Although the enclosed letter is quite long, I really hope you will be
able to read it and discuss it with him prior to your departure for the
NATO meeting.2 I firmly believe, for reasons set forth
in the enclosure, that following the formation of a new Japanese
government (probably in June) we must be in a position to take the
initiative in letting Kishi know
that we are prepared to discuss treaty revision. I am convinced that
such action holds the greatest hope for us to establish an identity of
fundamental national interests with Japan in the vital field of security
and thus to secure Japan’s long term alignment with us. I am equally
convinced that if we simply try indefinitely to temporize or stall on
the issue of
[Page 23]
treaty revision,
such action can only lead to a serious deterioration in our relations
with Japan and will also encourage those elements in Japan which seek to
shift Japan’s orientation away from the United States. As things now
stand, the conservative party in Japan still has support for its policy
of alignment with the United States despite the basic and growing desire
of all Japanese for a revision of the Security Treaty. Our willingness
to effect treaty revision will strengthen the position of those who
believe in Japan’s long-term security alignment with the United States
and will deny to neutralist and leftist elements a powerful argument for
a disengagement policy on the part of Japan.
I think it is tremendously important for us to have the initiative in
this matter. I feel that if we have the initiative, our prospect of
obtaining what we can reasonably expect in a mutual security arrangement
is good; whereas if we lose the initiative and the pressure builds up,
we may, over a period of the next several years, lose what we have
now.
After you have read the enclosure, I would be very grateful for your
reaction. It was wonderful seeing and talking with you on the plane from
Manila to Taipei, and I only wish there were some prospect of your
coming out to Japan some time before next year.
Enclosure3
Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (MacArthur) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)
Dear Walter: Thank you
very much for your letter of March 264 bringing me up-to-date on your and the Secretary’s
tentative thinking with respect to revision of the Security Treaty
with Japan.
In your letter you ask for my views on the Secretary’s comments
before possible discussion with the President and Defense. At the
out-set,
[Page 24]
let me say that I
agree completely with the Secretary that the essential objective of
treaty revision is to develop and expand our close relations with
Japan so as to create a balance of power as against the Soviet Union
and Communist China. A balance of power involves, of course, not
only military aspects but also very important economic and
industrial, political, and psychological aspects. The military and
other material resources available to balance the Sino-Soviet bloc
will obviously not necessarily be increased by a new treaty. Only
the steady and continued growth of Japan’s economic and military
capabilities, coupled with a desire in her own interest to do more
in the field of defense, will accomplish such an increase in the
military resources available to balance the threat from the
mainland. On the other hand, our basic policy objective with respect
to Japan, as I understand it, is the same as our objective with
respect to Germany, namely, the firm alignment of Japan (with its
vigor and industrial capacity) with the United States and the free
world. A truly mutual security treaty which aligns Japan with the
United States will, in my judgment, have a real impact on the
balance of power, since I believe it will over a period of time
result in greater Japanese defense efforts. But also in Asia it will
have an important political and psychological sense by wiping out
latent doubts over where Japan’s basic loyalties lie, which in turn
will affect the attitude and alignment of other free Asian
countries.
What are the specific objectives of treaty revision? Certain specific
“long-term security objectives” are mentioned in the paper attached
to the memo you sent the Secretary.5 While such objectives
would be useful for us to have, they will have to be sought, as the
Secretary commented, in evolution rather than in terms of what is
written into the text of a revised security treaty. The draft treaty
which I suggested had in mind the long-term security objectives of
American policy, and particularly the long-term alignment of Japan
within the framework of a reasonably durable, dependable, and
realistic arrangement. But at the same time it took into account the
political and psychological realities which we now face in Japan.
While Japan is now in practice aligned with the United States, it is
not yet a dependable alignment because of the
feeling of many Japanese that the alignment was forced on them
by us in a one-sided manner for our own purposes rather than for
mutual benefit. Therefore, a fundamental objective of
treaty revision would be to define this alignment in a form which
will not have attached to it the stigmas and disadvantages now
associated in Japan with the present Security Treaty in order to
give the alignment durability and dependability.
[Page 25]
It can be argued that at present Japan is essentially uncommitted to
the West because it has reservations regarding certain aspects of
some of our policies. It is true that Japanese policy does not on
all issues, including some of great importance, coincide with our
own; but, neither does British policy on Communist China; nor does
Norwegian and Danish policy on the stationing of non-national NATO forces on their territory; etc.
