Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, May 22, 1959, 7 p.m.

2498. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt and POLAD. COMUS Japan Exclusive for General Burns. ReDeptel 1673.¹Fujiyama had long meeting with Kishi this morning re security treaty negotiations and then met with me this afternoon to give me Kishi and his reactions to our amendments of treaty redraft as follows:

1. Preamble. Fujiyama said language we proposed (Deptel 1673 Para 1–c) would be objectionable to Diet since it appeared to imply that Japan’s interest in its own security was no greater than that of US. If we cannot accept Japanese formulation beginning “Desiring. . .”,² Japanese prefer to drop this para from Preamble. I agreed to recommend deletion since this clause is unnecessary for us.

2. Insertion of “in the Pacific area” in para 6 of Preamble, Article IV, and Article VI. Fujiyama said GOJ could not accept inclusion this phrase. Kishi realizes that addition would not create any new obligation for Japan and indeed that it could be held to have no substantive importance. However it does not [garble], and Japanese Diet, press, and public would, when comparing new treaty with old treaty, immediately regard insertion this phrase as an indirect extension of Japanese treaty responsibilities. This would create major political problem for Kishi, would arouse new constitutional arguments, and would embroil Diet in acrimonious, futile and needless discussions. Furthermore, vagueness of term would permit Socialists and other Leftists to raise public clamor on basis that GOJ had indirectly agreed to security responsibilities as far away as the coasts of all of North, Central and South America.

3. Article III. I pressed Fujiyama strongly to accept “individually and collectively” along lines reftel but Fujiyama said Japanese could not agree to include this phrase. He insisted that in Japanese language this would have inescapable implication that treaty was intended to provide for Japanese membership in some regional collective security pact. He and Kishi had concluded that this phrase remained unacceptable. He recognized that “collective” is mentioned in Preamble in connection with inherent rights under UN Charter but use in context of Article III would be interpreted quite differently. He pointed out that word “collective” does not appear in corresponding Article II of US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. In view foregoing I said I would recommend that we accept alternative of “their capacities” (last sentence para 4 Deptel 1673) to which he agreed. (Since I pressed very hard for inclusion of “individual and collective” I would not tell him I was authorized to agree to deletion. Accordingly when next I meet with him, I will tell him we accept deletion of this phrase as authorized in Deptel 1673.)

4. Article IV. Japanese accept our proposed redraft except for addition of “and the Pacific area.” (See para 2 above.)

5. Article V. Japanese proposed and I accepted (ad referendum), as purely editorial change, “in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes” instead of “in accordance with its constitutional processes and constitutional provisions.” Also Japanese prefer “territories” rather than “territory” to replace “areas.”

6. Article VI. Since phrase that Japanese originally proposed, “desiring that the security of Japan be ensured”, has been dropped from Preamble because of our objection, Kishi strongly hopes we will now agree to reinstate introductory phrase “for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan” in Article VI as proposed by Japanese in Secnog 2.³

With respect to our proposed insertion “and about” at end of first para, Fujiyama said Japanese legal experts had come to conclusion it would imply granting of facilities and areas outside Japanese territorial limits, which would conflict with established Japanese policy in favor of three-mile limit. While it is true, Fujiyama said, that “in and about Japan” occurs in Article I of present security treaty, language did not refer to facilities and areas and could be construed to apply only within three-mile limit. As regards arrangements for target ranges, maneuver areas, and other facilities outside territorial limits, Fujiyama said there is no intention whatever to disturb existing facilities and arrangements. He said our desire for assurance in this respect is met by proposed language of Article II para 1 (b) of new Admin Agreement (Secnog 5)⁴ which now gives us adequate assurance. He emphasized it not possible for GOJ to appear to grant rights beyond their territorial waters.

Final language Article VI acceptable except that Japanese for clarity prefer to have final clause read “replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty Between Japan and the US of A, signed at Tokyo on Feb 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.” Fujiyama explained that they would prefer not to specify “governments” in this sentence because there may also be arrangements which in future could be concluded at technical or service levels, and they did not wish to appear to prejudice this possibility.

7. Fujiyama said most important remaining problem is Article VIII. He then made very strong pitch for US to accept Japanese proposal as per Secnog 2. I said it was impossible for US to accept Japanese proposal and explained to him again reasons why. He then asked if we could agree to include in Article III phrase “within their constitutional limitations” after “maintain and develop.” I told him that I felt this proposal would be unacceptable for the same reasons that original Japanese Article VIII was unacceptable since it carried in it implication that executive branch of Govt would interpret what were constitutional limitations.

I then said to Fujiyama that I felt he must seek elsewhere for solution to his problem. As I had informed him earlier (Embtel 2374)⁵ I would be willing to recommend Washington consideration for including phrase “in acceptance [accordance] with their constitutional provisions” in Article III. If this did not meet Japanese problem we could ask Washington consider feasibility of a new Article VIII based on language of Article XI of MDA agreement,⁶ along following lines: “This treaty will be implemented by each government in accordance with its respective constitutional provisions.” I did not know if Washington would agree to this but we could inquire. Yamada suggested that Japan might put in the treaty unilateral “understanding” similar to US understanding in SEATO Treaty which could contain substance of Japanese-proposed Article VIII. I strongly discouraged this and explained why circumstances were different. I said only remaining way for Japan to handle this matter that I could envisage would be for Fujiyama to make a general public unilateral statement when the treaty is signed or sent to Diet, indicating that nothing in the treaty should be construed as imposing on Japan any obligations in conflict with its constitutional provisions. Fujiyama said he would reflect further on this matter and discuss it with Kishi before meeting me again on May 26.⁷ (If Department has any views on this I must have them before May 26. Also, Deptel 1786⁸ just received. Would hope have Department’s reactions before May 26 when consultation formula will also be discussed with Fujiyama.)

8. All other points re treaty as set forth in Deptel 1637 were accepted by Fujiyama.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/5–2259. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 56.
2. Ellipsis in the source text.
3. Document 47.
4. Document 50.
5. Document 59.
6. Mutual Defense Agreement between the United States and Japan, signed at Tokyo March 8, 1954; entered into force May 1, 1954. For text, see 5 UST 661. The phrase “in accordance with the constitutional provisions of the respective countries” appears in Article IX.
7. No record of such a meeting has been found.
8. Telegram 1786 to Tokyo, May 22, dealt with the consultation formula. The Department commented on some words suggested by Yamada and informed MacArthur that several aspects of the formula were still under consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/5–1559)