126. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0
1982. CINCPAC exclusive for Adm Felt and POLAD. COMUS/Japan exclusive for Gen Burns.
Embtels 1607, 16231 and Deptel 1328.2 Indirect aggression. Following receipt of Deptel 1328 I explained to Fujiyama at length why we would not wish to tie proposed agreed minute on indirect aggression to language of Article V. I gave him language reftel making point that if Japanese wished, minute could refer to Article IV or VI of new treaty. I said however that we could not accept language referring to Article V, and if this were indispensable in Japanese view, we would perhaps do better not to make any public reference to matter, since even without minute we would be prepared on request of GOJ to assist Japan to meet indirect aggression by such measures as both governments deemed appropriate.
I asked Fujiyama to consult with Kishi and let me know latter’s views.
[Page 253]Fujiyama has just told me that he and Kishi have had long series discussion this problem. Kishi is faced with dilemma. On one hand Kaya and certain other LDP leaders who fear possibility of Communist insurrection strongly want an agreed minute for its deterrent effect on Communists. On other hand unless such agreed minute is tied to Article V it might be construed in Diet discussions as simply re-introducing Article I of present treaty re internal riots and disturbances. Kishi has publicly announced such provisions would not be included in new treaty and his announcement has been well received by press and public.
Fujiyama said with foregoing in mind they had carefully considered our new draft and had unbalance concluded that advantages favor some specific statement re indirect aggression. They had concluded they could meet their requirements without reference to Article V, but they would like a somewhat shorter version than we had proposed. They had not completely decided however whether form of such statement should be as agreed minute, or as paragraph in possible joint official communiqué to be issued after Kishi’s meeting with the President. In either event, they would wish know whether substance of their proposed statement re indirect aggression as set forth below is agreeable with us. Fujiyama emphasized however that they still had not determined form:
Begin verbatim text.
“Japanese plenipotentiary:
“The security of a country could be jeopardized by indirect aggression as well as by an overt attack. If the two governments considered that such indirect aggression had occurred against Japan, the Japanese Govt understands that the United States would be prepared, upon the request of the Japanese Government, to assist Japan to meet this indirect aggression by taking such measures as might be deemed appropriate by both governments.
“United States plenipotentiary:
“Under the circumstances you have set forth, the United States would be prepared upon the request of the Japanese Government to assist Japan to meet this indirect aggression by taking such measures as may be deemed appropriate by both governments.”
End verbatim text
Comment: I told Fujiyama that I would forward their revised draft to Department making clear that question of form was not yet determined. I felt that substance met basic requirements from both US and Japanese points of view and that I would urgently request Washington’s views as to form of statement.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–2259. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.↩
- Document 106 and footnote 2 thereto.↩
- Document 112.↩