., 794.5/7–659)↩
- Despatch 1292 from Tokyo, May 13, enclosed a translation of a report published on May 2 by the LDP subcommittee on the security treaty revision. The covering memorandum summarized the report and commented that it was rather general in nature. The most important portion of the report, according to the cover memorandum, dealt with the constitutionality of the present and the new security treaties and the status of the Ryukyus. The memorandum concluded that the report was “noteworthy for its forthright call for close relations with the United States not only in the military but also in the political and economic fields.” (Ibid., 794.5/5–1359)↩