Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

26. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

FUJ MC–1

Washington, September 11, 1958, 2–4:20 p.m.

SUBJECTS

1.

Proposed Mutual Security Treaty

2.

Ryukyus

3.

Bonins

4.

War Criminals

PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign Minister Fujiyama
• Ambassador Asakai
• Mr. Mori, Chief, American Bureau, Foreign Office
• Mr. Togo, Chief, Security Affairs, Foreign Office
• Mr. Shimanouchi, Counselor, Embassy of Japan
• Mr. Yasukawa, Counselor, Embassy of Japan
• Secretary Dulles
• Assistant Secretary Robertson
• Ambassador MacArthur
• C–Mr. Reinhardt
• FE–Deputy Assistant Secretary Parsons
• S/P–Mr. Morgan
• NA–Mr. Parsons
• NA–Mr. Martin
• S/S–Mr. Cassilly
• FE–Mr. Zurhellen
• Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague
• General Lemnitzer, Vice Chief of Staff, Army
• Captain Howe, Department of Defense

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that he welcomed these talks pursuant to our mutual desire to draw closer and find ways to be helpful to each other. He recalled vividly, he said, the prior visit of Mr. Fujiyama and also that of Prime Minister Kishi. He believed that the past talks between the Prime Minister and President Eisenhower had historic significance as the beginning of a new stage in our relations. It was natural and normal that these should develop into a new epoch.

Foreign Minister Fujiyama replied that he, too, was very glad of this opportunity to meet with the Secretary and engage in talks. As you know, he said, the Government of Prime Minister Kishi won a majority in the Japanese elections last May, and as a result had been established on a long-term stable basis for four years. United States-Japanese relations, Mr. Fujiyama said, were the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. It is appropriate from that aspect to take account of Mr. Kishi’s desire to proceed from the talks which he had had with the President and the Secretary last year and further develop ties of strength.

The Secretary asked how Mr. Fujiyama desired to proceed with the meeting. The second item on the agenda, security relations, was perhaps the most important, but he would be glad to follow any order Mr. Fujiyama suggested. The Foreign Minister agreed that the second item should be taken up, in view of time limitations, and remarked that the substance of the first item, the world situation, would no doubt come up in passing. The Secretary invited Mr. Fujiyama to begin his presentation.

As Mr. Dulles knew, the Foreign Minister began, a considerable time has gone by since the Security Treaty was concluded. Changes have taken place in the political, economic and defense situations in Japan, and a considerable maturity has also developed in the thinking of the Japanese people. It is against that background that he would like to begin his presentation.

While the Japanese Self Defense Forces, he went on, are not perfectly ideal because of financial limitations, still qualitatively and quantitatively they have developed to the point where they have a considerable effectiveness as armed forces. Moreover, Japan’s status in the international community has improved, thanks to United States cooperation and help, and Japan is a member of the United Nations. The people of Japan have a strong desire to project themselves as an independent and self-reliant country. The recent elections testify to the fact that 80 percent of the Japanese people want Japan, as an independent country, to collaborate fully with the United States.

In the light of these circumstances, Mr. Fujiyama went on, certain elements in the Security Treaty tend to provoke the thinking of the people. They feel that the time has come to consider revising the Security Treaty or conforming our security arrangements to the present situation. This is the strong desire of the Prime Minister. The public in Japan thinks that, in comparison with the United States treaties with the Philippines and with Taiwan, they lack independence and initiative under our treaty with Japan. So long as this thinking exists, it will be harmful to United States-Japanese relations.

The Foreign Minister continued that there were three approaches to changes in our security relations: a new treaty, a revision of the present treaty, and some side arrangement such as an exchange of notes. Technically there are various considerations in handling these approaches. As far as the spirit of the matter is concerned, Prime Minister Kishi believes, as he had said to Ambassador MacArthur, that it would be best to have a new treaty, which would go through a full democratic debate in the Diet and provide a permanent relationship between Japan and the United States. This reflected the basic Japanese attitude toward the Security Treaty, he concluded, and he then asked for the Secretary’s opinion and comment.

