Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

81. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, June 18, 1959, 8 p.m.

2733. CINCPAC exclusive for POLAD and Admiral Felt. COMUS/J exclusive for General Burns. Deptels 1972 and 1975¹ and Embtel 2715.² Treaty and formula.

1. I met with Fujiyama again today to get considered Japanese reaction to the three points re treaty that we had discussed yesterday (Embtel 2715).

A. Re inclusion of “Pacific area”, Fujiyama said Japanese still believe inclusion would be seized on by opposition to distort new treaty and would create great confusion, thus not serving interests of either Japan or U.S., particularly since there is no substantive question involved. Accordingly Japanese felt they could not agree that “Pacific area” should be included.

B. Re constitutional problem in Article III, he said Japanese had done utmost to meet our position. They had dropped their proposal for separate Article VIII which from their point of view would have been most desirable and important for both Diet and public discussions. They had also, with greatest reluctance, dropped insistence on phraseology referring to constitutional limitations. However, acceptance of words “in accordance with their constitutional provisions and processes” in Article III would simply not meet their problem and they could therefore not accept it.

What troubles Japanese, Fujiyama emphasized, is handling of words “maintain and develop . . .³ capacities to resist armed attack”. These words had already been singled out in Diet debates as possibly implying obligation for Japan to expand its defense establishment beyond what would be necessary for exercise of inherent right of self-defense. In this connection Socialists would certainly charge that under treaty, US would require Japan to build up its war potential in excess of defense needs. Difficulty in accepting language we propose (“in accordance with constitutional provisions, etc.”) stems from absence of any provision in constitution relating to self-defense capacity. On contrary there is an absolute prohibition in Article 9 of constitution against Japan maintaining land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential. While Japanese constitution is interpreted as not denying inherent right of self-defense, and hence necessity for self-defense forces, it is legally impossible to say that such capacity would be maintained and developed “in accordance with constitutional provisions” because there is no relevant provision in constitution. Socialists and others in and out of Diet would seize on this phrase to make major political issue. It would be difficult enough with “subject to” but that would at least minimize political problem.

Fujiyama went on to say that he could give me most categoric and absolute assurance that use of phrase “subject to their constitutional provisions” in Article III would not have different substantive meaning from phrase “in accordance with their constitutional provisions and processes” in Article V and that it does not in any way negate or limit undertakings contained in treaty other than fact that Japan cannot build up its forces beyond what is necessary for its self-defense.

C. With respect to Article VI, Fujiyama said that after reflection he personally felt that if we could not accept Japanese proposed language “for the purpose of contributing, etc.” then he would prefer to go back to our earlier proposal, “in consideration of the common interest that the two parties have in the security of Japan and in consideration of the common concern, etc.” (Deptel 1673 para 7(a)).⁴ However, he could not give a final answer until he conferred further with Kishi.

2. In accordance with authorization in Deptels 1972 and 1975 and since all points made in Embtel 2476⁵ are still as valid as ever, I then put a definite proposal to Fujiyama re treaty and formula.

I said following proposals re security treaty and consultation formula must be considered together in light of assurances which he had given me yesterday re Article III which I had transmitted to Washington; in sincere desire to help Japanese meet their public opinion problems in Japan; and to meet deadline for signing treaty and related documents before Kishi’s departure in July, I was now authorized to make one comprehensive proposal re treaty and consultation formula. In making following proposal I thought Washington had gone very far to meet every important point raised by Japanese. Our proposal is:

A. We agree to drop reference to “Pacific area” in preamble, Article IV, and Article VI of treaty;

B. We reluctantly accept “subject to their constitutional provisions” in Article III;

C. We understand Japanese will agree to new formulation in final para of Deptel 1972, or formulation which we previously had proposed (Deptel 1673 para 7(a)).

[3 paragraphs (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. In conclusion I said to Fujiyama again that I wanted him and Kishi both to know that I considered above proposal a package which I felt they should consider as such. I reiterated that I felt we had met them on all important points and if they could not accept above proposal I was quite pessimistic over our being able to reach agreement in near future.

Fujiyama expressed appreciation for our effort to meet essential points of Japanese concern. He could not give any “official reaction” as he must put this whole problem to Kishi. One point that gave him immediate concern was whether inclusion in public formula of “in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time” would be interpreted in Japan as qualifying fact that there would be consultation. He said Kishi would be busy with formation and swearing-in of new cabinet this afternoon and evening but he would put our package proposal to him and try to obtain official reply for us just as soon as he could thereafter.

In light of Dept’s instructions, I purposely omitted any reference to “shuttle bombing,” hoping to give impression that if I did not mention it it was obviously not included in package. Fujiyama made no reference to it. Should he do so at next meeting, I shall tell him it is obviously not possible to cover every possible or imaginable contingency in any agreement and that if he insists on pursuing this matter, then it will reopen entire question of treaty and formula.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/6–1859. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. Documents 79 and 80.
2. In telegram 2715 from Tokyo, June 17, MacArthur reported that he and Fujiyama had had that afternoon inconclusive discussions on some aspects of the Administrative Agreement and the treaty. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/6–1759)
3. Ellipsis in the source text.
4. Document 56.
5. Document 63.