Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, December 14, 1959, 7 p.m.

1865. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt and POLAD. COMUS/Japan exclusive for General Burns. Embtels 124¹, 11777,² and 1864;³Deptel 1217, para 1.⁴ Consultation formula.

In my talk with Yamada last evening (Embtel 1864) he said in strictest confidence that in view of my strong opposition to any formula on “consultation” which contained the word “agreement” Japanese are having extremely difficult time to come up with language for an agreed minute. He said this problem is at the very heart of the revision of the treaty for if public impression in Japan is created that we would without Japanese consent introduce nuclear weapons into Japan or use our forces and bases here to initiate combat operations in hostilities in which we but not Japan are engaged there will be immediate defections in LDP, collapse of Kishi government and treaty will be defeated in Diet on this issue with all the consequences to Japanese-American relations that would obviously stem therefrom.

With this in mind some elements within GOJ are now thinking that this is a problem which Kishi should discuss with the President. (There have been a number of suggestions to this effect in press.) Their view is that Kishi would then be in a position publicly to take line that he had discussed the consultation matter with the President and latter had assured him that US Govt had no intention of acting with respect to matters covered in the consultation formula against the will of the Japanese Govt. I gathered Yamada believes the President’s prestige is so great that this would enable Kishi to keep Miki and other leaders of LDP in line and at the same time such a procedure would not involve an agreed minute or use of word “agreement” which he understood from me would create serious difficulties for us in some of our security arrangements with other countries. I told Yamada I would pass foregoing on to Dept making clear it was not yet a formal proposal, but had been told me informally and personally in strictest confidence.

There is no question whatsoever that consultation formula, as Yamada says, is at very heart of treaty revision problem for Kishi. Furthermore, there is no way to prevent Kishi from discussing it with the President if he wishes to do so. However, if Kishi puts above proposal formally to us, it seems to me that if we can develop some appropriate language for Kishi to use after his meeting with the President, we might have acceptable solution to this very difficult problem. If we are able to respond affirmatively it would seem preferable to proceed to reach agreement on some appropriate language with the Japanese before Kishi departs for Washington. The alternative which to me seems less desirable would be to wait until Kishi sees the President and then try to work out agreed language.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–1459. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 101.
2. Telegram 1777 from Tokyo, December 6, discussed Article XI of the Administrative Agreement and reported that Kishi had taken personal charge of the remaining unagreed items in the Administrative Agreement as well as other matters related to the treaty. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/12–659)
3. Document 117.
4. Document 104.