280. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State0
110. Deptel 83.1 Statement that President Rhee’s personal control over ROK policies and operations is weakening, while true, needs explanation, for in literal sense it can be asserted that his control remains absolute.
It has long been practice of Mrs. Rhee, with collaboration presidential assistant Park Chan-il, to try to shield President Rhee from problems which may disturb him, at times taking decisions in his name when it is fairly certain that he will not become aware of them. Recently with Rhee’s physical and mental powers diminishing, and with uncontrolled outside sources of information less readily available to him (he reads fewer papers and sees fewer people), opportunity for such practice is greater, and I surmise that Park Chan-il is now playing increasingly powerful role, probably with tacit consent of Mrs. Rhee. This is not to say that final decision, particularly in significant or controversial matters, does not lie with Rhee himself, but with tendentious presentation of case, I believe Park Chan-il can generally obtain decisions he advocates, at least within frame-work of Rhee’s long-established policies and prejudices.
I surmise too that Cabinet Ministers are now frequently resorting to same tactics to obtain desired decisions. As I have reported, Rhee has encouraged his Ministers to assume more responsibility, and this they are doing, although generally only in matters which in most governments would be regarded as purely routine. To some extent, this has been forced upon them, since with exception of Ministers of Home Affairs, Finance, Defense and Justice and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, their contacts with Rhee are now confined largely to Cabinet meetings. (Another consequence is that Cabinet Ministers must often rely on Park Chan-il to obtain Rhee’s decision on written briefs submitted to him, thus enhancing Park’s influence in these fields.)
There are, however, checks and balances to this system of decision making. General Won Yon Duu is still used by Rhee as an informant though perhaps less extensively than formerly. Kwak, Chief of Kyung [Page 581] Mu Dae police and devoted to Rhee, exerts great personal influence on him in an informal way through private conversations, for which there are daily opportunities. Huh Chung, one of Rhee’s oldest friends, who always re-emerges after periodic eclipses, is reputed to be able to speak frankly and persuasively with Rhee when he is in favor. Finally, Yi Kipoong’s influence apparently remains second only to that of Rhee himself. Although Yi sees President Rhee far less frequently than formerly (allegedly because he fears too close observation by Rhee of his growing infirmities) Cabinet Ministers as well as Park Chan-il formally report fully to him, and he often uses Home and Justice Ministers as envoys to Rhee on domestic political matters.
In fact, it can be said that increasing number of decisions are being taken by Rhee’s subordinates, notably Park Chan-il, and that even in vital matters, where Rhee is always consulted, there is no doubt that his decisions are often taken without benefit of full information. It must be emphasized, however, that if for some reason Rhee makes a decision on his own initiative, or contrary to that desired or expected by his subordinates, such decisions would be carried out without question or at minimum regarding as binding until Rhee could be persuaded to accept some other course.
As for President Rhee himself, reports alleging his mental deterioration deserve, as Dept is aware, from ROKG officials in regular contact with him and from visitors who have known him previously. All agree that, as confirmed by doctor’s reports he is in remarkable physical condition for a man of 84 years, although noticeably feebler in voice and gait, but they see clear evidence of reduction in mental acuity. My own observation is that compared with three years ago, there has been marked deterioration both mentally and physically, though this deterioration may be painfully obvious one day and far less evident the next. To me, one of most significant indications is his preference now for exchange of pleasantries with visitors, and his inclination towards reminiscences, whereas formerly he was apt to utilize every occasion for substantive discussion or for expounding his views. My recent conversations confirm that he is increasingly forgetful, and that it is necessary to explain and re-explain ideas and suggestions before grasps meaning or significance, although if his interest or ire is sufficiently aroused his performance can still be impressive.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.11/8–159. Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.↩
- In telegram 83 to Seoul, July 31, the Embassy was requested to prepare an assessment of President Rhee’s physical and mental condition in light of reports that he was failing and that decisions in Korea were being made by a palace guard. (Ibid., 795B.11/7–3159) See Supplement.↩