Such differences do not destroy our basic ties with these countries,
and similar differences with Japan need not vitiate its basic
alignment with the United States. If treaty revision requires
unreserved acceptance and approval of all aspects of all major U.S.
policies, then I am confident that Japan will not pay this price,
any more than would Britain, France, or other of our allies. However, if we are seeking a basic alignment with
Japan which establishes an identity of fundamental national
interests in the vital field of security, and a framework for
adjusting differences in security matters, early treaty revision
is not only feasible and meaningful but absolutely
essential.
The need to consolidate our present alignment with
Japan in a treaty agreement is an urgent one.
There are unquestionably elements in Japan which suggest a
disengagement from close ties with the United State and toward
neutrality or non-involvement as to security commitments. The
motivations of such elements are to some extent based on the
neutralism and pacifism which is the stated objective of the
Socialist Party (and of course the Communist Party) and which strike
a responsive chord in the emotional reflexes of much of Japanese
opinion, which still feels that “militarism” brought a great
disaster to Japan. As the memories of the war, defeat, and
occupation recede, however, the acceptability of the Japanese
defense effort is gaining momentum and the underlying trends in this
general field are favorable to our own interests.
However, quite aside from the stated policies of the Socialists,
neutralists, and Communists toward disengagement from close
relations with the United States, there is a universal desire among
the Japanese to liberate themselves from those terms of the security
relationship with the United States which they consider as being
“genuinely unequal”. This is not an “alleged” inequality, to quote
the phrase in FE’s memorandum to the
Secretary.6 There is, as we all recognize,
actual inequality. This has nothing to do with the size of the
respective military forces of the two countries. A U.S. military
view is that the Japanese can have “equal” treaty status when they
have “equal” military forces. This can never happen because of the
disparity in the strength and resources of Japan and the United
States.
[Page 26]
There is another aspect of the problem which I would like to touch
upon. It is logical that we should want to use military facilities
in Japan to “contribute to the maintenance of international peace
and security in the Far East”. Our bases in Japan must in practice
be linked with our base structure elsewhere in Asia. This Japan
recognizes, but it is unwilling to grant us in
advance the unilateral right to use them as we please in
hostilities in which we may be engaged but in which Japan is not.
The Japanese are no different in this respect from our other allies.
They cannot and will not accept, any more than the United States or
any other country would accept, a treaty arrangement which
manifestly deprives them in advance of any say as to how their
territory is to be used by another power (i.e., the United States)
in hostilities which in the first instance do not involve Japan
directly but which Japan might be dragged into against her will by
the action of foreign forces operating from her soil. We have no
such rights in NATO, as
demonstrated again by the circumstances of the recent agreement with
the UK7 on missile
bases. The Japanese have noticed that the Secretary said in his
press conference of April 1 that “the pattern for any such
agreements has been set by our arrangement with the United Kingdom,
where it is expressly stipulated that there cannot be any use of
those bases except with the consent and participation of the
government of the United Kingdom, and the same would presumably
apply to Italy.”8
Japan, as does every sovereign power, seeks to exercise control over
the use of our bases here, particularly during an emergency, not
necessarily because it desires to restrict such use rigidly, but
because it wishes to assure that any U.S. actions from these bases
involving major consequences for Japan will be taken in consultation
and agreement with the Japanese Government and for objectives which
the Japanese see as being in their national
interest as well as in ours.
Actually, what is much more important than the so-called “right”
(which will not be granted us) unilaterally to use bases in Japan
for any purposes we see fit, is Japan’s continued alignment with the
United States and the continued use of Japan as a logistical base to
support our forces in the Far East. I think we all agree that the
danger of war breaking out in the Far East is not the danger of
planned, overt Communist aggression. The danger is that if there is
not adequate deterrent military strength deployed in this area, the
Communists might be tempted to use force (just as they did in
Korea). Therefore, the continued presence in the
[Page 27]
Far East of the minimum necessary
deterrent military strength is vital to the preservation of peace,
and Japan is of major importance to the proper deployment and
logistical support of our deterrent forces. For example, Admiral
Stump told me that if we did not have the two large fleet facilities
at Yokosuka and Sasebo and the other naval facility in the
Philippines, it would take two-and-a-half times as many ships and
men to maintain the 7th Fleet at its present strength in Far Eastern
waters. This would involve a terrific additional defense
appropriation.