Mr. Dulles noted that the present Security Treaty had been negotiated with himself as negotiator. He takes some satisfaction in the fact that it has served well the purposes for which it was designed under the conditions then obtaining. As the father of the Treaty, however, he was not so devoted to it that he would be unwilling to consider changing it, assuming something better would take its place. Of course, he said, it had never been designed to be a permanent and perpetual formula for the regulation of our security arrangements. The Treaty itself stated that it was a “provisional” arrangement.

He thought, the Secretary said, that the United States was quite prepared to accept the view of the Foreign Minister that in the period, now nine years, since the Treaty was negotiated the situation had changed. It had changed along the lines forecast by the Treaty, the preamble of which indicated that Japan would increasingly assume the responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression. He did not want to say that the United States considers that what Japan has done has been adequate, but he recognized the limitations of budget which Japan, like others, faces. As the Prime Minister had said, financial considerations place a ceiling on Japan’s military strength.

But he wanted to add, the Secretary continued, that even if Japan had done the maximum which might have been expected, he did not believe that in world conditions today any single nation, including the United States, could feel secure without interdependence and unity with the other free nations. We had hoped at the time the Treaty was made, we have hoped since and we hope today that there may be some disarmament or limitation of arms, measures which would diminish the threat now so great. In order to be secure we must stand together, since this has not yet happened and is not in prospect.

The Foreign Minister had said that matter concerning the world situation would also come out during the conversation, the Secretary went on. He said that the most disturbing basic fact in the international situation is the stubborn unwillingness of the Soviet Union to do anything which might lead to a reduction in armaments or effectively eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union concentrates its propaganda on the single item of discontinuing nuclear tests, but this is not a measure which would affect the production or limitation of armaments. The United States, on the other hand, with its Western Allies, has sought the cessation of the use of fissionable materials for weapons and the siphoning off of weapons stocks to peaceful stocks to diminish the threat, but the Soviet Union rejects this.

Furthermore, he continued, the Soviet Union increasingly threatens the use of nuclear weapons and missiles. They boast, falsely, that those threats force other countries to bow to their will. That occurred during the Suez crisis, later on in Syria, and at the time of the threat in Lebanon. The latest letter from Khrushchev to President Eisenhower¹ contains a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons to destroy navies. He believed, the Secretary said, although it was a surmise, that in the present trouble in the Formosa area the Soviet Union told the Chinese Communists that the United States was frightened of Soviet nuclear and missile power and that we gave in in Syria and Lebanon (which is utterly false). The Chinese Communists now use the threat of force to see if we are frightened by the nuclear power which the Soviet Union says it will use to aid the Chinese Communists. In the face of that Soviet power and their apparent willingness to threaten its use to impose their will, there is no alternative for the free non-communist nations but to unite their strength. No one, without catastrophic consequences on the budget and on our free way of life, could maintain the deterrent power needed to be effective against this intimidating threat.

So I believe, the Secretary went on, that any nation which wants to remain master of its own destiny and not subject to intimidation needs security relations with others, so that a single pool of power to which each contributes can in total be pledged to protect all, and sufficient deterrent power can be maintained at a cost which is not prohibitive. And so, he said, the United States believes that we still need a dependable Security Treaty to govern relations between Japan and the United States, assuming that Japan wants to retain genuine independence and remain master of its own destiny.

In the light of these considerations, Mr. Dulles continued, he was happy that the Japanese Government wanted to continue mutual security relations with the United States, and that the question presented by the Foreign Minister was not whether, but how, these relations would evolve. He had mentioned three alternatives, a new treaty, a modification, or side arrangements, presumably under the present treaty. Mr. Fujiyama had indicated that the preference of his Government was for the first choice, a fresh, new treaty. The United States is quite prepared to accept [that] in principle, the Secretary said, with the possibility of reserving the other alternatives to fall back upon if serious difficulty is encountered in reaching a new treaty.

