Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

32. Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, October 13, 1958, 8 p.m.

792. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt and POLAD. COMUS/Japan exclusive for General Burns. Re Embtel 781.¹

1. Following are points in draft treaty on which FonOff officials at working level have informally sought clarification. They made clear that clarifications they sought had not been suggested by or discussed with high level members of GOJ but were points which would unquestionably be raised soon by senior Japanese officials and leading members GOJ and eventually LDP.

2. Points raised on (a) consultation formula, and (b) Acheson–Yoshida exchange of notes are in two immediately following telegrams.²

3. It is extremely important that just as soon as practicable I have Washington’s comments on these three messages, in as much detail as feasible. In addition to specific comment on points raised by Japanese, would appreciate additional points which you might consider helpful in getting Japanese working level support for our views.

• Point 1. Japanese said “objectives” of treaty (as term is used in Article six) were nowhere clearly set forth in treaty and that Article six language “in furtherance of the objectives of this treaty” could be subject to several interpretations, particularly when read in conjunction with Article five and the formula on use of US forces in Japan. They pointed out we appeared to have in mind three related interpretations in our draft treaty when taken together with the “formula” which everyone would read in relationship to the treaty: (a) defense of Japan area; (b) defense of US-administered territory in Pacific; (c) specific type of use by US in certain circumstances of facilities in Japan in relation to situations outside purview of Article five of treaty. (Comment: They did not express objection to this triple concept, but asked for clarification, and clearly implied that language of Article six carried apparent implication that treaty itself limited use of US facilities to achieve objectives of Article five (i.e., defense of US or Japanese administered territory in Pacific). If we had other aspects in mind, there would have to be full understanding and agreement about them. There might be aspects of this problem which could not usefully be formulated in official documents. In such event it would still be important to have agreement on how GOJ and US Govt would reply to questions in Diet and Congress.
• Point 2. FonOff officials referred to commitment in Article five to “act” in accordance with constitutional processes and asked what concrete measures Japan would be expected to take in event of attack on US-administered territory within treaty area, but outside of Japan area, short of sending its forces overseas. (Comment: We noted actions left to respective decisions of each party within limits of constitutional and legislative powers as they were then interpreted. Since under present interpretation of Japanese constitution, Japan cannot send its armed forces overseas to non-Japanese territories, this question is one which will be scrutinized most carefully by Japanese Diet and public.)
• Point 3. During discussion of Article five on treaty area, we took opportunity to point out that while an attack on Ryukyus or Bonins would bring Article five of treaty into effect, Japan would not have responsibility for planning or for contributing armed forces in Ryukyus or Bonins for their defense while these areas under US administrative control (Embtel 268).³ Thus, provisions for consultation on nuclear weapons in consultation formula did not in any way whatsoever apply to these areas. We pointed out this would be consistent with position already taken by Kishi in Diet.
• Point 4.

  FonOff officials asked whether we intended by Article six to make administrative agreement integral part of treaty, and thus either freeze it in its present form or require that its future amendment be subject to same ratification procedures as treaty itself. Their initial view was that present language appeared to do this and to be inconsistent with Article XXVIII of administrative agreement which permits amendment through executive action.

  (Comment: We noted only that, for our part, US considered that administrative agreement and any amendments thereto were responsibility of Executive branch only and that there was no intention to make amendment of administrative agreement subject to Senate ratification.)

• Point 5. FonOff officials asked whether taking technical steps to conform references to security treaty in administrative agreement to new treaty would also include deletion of references in administrative agreement to “rights” conferred on US. They did not indicate any desire to change main substance of administrative agreement but did indicate that retention of administrative agreement in all its present language, with exchange of notes only stating references to present security treaty applied to new treaty, would be politically difficult. They did not appear to be challenging basic substance of present agreement, but pointed out Article six of draft treaty had no specific references to US “right” to station forces in Japan, Whereas there are such references in administrative agreement and these would seem to be inconsistent with new treaty. (Comment: We reiterated that we had in mind only conforming administrative agreement to new mutual security treaty but not altering substance of present administrative agreement.)
• Point 6. FonOff officials asked whether word “bases” was used deliberately in Article six and in consultation formula, in place of present terminology in administrative agreement, i.e., “facilities and areas”. They said word “bases” had been deliberately avoided in present security treaty and administrative agreement when negotiated since it was considered to have very unfavorable connotations for Japanese public. They also asked what was intended by language “use of certain bases”, i.e., whether this was intended to give treaty sanction to facilities and areas now used by US forces and thus foreclose or make very difficult any adjustments in this base system, or whether it was intended to imply that US would retain bases after US forces were withdrawn. (Comment: We said that as we understood it, phraseology in Article six and in consultation formula was intended to affirm fact of presence of US forces and bases in Japan which at present seemed necessary to fulfill treaty obligations, without specifically mentioning our “right” to station such forces in Japan.)

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/10–1358. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. In telegram 781 from Tokyo, October 10, MacArthur reported that Fujiyama had requested “a minimum formal meeting” concerning negotiations on the new security treaty. The Ambassador also said that the Japanese Foreign Office had been studying the U.S. draft treaty carefully and had asked the Embassy informally and at working level for clarification of certain aspects. (Ibid., 794.5/10–1058) See Supplement.
2. Documents 33 and 34.
3. Telegram 268 from Tokyo, August 6, discussed a possible visit by Philippine President Garcia to Japan and his interest in securing Japanese economic aid. (Department of State, Central Files, 796.11/8–658)