Our considered judgment in the Embassy is that our best chance of
aligning Japan with the United States for the longer term, and of
being able to continue to use Japan for logistical support and
deployment purposes, is to revise the Treaty now. On the other side
of the coin, we are convinced that the longer we put off making the
necessary adjustments, the more the pressures will build up and the
latent forces of neutralism and non-involvement will gain ground. In
this connection, I would like to remind you that just a year ago
great pressures were building up for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
When we agreed to withdraw all of our forces if necessary, the steam
went completely out of the withdrawal movement. We are convinced
that anew mutual security treaty will substantially reduce pressures
in Japan for a policy of non-involvement and will certainly have far
greater acceptance and support in Japan than the present Security
Treaty.
Negotiation of a new treaty thus involves a “calculated risk”, but as
the Secretary has so often pointed out, all decisions where gains
are sought generally involve an element of calculated risk. It is
our considered judgment that what I have said above comes as close
as we can to the Secretary’s condition that before making a treaty
there should be confidence that the very fact of making the change
will bring about the basic attitude which we wish to see. A prime
example of what we believe may gradually be accomplished following
treaty revision is on nuclears. We believe there is a definite
possibility that one day Japan will allow us to have nuclear
components in Japan (perhaps on somewhat similar terms to what we
have with the UK) and will themselves
have at least defensive missiles with a nuclear capability. [3-1/2 lines of source text not
declassified].
On a broader plane, a willingness on our part to revise the Treaty
should wipe out resentment of the “one-sided” Security Treaty and
greatly improve the climate of public opinion on security and
defense matters which now inhibits Japan’s leaders from moving ahead
as rapidly as some would like in strengthening Japan’s defense
forces and broadening Japan’s security commitments. The
Japanese-American Committee on Security has helped for the time
being to reduce some suspicions of the “one-sided” nature of
US-Japanese security relations. But, the Committee was at best only
a temporizing expedient to keep
[Page 28]
pressures for treaty revisions under control
until such time as we were in a position to discuss privately with
the Japanese Government a new arrangement. And, recently the
Security Committee has come under progressively heavier criticism
not only from the Socialists but also from the press, and even
conservative elements, for not studying treaty revision.
Finally, the draft treaty would represent the first commitment by
Japan to a mutual security arrangement. The proposed treaty area
comprises, in our view, what the Japanese can realistically be
expected to commit themselves to at present in view of (1) their
limited military capabilities, (2) the need to concentrate for the
present on building up forces to be deployed in the defense of the
Japan area (this, incidentally, is to our immediate benefit since we
have forces tied down here which we could perhaps better use
elsewhere), and, most important (3) the Japanese interpretation of
Article 9 of the Constitution and the barriers in Japan and
elsewhere in Asia to use of Japanese troops abroad. I think the
treaty area which we envisage must be defined to Kishi at the outset if we are to go
on to constructive discussion of other issues. When Japan is able
and willing to play a larger military role in Asia, there will be
ample opportunity to broaden the treaty commitments. In fact, given
Japan’s past history, I would suspect that the initiative for this
may well come eventually from Japan. A mutual security pact with the
proposed treaty area is still a substantial advance for Japan. Our
treaties with the Republic of China and Korea9 are, incidentally, no more extensive.
Let me say again, I frankly think that we have little choice but to
move ahead after the elections and start
quiet talks with Kishi on a
draft treaty along the lines I have proposed. To delay these
discussions and treaty revision can only lead to a serious
exacerbation of our relations with Japan and encourage the forces in
Japan who seek a shift in Japan’s orientation away from the United
States. Friendly elements are now in power here and their policy of
alignment with the United States still has support. Our willingness
to effect treaty revision will strengthen the position of those who
believe in Japan’s alignment with the United States. Early treaty
revision is, therefore, very much in our own enlightened
self-interest.
Summary
To summarize, in answer to the question raised by the Secretary, it
is my judgment that a change in the Security Treaty at this time
will in itself help to intensify Japan’s cooperation with the United
States over
[Page 29]
the subsequent
years. I would earnestly hope, therefore, that the necessary steps
could be taken in Washington now so that
after the elections and the formation of the new Japanese
Government, probably early in June, I would be authorized to
initiate talks with Kishi on
treaty revision.
On the above basis, I believe we have a good prospect for negotiating
a new treaty that will be mutually satisfactory and will contribute
to the strengthening of Japan’s alignment with us.
Sincerely,