Mr. Fujiyama then said that he would like to go further into the subject of the relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, but since China was on the agenda for tomorrow, he would wait until then.

He was happy, he continued, to note the willingness of the United States Government to take up the problem of modifying or otherwise changing our security relations to put them on a stronger basis. Except for the communists and other members of the left wing, there are no Japanese who favor abolition of the Security Treaty in its present or any other form. The people favor continuance of the relations between the two countries. To place our security relations on a very desirable firmer basis, however, the present security arrangements must be made to conform better to the sentiment of the Japanese public, for it is from there that support must come. So the problem or proposition is how to build a structure of security arrangements which would appropriately reflect the national sentiment of Japan. There would be various ways to arrive at arrangements or a treaty satisfactory to both sides.

One point, the Foreign Minister continued, was that the obligation of the United States to defend Japan was not spelled out in the present treaty. In the light of the development of the Self Defense Forces, on the other hand, internal problems (regarding which the present treaty says the United States will assist) should naturally be the province of the Self Defense Forces. Another point is the public feeling that Japan should on its part cooperate with the United States in certain defense responsibilities within the limitations of the Constitution. Unfortunately, because of constitutional limitations, Japan’s contribution might not come up to the expectations of the United States, and the manner of the contribution might not be fully satisfactory, but the limitations should be recognized. So far as military operations are concerned, it would not be possible for Japan to send its forces outside of Japan for cooperation in United States defense operations. That function could be carried out only in the limits of the Japan area, of Japan.

The Secretary interrupted to note that two terms had been used, “Japan area” and “Japan”. He asked for clarification of that point. Mr. Shimanouchi replied that the constitutional limitations applied to the territorial limits of Japan. The Secretary wondered whether “Japan area” meant the “area in and about Japan”, or the technical geographic limits of Japan. Mr. Fujiyama answered that he had meant “within the territorial limits of Japan”. He would add, in clarification, however, that Japan claimed 3-mile territorial waters as the territorial limits. Submarines, ships and airplanes, however, could be used beyond those limits for convoy duty.

Therefore, said the Foreign Minister, naturally in the event of armed aggression Japan would provide the necessary base and operations facilities in Japan. In the event of armed or aggressive action against the United States or United States forces outside Japan, the present arrangement would of course continue for logistic and other facilities for United States forces. Naturally Japan was fully ready to cooperate, but desired consultation on such matters. To clarify, he said, when Japan was used as an operational base, it was desired that the Japanese Government be consulted, but when it was used for logistics or supplies the present basis was satisfactory. But in the latter case also, he added, he would like to have spelled out in the treaty that the Japanese Government would be consulted on questions of the deployment, armament, weapons and equipment used by the United States forces. What gives the impression that the present treaty is unilateral, he said, is that these specific things are not spelled out in the treaty.

As you well know, Mr. Fujiyama went on, there is a great sensitivity in Japan regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, not limited to the communists but shared by other segments of the population. The bringing in of nuclear weapons is a point of considerable debate and concern in Japan. If the matters of deployment and equipment (including all types of weapons) were included in the treaty as matters for consultation, this would quell any misapprehension of the Japanese people.

Another point, continued the Foreign Minister, undesirable at present from the point of view of Japan, is that no date of termination is specified in the Security Treaty. Some segments of the population feel that this puts Japan in a position subservient to the United States.

Thus, Mr. Secretary, said Mr. Fujiyama, I have summarized the points uppermost in the minds of the Japanese people. Agreement is needed which will be squarely supported by the people. The question is “How?” By a new treaty, or by another form? These are technical points for study. The Prime Minister’s thinking, as I have indicated, is that, if it is technically feasible, the best approach would be a new treaty which would be submitted to the Diet for full debate. Diet approval of such a treaty would strengthen ties with the United States. Once the Diet had approved the treaty, this would end all, or substantially all, of the debate in Japan and remove various causes for dissatisfaction, since the situation would have been clarified.

The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for his presentation and for the indication of the way in which the mind of his government worked on this subject. I doubt, he said, that it would be wise to attempt now to comment in detail on Mr. Fujiyama’s observations. He would have to give the matter more thought and study, and would consult with his military advisers. The Foreign Minister should also bear in mind that we were accountable to our Congress in the same way that he was to the Diet. A new treaty or a revision of the present treaty would require the consent of the Senate for ratification.

The only comment he would permit himself, the Secretary continued, was that some of those concerned understood that questions regarding consultation could be expressed more usefully under the treaty rather than as part of the treaty, as was the case with our other allies such as the United Kingdom. Of course, the basic problem we would have to weigh is what the Foreign Minister refers to as the constitutional limitations in Japan. As the result of a treaty of the kind which Mr. Fujiyama envisaged, it might perhaps be considered one-sided, in the sense that the United States would be committed to the defense of Japan, but Japan would not be committed to the defense of the United States. He referred, the Secretary said, regarding commitment for the defense of the United States, to the fact that the armed forces of Japan would not be available for use outside the Japan area. We do recognize, on the other hand, the substantial value of the suggestion made by the Foreign Minister that Japanese logistic support and facilities would be made available to the United States even though Japanese armed forces could not be used with the same geographic freedom as the United States forces.

He would like to suggest to Mr. Fujiyama, the Secretary went on, a practical way to progress. We would take steps which the Secretary would outline:

1. The executive branch of the Government would study with care the preliminary observations which the Foreign Minister had made. The Department of State would consult with the Department of Defense.

2. We would consult, on a highly confidential basis, a small number–4 or 5–of the members of the United States Senate concerned with this problem, to see if they think the Senate would in principle go along with a new treaty or revision, which for practical reasons amount to the same thing, since both would have to go to the Senate.

3. If these preliminary explorations in the executive branch and the Senate indicate a good hope that we can proceed along this new line, we would ask our representatives, presumably under Ambassador MacArthur’s leadership, to commence actual discussions with reference to a new treaty, in the hope that something could be arrived at by the first of the year when the Senate reassembles. We would do our best to conclude the preliminary work by October 1, so that if the explorations indicated it was desirable to proceed we could proceed on or after October 1.

I would like to say, the Secretary continued, that it would be desirable to have no publicity at this stage. It might be premature and give expectations prematurely before it was ascertained whether it was possible to realize them. Our Senators are particularly sensitive about reading in the papers of these matters before they hear from us that they are being studied.

I would like to say, Mr. Minister, continued the Secretary, in this connection, that the position I have indicated does bear testimony to the great confidence we place in the Japanese Government and leaders and in Prime Minister Kishi, and to the confidence and faith in the desire of the Japanese nation as a whole to maintain its independent existence and its free and equal relationship with the other free nations of the world, particularly the United States. We have a treaty now which gives us broad continuing rights, but it is not in the nature of the kind of nation that we are to rest only upon legal treaty rights. We believe that more important than that is to rest upon good will and the sense of common destiny which links our two nations together. From a purely legalistic, juridical standpoint, what the Foreign Minister proposes would involve considerable sacrifice on the part of the United States. We have a treaty duly ratified by the Japanese Government, and approved by the Diet, containing broad rights as long as we think it necessary to have them. We are asked to give these up in favor of a treaty which would impose upon us much heavier obligations without any corresponding advantages, so far as they lie in the treaty language. We are prepared to consider that, assuming that the Senate is also willing, because we consider this the enlightened way in which nations which respect each other act toward each other. Frankly, our expectation and willingness in this respect are based on our understanding and appreciation that this will lead to increased spiritual ties with the Japanese nation, which are more important than strictly material ties. That is all, the Secretary concluded, that he cared to say on this subject at this time.

Mr. Fujiyama answered that he fully concurred in the Secretary’s sentiments. Certainly, the Japanese realize that strengthening ties to share a common destiny is an important element in our relationship. As the Secretary said, the United States’ sacrifice involved might mean that what was now unilateral from the Japanese point of view might become unilateral from the American point of view. But the strengthening of spiritual ties and relations and the knowing of the Secretary’s thoughts would impose a greater responsibility on Prime Minister Kishi and the Japanese Government.

Since time was short, Mr. Fujiyama said, he would now go on to other items. First, Okinawa. He wanted to express the appreciation of himself and his Government to the Secretary for the efforts of the United States to settle the land problem which has now been satisfactorily concluded. This has already been reflected in actions in Okinawa and was a very wise decision. Of course, the Foreign Minister hoped Mr. Dulles would understand that the problems and welfare of the 800,000 people in Okinawa were close to the minds and hearts of the 90 million people of Japan. He did not intend to bring up the subject of restoration of administrative rights in Okinawa. Because the hopes and aspirations of the people of Okinawa are shared by the people of Japan, however, it may be necessary for Japan to take up some of these problems. At least Japan cannot ignore them. That would be impossible. So, from time to time, the Japanese Government may bring up certain matters with the hope and purpose of maintaining stability and tranquility. Even before the war, Okinawa, as part of the administrative territory of Japan, was a financial drag on Japan. Therefore, the Japanese were naturally cognizant of the economic aspects of the Okinawa problem. It would sometimes be necessary for Japan to extend economic aid to maintain the stability and livelihood of the people in Okinawa. Only thus could we prevent unrest and the rise of extremists and other undesirable elements. From that point of view he would like to strengthen the economic relations between Okinawa and Japan. Mr. Fujiyama expected that certain things would arise in the future, and when and if they did, he would take them up with Ambassador MacArthur. He hoped the Secretary would understand that sentiment required Japan to play a role in Okinawa. That was all he wished to say about Okinawa, but he wanted to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of his Government to Assistant Secretary Robertson, General Lemnitzer and Ambassador MacArthur.

Secretary Dulles said that he would make one or two comments. The United States had no desire to erect artificial barriers to good relations between the people of Japan and the inhabitants of the Ryukyus. He was sure that Mr. Fujiyama would recognize that, for the sake of good order, economic matters and the like would have to be coordinated with the administrative authorities of the Ryukyus. We could not afford to have a competitive or conflicting situation. Because of the need for coordination with the administrative authorities, he hoped the Foreign Minister would take these questions up with Ambassador MacArthur on an informal and unpublicized basis, so that the public would not be aroused about matters which still had to be coordinated with the administrative authorities.

The Foreign Minister then referred to the Bonin Islands. As the Secretary would recall, during the discussion on the Bonin Islands last year it had been stated that repatriation could not be carried out. This had been explained thoroughly by the Japanese Government to the League of Bonin Islanders. They accept the fact that circumstances at present prevent their return. Without abandoning their hope for future repatriation, however, they would like to be compensated for the losses suffered by reason of their evacuation. They had proposed a certain sum of money as compensation. The Foreign Minister would like to have Ambassador Asakai discuss this problem with the Department of State.

The Secretary replied that the United States appreciates the acceptance of the position against repatriation, which the United States Government took reluctantly but for compelling reasons. We also appreciate the spirit in which the Japanese Government explained this matter to the Islanders and their understanding. Regarding the matter of compensation, that thought had been expressed in the prior talks. We are prepared to discuss this with the Japanese Government. The Secretary had heard figures mentioned, however, which seemed to him somewhat beyond the value of anything he thought had existed in the Bonins. But he was prepared to talk about these matters.

The Foreign Minister said that the situation on the United States side had been thoroughly explained by Ambassador MacArthur. The difference in legislation between the two countries was understood. The question, however, was one of the mental anguish of the Bonin Islanders, who hope that some settlement can be made. Mr. Fujiyama hoped that the Secretary understood that the League was well meaning. It was constantly making anti-communist efforts. Any compensation granted would be appreciated by them and by the people of Japan in a manner which would increase good will toward the United States.

After a brief discussion the Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that negotiations on this subject would be conducted both in Tokyo and in Washington on a parallel basis.²

Lastly, said the Foreign Minister, he would like to discuss the question of war criminals. The fact that all B and C Class war criminals had been paroled was very much appreciated by the Japanese Government. If the United States formula were followed, however, two years would elapse before their parole could be terminated. It was the desire of the Japanese Government to have parole terminated for these 80 or so men at about the same time.

The Secretary replied that we have examined this matter and that we can waive the balance of the two-year parole requirement by the beginning of next year, and this would liquidate the entire matter.³ He recommended that the details be discussed in Tokyo.

The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary, and stated that before the meeting broke up he would like to ask whether agreement could be reached before the negotiation of a new Security Treaty regarding the question of consultation on the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This might be discussed in the Security Committee in Tokyo, with an indication that the Japanese Government would be consulted. Mr. Fujiyama said that this was a “hot potato” in Japan.

The Secretary noted that this was a new thought and that he would have to give it consideration before replying. The Foreign Minister said that he did not expect a reply here, but asked that the Secretary consider taking the matter up in the Security Committee.

The Secretary answered that he could not forecast our attitude. He would have to take this up with our military advisers.

(The Secretary then excused himself to leave for a meeting with the President.⁴ Assistant Secretary Robertson assumed the chair on the U.S. side.)

Mr. Robertson said that he understood the Foreign Minister had suggested a press release at the end of each meeting rather than a final communiqué. He had a draft which he gave Mr. Fujiyama for consideration. Mr. Robertson recommended that in speaking to newspaper reporters we should not go beyond or embroider on the press release, and the Foreign Minister agreed.

With some changes, the text of the press release⁵ was agreed upon and sent to the Department’s Press Division for immediate release.

The meeting thereupon adjourned at 4:20 p.m.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1130. Secret. No drafter is indicated on the source text. The meeting was held at the Department of State. The following day Fujiyama met with Dillon at 10 a.m. to discuss economic affairs and with Dulles at 3 p.m. for a discussion of GARIOA, U.S. relations with China, and Japanese relations with Korea. (Memoranda of conversation, September 12; ibid.) See Supplement for both.
1. An unofficial translation of Premier Khrushchev’s letter to the President, September 7, and the President’s reply, September 12, are printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 29, 1958, pp. 498–503.
2. Japan had accepted the U.S. decision that for the time being former Bonin islanders could not return to their native soil but continued to press for compensation totalling $12.5 million. The United States was willing to compensate for the use of private land holdings as valued at the time when the peace treaty went into effect (April 28, 1952), plus 5 percent per annum interest, approximately $5 million. Eventually the two governments agreed on $6 million. (Position paper, “Compensation for Former Residents of Bonin Islands,” prepared for the visit of Prime Minister Kishi, January 13, 1960, VKW D–1/2; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1588) See Supplement. Documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central Files, 294.94C22 and 794C.0221.
3. After examining recommendations of the Japanese Government for reduction of sentence to time served in the case of the remaining 83 Class B and Class C war criminals, the United States agreed to waive the 2-year parole requirement, effective December 29, 1958. (Memorandum from Parsons to Acting Secretary, December 24; ibid., 694.0026/12–2458) See Supplement.
4. Dulles’ September 11 memorandum of this meeting reported that “I mentioned that the State and Defense Departments have agreed on renegotiation of the Japanese Security Treaty and said I thought this would do much to strengthen our relations with Japan and put them on a more durable and permanent basis.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)
5. See Department of State Bulletin, October 6, 1958, pp. 532–533.